HANNA SCHECK (ED.)

Changing Identities in South Eastern Europe

Between Europeanisation, Globalisation, Regionalisation, and Nationalism
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Preface

In cooperation with the Centre for Social Innovation in Vienna, the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office Ljubljana announced in 2010 its seventh call for proposals for projects in research cooperation and networking between institutions in Austria, Slovenia, and the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/1999, Montenegro, and Serbia). The call focused on intensifying short-term cooperation in the scientific field of “Changing Identities in South Eastern Europe: Between Europeanisation, Globalisation, Regionalisation, and Nationalism,” with the aim of supporting the development of long-term scientific collaboration and to gain scientific insight in changing identities in South Eastern Europe.

Funding was provided by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research within the framework of its South Eastern European Science Cooperation Initiative. Six projects have been funded from this call, and the outcomes were presented at a conference which took place in May 2011 in Vienna. This publication presents some outcomes of the funded projects and it also includes other papers reflecting the subject. It addresses current changing processes, analyses, as well as historical developments in South Eastern Europe by having a closer look at various selected aspects which describe the complex nature of territorial identification in the areas of conflict between Europeanisation, globalisation, regionalisation, and nationalism.

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Introduction: On a tentative pathway toward universalized social justice and global citizenship

I.

Being invited to write an introduction to this volume on changing identities in South Eastern Europe, it is important to pay attention to the particular historical framing within which it is being played out: the European economic and financial crisis; the regime-collapse in the Middle East; and the emergence of new global assemblages. All these developments challenge the project of European integration in both specific — and contradictory — ways. It exposes the familiar tension between capitalism and democracy, but, under the radically new circumstances of the “Non-death of Neo-Liberalism” (Colin Crouch); it points out the increasingly supra-national interdependency, and the trans-national character of the social question. It also emphasizes the simultaneity of democratic lassitude in many Western welfare states, and the vitality of democratic ideals worldwide manifesting in various forms of civil disobedience and socio-political resistance, within, and also increasingly across national borders. All these phenomena become significant for individual and collective life: From the collective perspective, the current crisis increases the risk of insufficient, and inefficient, institutions that may lead to ungovernability, i.e. political instability and consequently to institutional re-arrangement. From an individual’s perspective, the situation may lead to frustration, with an increasing distrust in democratic institutions, an increase of support for radical populism, or even so far as to abandon democracy.

In his most recent publication, “Zur Verfassung Europas” (2011), Jürgen Habermas reformulates his argument that democratic Europe not only has to go radically beyond the existing concentration of power within the inter-governmental commission of the national heads of government, but, it rather needs a broad and radical controversy on the advantages of a post-national democracy. Democratic Europe does not necessarily follow the model of a European federal state, Habermas argues; but is based on and nourished by the vitality of its (increasingly trans-national) public sphere and political culture. The critical juncture of current democratic Europe results from well-known contradictory tendencies. Whereas inside of Europe, national interests remain strong and thus hamper the development of new inclusive and supra-national institutions, at the same time, the post- and trans-national revitalization of democracy is defined — and restricted — by the contemporary structural, political and cultural transformation of world society. Even if democratic values and human rights serve as important references in political conflicts, particularly within the context of today’s social revolutions, the global socio-political landscape is even more strongly characterized by authoritarian tendencies observed not only in the context of ‘socialist’ capitalism (China) but also in the frame of the reconfiguration of the state’s role in Western (welfare) states (from welfare to penal policy). Reactionary democracy is a highly problematic but not unrealistic consequence of the on-going post-democratic turn in European society. Additionally, it is reinforced by post-socialist autocracy becoming dominant in countries such as Hungary or Romania.

II.

From the standpoint of the post-Yugoslavian experience, the papers of this volume deal with the contradictory dynamics of the European democratization and integration project, with regard to the sustainability
of democratic culture, and to its future potential in both the Balkan states and the European Union. One distinguishing common thread discussed is the existence and liveliness of ethnocentrism and nationalism, and questions of collective identity, in all post-Yugoslavian succession states. However, this experience is interpreted in different ways, e.g., as the expression of a defensive self-placing vis-à-vis the on-going Europeanization and globalization processes; or in the tradition of the Central-South-East-European cultural understanding of nationhood; or as a long-term effect of the Yugoslavian system. Anyhow, by reading the papers, it becomes evident that the development in the Western Balkan states cannot be analyzed by ignoring their structural placement, nor their active involvement within the historical process. They are an immanent part of European (and global) history, and embedded within its multi-ethnic and multicultural multiplicity, they are exposed to its socio-economic cleavages, and to the dominant pattern of power and dependency as well. The title of the volume, “Changing Identities,” refers to a continuous process of adaptation, re-definition and re-invention. If people today define their identities, they do it “in manifold and often conflicting ways, and this includes their national identities which are being renegotiated against the backdrop of local transformations, regional remappings and national reordering of society into a transnational communicative space and global culture” (Horvat and Mandec, page 22 in this volume). The challenge, not only for the Western Balkan states, but for the whole of Europe — is how to bring the different experiences and perspectives “into a creative ‘laboratory of citizenship’ and belonging” (ibid.).

In the context of the current economic and financial crises it has been often argued that one important effect will be the ‘politization’ of Europe. This view is also taken in other articles within this volume. Tamara Ehs sums up her reflections on the role of Austria in the EU accession of South Eastern European countries with the statement “European identity is not a pre-condition, it is not a basis for legitimising the EU, built on myths and nostalgia, but it is its democratic product. A European identity cannot be constructed out of tales and anecdotes and then endure for ever more. It can only arise and be re-negotiated in ever new acts of democratic law-giving and in public debate” (pages 42–43 in this volume). Thus, the changing of identities in South Eastern European countries means that it is not only a challenge, but potentially, it is a gain for the European integration project. At the same time, the changing identities may also become a source of irritation and conflict, as for example, in regard to the reciprocal stereotypes between South Eastern Europe and the EU (see the contribution of Wöhlt, Hodzic, Pudar and Sekloča), or relating to the “low levels of generalised trust,” “pronounced intolerance” and a “high degree of conventionalism among Croatian youth” which the authors (Tomić-Koludrović, Petrić and Zdravković) interpret as “an indicator of susceptibility to authoritarianism” (pages 86–87 in this volume), or concerning the search for a new historical profile in the sense of a “usable past” in Serbia (see Petrović in this volume).

If we ask for a (re-)definition of ‘European identity,’ the key question is: Which content is this identity referring to? Regarding this, the volume contains some important suggestions, concerning the situation of immigrants and ethnic minorities, many of them suffering under difficult living conditions (social exclusion, poverty) and a systematic lack not only of life chances and social recognition, but also of access to essential rights. This especially affects the Roma population who can be characterized as the most vulnerable minority group as they are confronted with multiple exclusions that severely limit both their individual and group-related quality of life and well-being (see Sobočan and Videmšek in this volume). Following Krajl, in Slovenia, the lamentable situation of ethnic minorities and immigrants, many of them coming from former Yugoslav republics, relates to fact that “the discrimination they face is often deeply rooted within the institutional structure” (page 106 in this volume). Beside societally anchored xenophobia, it is the absence of a legal status defining minority rights, and of anti-discrimination laws, that mark the precarious situation of minorities. Here, European identity relates to the participatory equality and the protection of minority rights.
We can find some additional suggestions concerning the content of European identity. They are formulated within the frame of contemporary art without putting culture as the core topic of identity, but as the social question. The function of art is assumed in its capacity to “launch possibilities for social improvements,” as a source of “resistance against cultural homogenization and uniformism” (Tratnik, page 152 in this volume), as a means for the glocalization of popular culture (Kalapoš, page 162 in this volume) and the social construction of self-defined, locally anchored, but hybrid and multicultural identities (Behr and Pichler, page 181 in this volume). Here, European identity refers to the social recognition of diversity, and the equality of milieu based identity claims.

III.

The concept of identity implies languages and practices of ‘we-ness’ and ‘otherness,’ a drawing of demarcation lines, often connected with social practices of exclusion and hierarchization. The discourse on European identity is familiar with multiple cleavages and divisions, amongst East and West, Christianity and Muslim heritages, EU members and non-members, post-socialist and non-post-socialist countries, etc. In a recent article, Biebuyck and Rumford recommend a plural conception of “many Europes”\(^2\). To their mind we should envision Europe as a “fractal cultural configuration” (Arjun Appadurai) formed out of various polythetic cultures which are (at best) weakly patterned and structured. A Europe that is characterized by disjunction, fragmentation and uncertainty rather than ‘older images of order, stability, and systematicness’ remains a possibility” (Biebuyck, Rumford 2012: 16).

The papers in this volume formulate not only a plaidoyer for a pluralistic concept of European identity (“European identities”), they also point to the necessity to construct Europe as a democratic project based on the principles of socio-cultural multiplicity, participatory equality and social justice. The South Eastern European societies are described as strongly marked by the tension between the meaning of transformation as a process of re-establishing national identity, and the European integration as a process of overcoming the methodological nationalism in politics, institution building, and identity building. If we believe in the future of Europe, then Europe should be more than the sum of individual national discourses, and it should not only represent a new supra-nation state. From a sociological point of view, Europe is not a community (even if it calls itself in that way) but a post-national democratic society. Even more, Europe constitutes a continuous process of self-politization, of institutional adaptation and institution building, especially in the fields of rights: beyond Kant’s utopia of perpetual peace, but on tentative pathways toward universalized social justice and de-nationalized citizenship.

Some conceptual problems in tracking the influence of Europeanisation in South Eastern Europe: the case of the ex-Yugoslav Balkan region

Keywords: Europeanisation, Western Balkans, European identity, nationalism, cosmopolitanism

This paper presents the results of the ASO project “The Challenges of Europeanisation: Mediating between National and European Identities in South Eastern Europe” (SEUM). The aim of the project has been to analyse the role of the processes of EU integration and Europeanisation in the reformulation of national identities in post-socialist South Eastern Europe. Current analysis has shown that in order to assess the impact of Europeanisation in the region, local social and political histories of collective identity building processes need to be taken into account. This should then provide a basis for a dialogic interplay in the formulation of key EU values with an understanding of their multiple and situated meanings. In this paper, the authors demonstrate the need for this dialogic relation through an examination of three analytical terrains: globalisation, cultural diversity and cosmopolitanism, and their semantic and political articulations in the Western Balkan region.

Introduction

In this paper, we investigate conceptual ambiguities of the research on the impact of Europeanisation reformulating collective identities in South Eastern Europe. The interest of social sciences and humanities on the changing geographies of Europe — economic, territorial, political, symbolic,... — as they, have unfolded in front of us during the last decade has produced rich literature on processes of Europeanisation. (Amin 2003; Balibar 2004; Delanty, Rumford 2005; Hermann et al. 2004) This solicits the question whether we now have a better understanding of institutional and daily formations and discourses of identity across different parts of Europe The last two enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007; the expansion of the Schengen regime to eight former socialist states and the initiation of the negotiation processes to bring the rest of the former Yugoslav states (i.e. apart from Slovenia which has become EU member state in 2004) into the ‘family of the EU nations’ has certainly triggered more pronounced interest for developments in South Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. A most pressing concern in this regard is the allegedly ‘delayed modernity’ in the region with respect to political democracy, human rights and diversity policies. In addition, the ex-Yugoslav Balkan region, which has been deeply affected by daily and the living memories of ethnic violence spilled out from the 1990s wars, is the cause of most concern. “For much of the 1990s,” Shaw writes, “the dissolution of Yugoslavia represented one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges for the EU and its Member States — a challenge which, in the view of many, both the EU and its leading member states failed rather comprehensively.” (Shaw 2010: 14) Even now, the author goes on, “while officially all of the states are at least potentially EU Member States, it is hard to discern precisely whether this region is in the arena of EU enlargement policy or foreign policy.” (Ibid.) It seems that the “EU conditionality,” and the “complex set of pressures and motivations” which govern the agreement between the EU and the accessing state (ibid.: 21), in the Western Balkans needs an additional and delicate tuning to the political and historical contexts of the region.
On the other side of the EU enlargement policy coin, there has been a silent assumption that by accepting the terms and conditions of becoming an EU member state, the ex-Yugoslav Balkan countries will be given a chance to close the recent chapter in the long durée of their violent histories, re-accommodate their backward looking ethno-nationalism by the demands of modern global society, and embark on the yacht of progress that, if consensually put in care of the winds from the West, they will be guaranteed an on-going journey.

To reduce the discomfort of the outlined simplification of the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans which can be found in the literature and which regard processes of Europeanisation in the region, it should be noted that the sentiment of “the long journey home” (Petrović 2009) has been widely embraced and disseminated by the political elites of the region as well. “Western-led and -funded institutions functioned as important channels for the creation and reproduction of a pro-Western elite in postsocialist Europe.” (Jansen 2008: 86) The pro-Western loyalty has been also home-grown. Slovenia is a most handy case to observe the rise of the ‘EU emotion’ which in critical writing has been defined as bridging collective neurosis, or EUrosis (Velikonja 2005), producing a domino-effect of “nested Orientalisms” towards the Balkans (Žižek 1993) and the fantasy of ‘civilisational mission’ that the Slovene nation has to perform in the region. The fantasy element of the local, and national engagement in the transnational politics of the EU integration and Europeanisation throws light on the complex and complicit architecture by which the most current structures of knowledge-power in the EU are being defined. It also unveils, albeit unwittingly, the desire to ‘harmonise’ the EU into the image of Europe which continues to be fashioned in Westernocentric terms. This is most evident in the revival of the idea of Central Europe as a cradle of European identity, raised in the traditions of Christianity and humanism. Notwithstanding how this selective remembering obscures the legacies of Mitteleuropa as a cosmopolitan and multicultural pool of identification (Vidmar Horvat, Delanty 2008), the historical reclaiming of the Central European identity as ‘Western’ at its heart, serves the ideological function of (re-) producing mythologies of Europe by which Europe’s ‘others’ can also be excluded from mytho-historic and real communities of belonging in the new post-socialist states.

Whereby the desire to bring the reality (of the EU) to a projection (‘Europe’) may be a legitimate one, it is questionable whether it can succeed in the effort. In the analysis which follows, we provide arguments for debate concerning this effort. In particular, we point to theoretical limitations in the plan to harmonise national politics of identity with the transnational politics of the EU based on the pre-assumed notions of a ‘shared understanding.’ Instead, we argue that, first, the process of harmonisation can be successfully governed only if, and when local histories of identity have a channel into the conceptual map of Europeanisation of identity; and second, when these histories, and the memories of them are taken into consideration as vital to democratisation and pluralisation of the Europeanisation agenda.

**Background**

The current analysis is based on the ASO project entitled “The Challenges of Europeanisation: Mediating between National and European Identities in South Eastern Europe” (SEUM). The project has been coordinated by University of Vienna (Tamara Ehs) and includes four partners: University of Ljubljana (scientific coordination, Ksenija Vidmar Horvat), University of Zadar, Croatia, University of Belgrade, Serbia, and Euro-Balkan Institute, Skopje, FYR Macedonia. To create the context for our argument, in this chapter we briefly present the project’s scientific and research outline.

Our research started with the following observation: One of the prime objectives of the EU enlargement processes has been to create a mutually beneficial synergy between national and European identities. In the post-cold-war Europe, the overlapping and re-enforcing power of the national and the European identities has been proposed as a means of enhancing a shared sense of European belonging that can
create both an imagined and real democratic space of daily co-existence among diverse ethnic and cultural communities both nationally and transnationally. However, several incidents, which have occurred in the past few years at either the local national or supra-national European level indicate that processes of Europeanisation may widen the gap between the EU commitment to cherish cultural diversity and the reality of daily co-existence within diverse communities of Europe. As Delanty and Rumford observe, instead of taking on the opportunity to create an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” the project of European unification has triggered new waves of racism, xenophobia and discrimination against ethnic and migrant minority groups within individual member states (Delanty, Rumford 2005: 102). Moreover, unification has also been seen as a contributing factor to the re-birth of a reactionary nationalism.

Furthermore, we have postulated that “In SEE, the processes of Europeanisation in this regard may present an even greater challenge. Given the specific historical, cultural and political developments in the region since the collapse of Yugoslavia, one can expect an even stronger accumulation of negative sentiments against Europeanisation, linked to the (perceived or real) threat to newly renegotiated national identities. To ensure smooth and effective compliance of SEE with core EU values and policies, it is a prerequisite to account for these recent developments. This provides a foundation for creating a knowledge base about and an understanding of popular perceptions of the EU and the collective uncertainties regarding the processes of integration; it also renders the critical tools necessary to implement common cultural standards of intercultural cooperation and multicultural co-existence in the region.”

As regards the ex-Yugoslav Balkan region, the problem therefore is threefold:
1. renewed ethno-nationalism following the breakup of Yugoslavia;
2. reluctance, based on past memories and traumas, to assimilate the ethno-national identities into a larger entity (such as the EU);
3. growing uncertainty triggered by processes of globalisation (migration, economic uncertainty, crime waves, loss of stability and solidarity).

Scholars of EU integration have explained the reactionary movements towards Europeanisation in terms of re-actions to processes of integration and to the uncertainties produced by the accompanying economic, political and social changes. Negative sentiments and the spread of anti-European ethics, directed away from multicultural and transnational cooperation and exchange within individual nation-states, have also been interpreted as closely linked to the (perceived or real) crisis of national identity set in motion by manifold processes of integration. This led us to two preliminary conclusions:

First, the scope of simultaneous changes affecting institutional and everyday life in the region calls for a more nuanced approach to building European identity, one which we will be able to mediate between the shared, trans-European challenges of Europeanisation and the distinct features these challenges produce in SEE countries.

And second, the rise of collective anxiety and resentment to Europeanisation in both the West and the East, and in member and non-member states alike, demonstrates that national resistance to unification should not be dismissed as the failure of (not yet) generating a sense of commitment to core European values, and, hence, a successful transnational subscription to democratic and multicultural notions of European identity. Rather, they point to the conceptual failures to engineer the European identity based on simplistic mapping together and a cross-over of the national and the supranational sense of belonging. In particular, it is not only important to acknowledge that in different national contexts, the project of Europeanisation is being ‘domesticated’ differently and moreover, that processes of nationalisation of Europeanisation are, by and large, affected by collective experiences of past political formations.

Our working thesis has been formulated as follows:

- In order to reduce the tensions between national and supranational communities in SEE, the process of Europeanisation should be embraced as pivotal in providing a fresh push and a shared ground allowing the national identities to be re-negotiated and re-claimed in democratic, open and dialogic mode.
- However, a meaningful incorporation of the national collectives of
SEE into the supranational European ‘collective of values’ can be accomplished only if conceived in terms of a dialectic interplay, rather than an enforced, top-down project of mediation between national and European identities.

In summary, in order to construct a manageable plan of the EU governance of the transnational society, a major question is “how do we take into account the specific histories of the nation states as a decisive contributing factor in accepting EU values such as cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and shared European identity. Only by developing channels of understanding it is possible to create conditions which foster social cohesion and strengthen European solidarity across the region and beyond.”

To contribute to this understanding, SEUM project has followed three main research questions:

• First, how and which processes of European integration have triggered nationalist reactions which undermine the Europeanisation project in SEE?
• Second, by considering different and contingent political, social, cultural and economic histories of the selected countries, could it account for why these processes of constructing supranational identity have led to such reactions?
• And third, how does this relate to the national myths and specific nation building processes of each country and how can the potential tensions be modified into solutions?

We have argued that “To break new ground of European belonging and identification in SEE, it is crucial to account for historical trajectories and ethno-cultural contexts of individual countries within which integration is taking place. The retreat to nationalism and its individual expressions cannot be studied separately from long historical and cultural articulations of national identities.” Therefore, the research project SEUM has focused on the examination of the interrelatedness between processes of integration and nationalist reactions to Europeanisation in the region. It asks how by comparing similarities and differences in nationalist reactions to integration can there be an explanation for distinct individual cultural and political histories of the formation of national identity among the selected countries and how, by interrogating different national ways of claiming and formulating supranational European identity fueled by past historical and cultural legacies, can a comparative socio-cultural analysis help outline cultural policies to further processes of integration.

Current research

Following the SEUM research agenda, we have investigated three conceptual areas in which the ‘challenges of Europeanisation in SEE’ are articulated: globalisation, cultural diversity and cosmopolitanism (Vidmar Horvat 2010a, 2010b; Mandelc 2010). We illuminate each of the three areas with the discussion on the democratic development in post-Yugoslav region of the Western Balkans.

Globalisation

Globalisation today has become a part and parcel of academic and daily language (Featherstone 2006). Featherstone describes the process:

By the early 1990s the term globalisation was very much on the increase, and it had migrated into mainstream academic usage. In the past decade it has rapidly become part of everyday vocabulary not only of academics and business people, but it has been circulated widely by the media in various parts of the world. It is in this decade that we find assertions that we now live in ‘globality,’ a new ‘global age.’ There has also been the beginning of political movements against globalisation and proposals for ‘de-globalisation’ and ‘alternative globalisations’; projects to redefine the global. In effect, the terminology has globalised and globalisation is variously lauded, reviled and debated around the world (Featherstone 2006: 387).

However, despite the pervasiveness of the use of the term, the signifi-
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Vidmar Horvat, Mandelc

The significance of the impact which globalisation leaves on daily and institutional life remains vague. This is so because in addition to the cries for ‘de-globalisation,’ ‘anti-globalisation’ and ‘alternative globalisations,’ the processes of re-nationalisation and re-localisation have been observed. In many sociological accounts, these last two processes can be directly linked to and seen as a consequence of globalisation. In this regard, the debate has evolved from earlier discussions of globalisation as either a force of ‘Westernisation’ or ‘glocalisation’ to embrace this novel development which brings back into consideration political and cultural movements that, as either emancipator or imperial currents, had their prime domicile in 19th century Europe.

Globalisation, it can be safely argued, has triggered processes of re-nationalisation and localisation. In addition, two other processes can be observed as they come into the hegemonic field to struggle for the definition and the outcome of the emergent global society, namely, the cultural diversity-multiculturalism paradigm and cosmopolitanism. The heterogeneity of directions into which globalisation pulls local social life attests to post-modern development, that is the development which is both after and beyond modernity. The return to the modern nationalist agenda is no longer possible as it is not possible to create European nation that would follow the paths of the 19th century nation-states formations. This is particularly an important observation because in social theory, Europeanisation has been considered as integral part and a consequence of globalisation (Delanty, Rumford 2005). This means that, if we paraphrase Featherstone in relation to the concern of our analysis, processes of European integration should be formulated within epistemological frameworks which account for the ontological shifts (Featherstone 2006: 389). Today, people define their identities in manifold and often conflicting ways, and this includes their national identities which are being renegotiated against the backdrop of local transformations, regional remappings and national reordering of society into a transnational communicative space and global culture.

Despite the common threads which unite current processes of renegotiation of the national within the global, in the context of the debate on Europeanisation in SEE, it should be taken into account how the negotiation unfolds within particular socio-cultural context of re-claiming ethno-national history. They can be demonstrated with the re-nationalisation of Slovene society after the break-up of Yugoslavia.

When we approach the events of Slovenia’s independence from Yugoslavia and the new, ethno-national foundations of the new state, we clearly observe the ‘us versus them’ perspective, and the ethnic principle behind the claims of the rights to self-determination. The new state was seeking to re-nationalise its Slovene population. Using Charles Tilly (1996) may help to demonstrate these processes. Tilly categorises nationalism into two objectives, “state-led” and “state seeking.” We speak of state-led nationalism when state authority demands that citizens subordinate all other interests to those of the state. In state-seeking nationalism, intellectuals and political leaders sought to create a new state which could pursue the interests of distinct populations with a specific cultural identity; nationalism creating states. It is possible to think that the independence of Slovenia was a reflection of both state-led and state seeking nationalism. The state leaders worked to create a state in which all Slovene citizens were most likely to embrace symbols of Slovene culture and ideas and not attempt to salvage some of the Yugoslav legacy. By demanding this, they hoped to gain the support of the Slovene ethnic majority, and at the same time, gain legitimacy in separating the country from Yugoslavia. In doing so, they re-created the nationalist ideology of a homogenous population with a specific ethno-national, cultural and linguistic identity.

Following John Breuilly’s arguments, nationalism can provide identity in a time of rapid change (quoted in Özkirimli 2000: 49). It was precisely a period of rapid change that Slovenia was experiencing as it strove to erase its Yugoslav past and become a member of the European Union. Walker Connor observed that nationalist ideologies and political leaders often plumbed the emotional attachment of people to mobilise them into collective action (quoted in Conversi 2003: 9). If the idea for a new state has had a clear set of beliefs that it wants to become neutral and uniform then it can quickly and forcefully introduce these beliefs.
into everyday life. The problem arises when these decisions are made unilaterally and part of the population is left out.

For decades, the Slovene nationalist bloc has longed to return to its place in central Europe. Reconciling with ‘Mitteleuropa’ also meant growing distant from the Balkans. The general atmosphere was rather that of an annoyance of the influx of workers from the other Yugoslav republics (Komac et al. 2005), coming to Slovenia in waves from the early fifties onward. The immigrants from other Yugoslav states were soon characterised as people of poor culture with different values. In some ways, they were seen as instruments of the ‘Yugoslavisation’ of Slovenia. This legacy of Yugoslavisation was perceived to be exactly what needed to be removed from society if it was going to successfully make the transition into a modern European nation-state. It appears as though the elites were so willing to make this a speedy process involving only those who were ethnic Slovenes that in the process they alienated all those who, although ethnically belonging to non-Slovene groups, in the past decades nonetheless had become part of the Slovene culture as well. The administrative figures were used to convince the public that by openly supporting those who were considered to be autochthonous, traditional minorities (namely the Italian and Hungarian minorities), that the democratic standards of transition were observed. The idea was that by protecting the most powerful groups of minorities it would block any possible ethnic conflicts while the country would serve the international standards of the human rights record and could focus on democracy and the economy instead.

Based on this development, it could be argued that democratisation went hand in hand with the narrow nationalist interests. Economic interests played an important ideological role in the mobilisation of public sentiment; for many decades, the view that it was the other republics that had been impeding the progress of the country had been implanted in public discourse and collective self-perception. In this light, discrimination against people from the other Yugoslav republics was pivotal in setting the public climate after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Stefano Lusa explains how the ‘brothers from the South,’ as they were called deroga-

tively, represented an “ephemeral threat.” While in reality, they were poorly-trained workers who did the work that ethnic Slovenes declined to, they still were subject to direct discrimination (Lusa 2009).

Seyla Benhabib in her book exploring universal human rights and the idea of self-determination writes: “The right to have rights can only be realised in a political community in which we are not judged through the characteristics which define us at birth, but through our actions and opinions, by what we do and say and think.” (Benhabib 2004: 59) Daniele Conversi adds that, “any process of nation-building insensitive to ethnic nuances and local subjectivities implies a parallel process of nation-destroying among minority groups.” (Conversi 2003: 3) These statements can be used to describe the process of nation building that Slovenes experienced when they made the decision to separate from Yugoslavia. They were in a process of state building as well as rebuilding their nation. In doing so, one can observe the process of re-nationalising, when in the course of only few years, the national elites promoted Slovenian culture that was prevalent prior to World War I while blatantly omitting those aspects of the culture which could be considered also Yugoslav. Therefore, the move towards the era of post- and trans-national cooperation within Europe and globally was determinedly marked by former cultures of nationalist exclusionism and xenophobic transitional search for European identity vis à vis the Balkan.

Cultural diversity

In The Challenge of Transcultural Diversity, Robins (2006) throws a fresh light on conceptualisation of the European identity re-imagined through notions of difference and diversity. As Benett also puts it, diversity should not be perceived as a social problem but rather as a “potentially productive social resource, which should be positively nurtured by governments and cultural agencies.” (Bennett, quoted in Robins: 15) According to the authors, the recasting of diversity within the cultural map of EU policies may contribute to a cosmopolitan European cultural order (Robins: 19). However, in SEE this new cosmopolitan order may
Vidmar Horvat, Mandelc

Some conceptual problems in tracking the influence of Europeanisation in SEE

be coincidental with and contested by different experiences of modernisation (shifting belonging from empire/s to nation state to empire / EU).

This relates to the understanding of cultural diversity. In Central and (South) Eastern Europe national societies emerged under circumstances very different from Western Europe: they share the imperial (Venetian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian) legacies, late modernisation, socialism. After being set free from the imposed or consensually embraced non-ethnic identities (such as Yugoslavs, Soviet), they also have exhibited a passionate turning of “their own memories of suffering into a license for symbolic or real violence against their own minorities.” (Forrester, Zaborowska, Gapova 2004) As Kymlicka also observes, Arguments about historic injustice work against minority rights claims. In the West, homeland minorities typically would have been stronger than they now are where it is not for historic injustices perpetrated by the larger state … In post-communist countries, however, historic injustice is often seen as having expanded the scope and prestige of the minority’s language and culture at the expense of the majority. … In short, whereas arguments about rectifying historic injustice in the West operate to strengthen the minority’s claim for a more equal distribution of rights and resources between majority and minority, in post-communist countries they can be invoked to weaken the minority’s claims, and indeed to question the very legitimacy of the minority’s existence (Kymlicka 2007: 189–190).

However, the privileging of ‘cultural nationalism’ based on ethnicity and (due to) the assumed absence of the civic tradition in the region provides only one side of the story which is prone to generalisation; without allowing counter-narratives to contest the image of cultural homogeneity, it (re-)produces nationalist reading which it aims to confront and problematise. For instance, when discussing the joining of the ex-Yugoslav counties to the EU, often doubts are being cast as if these societies are ready for such a supranational integration. To this doubt, it can be answered with Igor Štiks: ‘been there, done that:’

Indeed, the former citizens of Yugoslavia often point to the institutional similarities between the current EU and the facto confederal Yugoslavia between 1974 and 1991. These include a rotating presidency, the politics of parity, agreement and consensus, funds for underdeveloped states and regions, a weak central government filled with commissaries equally distributed among members, economic and ethno-national disputes and rivalries, to name just a few (Štiks 2010: 2).

In addition, the famous visa-free ‘red passport’ carried a symbolic currency by which borders, mobility and “unity in diversity,” i.e. “brotherhood and unity” (Jansen 2008) were articulated and practised at the level that we have not yet witnessed as realised in the EU. This means that diversity cannot not be theorised as a pre-given: only by examining similarities and differences in understanding diversity, an effective cultural policy toward regional and European integration can be developed. Therefore, although the notion of transcultural diversity can be seen as a potent conceptual tool of negotiating the post-national European citizenship and cultural as well as political space, it should be carefully placed within the examinations of diverse histories running through distinct national environments both within different regions and the EU as a whole.

Cosmopolitanism

The SEE countries have histories and cultural legacies that convey both structural similarities as well as differences of experiences which can be clustered around several axes of belonging and identity formation, such as regional, imperial/colonial, and multiethnic/cosmopolitan. Being all part of the empires which covered the historical map of the region — the Venetian, the Ottoman, the Habsburg, and, conditionally called so, the ‘Yugoslav empire’ (Baskar 2004) — they have the experience of living in a supra-state formation in which alternative, cosmopolitan and/or hybrid collective identities were favoured to the national ones. With the collapse of the empires, processes of national homogenisation were initiated to stabilise borders and histories which before were contested
and permeable. Claiming the right to territory and belonging has often been borne on hostile exclusions and expulsions of minority groups sharing the land with the dominant ethnic populations and led recurrently to conflicts in the region, in some cases with a violent outcome. However, one should not downplay the role of the memory of the lived, daily cosmopolitanism in the region (Jansen 2008, Spasić 2009). As Jansen (2008) discusses the issue, the “remembered cosmopolitanism” in post-Yugoslav region presents an important ground on which current (nationalist) politics of identity and nationalism is being contested. This actually lived cosmopolitanism departs from Western academic discussions on cosmopolitanism in many significant ways. If explored in its various articulations, the ‘cosmopolitan’ anti-nationalism of post-Yugoslavia may provide an interesting case to theorise cosmopolitanism as a popular, daily practice of many, not only of the elites. This may also illuminate the potentials to turn remembered cosmopolitanism of the region into reformulation of identity and belonging at a transnational and trans-European level. The revival of nostalgia for the past empires and their cosmopolitan alternative to nationalist politics at least in part can be taken as a vital ground to investigate the power of multiple, national and supranational belonging which could be incorporated in cultural politics of identity and citizenship not only in the region, but in the EU as a whole.

Conclusion

It has been stated many times now that in the current contexts of the social, political and cultural transformation of European societies, the more the terms like European identity, European memory, Europeanisation and European integration are invoked, the less one is certain of what they mean. The stability of the meaning of what have become the key notions of the European project is increasingly being threatened — not merely by the time component which eventually unveils the temporariness and thus constructedness of all grand concepts and narratives, but because this time, the words indeed mean different things to different groups of Europeans. European identity, to take one example, for decades (the Copenhagen Declaration being the most visible benchmark of its post-World-War-II constitution) implied a Westernised construct, cultured by the historical legacies of Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Today, after we have lived through the ‘tragedy of Central Europe,’ the wars in the Balkans included, the politically crafted image of the noble European, civilised through arts and humanities, merits no philosophical legitimacy, nor historical trust: the emperor has proved to be naked. In addition, the enlargement of the EU and the integration of countries of Central and Eastern Europe has (yet again) split the European subject into two halves: each of the two brings to the European project its own history and memory while the clashing interpretations of the ideological outcome of the ‘reunification’ of the East with the West (sic!) has produced out of this territorial and political marriage a new terrain of divides and divisions which replicate the Cold War mentalities across what previously were (supposed to be) neatly divided hemispheres of the continent. The exclamation that Europe is not one but that Europes are many — which at the time of the ‘discovery’ of the truth seemed revolutionary — today sounds both profane and mundane at the same time. The real challenge no longer is how to present this ‘truth’ to the European elites (who continue to manufacture programmes of harmonisation of difference to bring closure to the quest for the borders of [European] identity); the true labour ahead, scholarly and politically speaking, is how to bring the contested views of Europe together into a creative “laboratory of citizenship” (Štiks 2010) and belonging in which the coexistence of differences will be the ending, not the starting point of departure.

To put it bluntly, the task on which the success of the European project is borne, no longer demands the creation of a mutually beneficial synergy between national and European identities. Europe is turning into a postnational phase in which national identities and loyalties can find a new space for democratic re-iterations of difference and rearticulation of civic freedoms of its inhabitants.
In this paper, we argued that integration can be turned into an instrument of democratisation and pluralisation of European society. In order to make this instrument effective, it is necessary to ask how different cultural histories and political legacies of the member nation-states can foster a process of conceptualising the democratic belonging in an open and fluid context of national and transnational communication and connection which will be the basis for the formation of a post-Western order. However, to enhance processes of harmonisation and cooperation among different agents of the EU project, engaged in either institutional and/or daily life practices, the key terms of the processes of Europeanisation need to be critically re-theorised. The concepts of citizenship, loyalty, (cultural) identity; but also cosmopolitanism, Balkanisation, patriotism are not universal in their meaning: they are socially, culturally and experientially produced, re-produced and re-memorised through the unfolding of the historical, collective and biographical times. The challenge of Europeanisation which the project, as it is presented in the limited scope of this paper, thus entails is to reconsider the concepts by which the European project — as an ideology and a programme — has been run up to the present.

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Myths of a mission: Austria and the EU accession of SEE countries

Keywords: democracy, Europeanisation, Habsburg Empire, identity politics, nationalism, nostalgia

Each country carries out its domestic adaptation to the European Union with national colours, carrying a backpack of (imagined) collective traditions and experiences. Therefore, the project SEUM — funded by ASO/ZSI and managed by me at the Department of Political Science as well as at the Department of Legal and Constitutional History, University of Vienna — examined the interrelatedness between the processes of integration and the national(ist) reactions to Europeanisation. Here, I present the Austrian national context paper of our comparative study by exploring how Europeanisation relates to national myths and nation building processes. I will point out Austria’s Habsburg-style ‘European mission’ that has been reactivated since the 2004/2007-EU-accessions of countries formerly having been part of the Habsburg Empire. This analysis will cast doubts on cultural identity politics.

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Shortcomings of EU identity politics

The European integration project is proceeding apace and has left the realm of mere cross-border and economic cooperation far behind it. Now, the European Union has embarked on a quest for Europe’s ‘heart’ and ‘soul’ — for an identity, and perhaps, an ideology of cultural unity and common values that would legitimise its existence. Europe is engaging in ‘soul-searching’ (Moisi 1999), seeking something that will hold its heterogeneous societies together and give them meaning.

The symbols and practices of the classic nation state (flag, anthem, myths) are the tools being used in this process, and repeated references to the ‘European spirit’ (for example Barroso 2006, 2009, 2010) represent Europe as a community united by a common fate, a common history, and a common culture. These identity policies prove largely ineffectual, however, as the Eurobarometer demonstrates time after time. For, according to Schmale (2008), such thought and behaviour patterns are not appropriate for the European Union, which is much more a ‘network’ and ‘medium’ than a nation state, or, as Judt (2005) put it, ‘The European Union is what it is: the largely unintended product of decades of negotiations by West European politicians seeking to uphold and advance their national and sectoral interests. That’s part of its problem: it is a compromise on a continental scale, designed by literally hundreds of committees.’

In looking at the links between memory and political power, to be more precise, when examining political power over memory (Müller 2002), political scientists have recently started to pay more attention to how identity is performed when the EU commemorates and celebrates anniversaries and jubilees in a way that is in fact typical of a nation state. An example of this would be how, on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, the EU attempted to create a European foundation myth. The logo Together since 1957 deliberately misinterprets history, (re-)constructs the past and makes the 21 states who joined later party (in more senses than one) to a historical event which only involved 6 member states — an ‘invention of tradition’ as Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) describe.

When one looks at how the EU manages collective memory and represents European identity, by following practices established in nation states, the question arises whether we find two identity narratives meeting and competing with each other or not? This issue was hotly debated at the time of Austria’s accession (Pelinka 1994) and re-surfaced during the discussion of a European constitution. As the word ‘constitution’ connotes nation state, the word was omitted from the text, which now bears the innocuous title ‘Treaty of Lisbon.’ Moravcsik (2006) maintains that seeking to frame a ‘Constitution for Europe’ was nothing more than wanting to pursue identity politics in the same way as nation states do, “The draft constitution was, above all else, a public relations strategy designed to attract the attention of common Europeans, to stimulate their involvement in democratic debate over the future of Europe — and thus to convince them to fall in love with the EU.”

By trying to emulate specific elements needed for the construction of a national self-consciousness on a supranational level, European identity politics adopted a strategy aimed at ‘falling in love with the EU,’ a strategy which failed. The biggest obstacle to the formation of a European identity, in fact, is European politics of identity that take the traditional nation state as its model and, as such, look for community and cohesion before politics come into play. This entails the gradual construction and reinforcement of symbols, special days and collective memories, together with a call for European stories that tell of values that bind (Csáky, Feichtinger 2007). Such a meta-narrative supported by myths is not appropriate for the EU, nor is it necessary because this post-national(istic) community, this ‘extraterritorial institution of government’ as Rifkin (2006) called it, which connects those who exercise power across borders, does not need a cultural identity to legitimise it. On the contrary, it is democratic participation in common institutions that will create a European demos and give rise to a European political identity. Although a system of law that is the product of a democratic process is the only possible marker of identity in a pluralistic society characterised by mass migration, the EU has hitherto opted for ideologisation instead of democratisation and is re-enacting nation state formation.
The Austrian case

Myths of freedom

The emergence of traditional nation states is rooted in the idea of freedom, which often meant liberation, either from the thralls of another state or from superseded structures (Flacke 1998). The notion of freedom is crucial to the building of a nation and national identity. It is embodied in myths, aptly called ‘the emotional foundations of nations’ by François and Schulze (1998). Such foundation and integration myths create and support identity. They provide a feeling of security in that they show the way forward, often accompanied by a sense of mission, thus providing social stability. They make society less complicated, offer guidance, and create identity across social and cultural borders: their narrative legitimises the community as a whole.

In the run-up to the referendum on Austria’s accession to the EU, the various political parties drew on such a narrative in their slogans: ‘We are Europe’ (Wir sind Europa) or ‘Stay Viennese — become European’ (Wiener bleiben – Europäer werden) or ‘We are Europeans. But we are still Austrians, too.’ (Wir sind Europäer. Österreicher bleiben wir.) The point at issue was how to preserve national identity in the case of accession. The choice of the arguments can appear quite absurd when viewed from a historical perspective, for example Erdäpfelsalat bleibt Erdäpfelsalat, the slogan using the typically Austrian word for potato (Erdapfel) as opposed to the north-western German word Kartoffel (Markhardt 2005). Why this slogan was used can be attributed to two crucial factors: on the one hand Austria’s accession to the EU coincided with the launch of European identity politics in the wake of the Treaty of Maastricht, on the other, especially in the early 1990s, there was a stronger sense of national identity in Austria as compared to other European states (Müller 2006), resulting in the potential antagonism between EU identity and Austrian-ness which played an important role in the parties’ campaigns. According to Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) resistance to European integration grows in degree the more pronounced a particular national identity is and how strong public confidence is, in that particular political system.

The erosion of Austro-awareness that was feared at that time did not, as we are all aware, take place. National identity endured as it continued to be embodied in folklore and performed as an Austrianising narrative, as could be seen in the highly symbolic celebrations which took place in 2005. The great majority of the events organised uncritically affirmed the narrative of Austria that defines national identity through myths of liberation and freedom (for details see Bundeskanzleramt 2005). Yet this mythology of freedom is not unique to Austria. According to Judt (1993) it holds true for the whole of Europe that post-war myths in particular are concerned with resistance to foreign powers and the struggle for independence, which are celebrated accordingly. These struggles for freedom, whether fought out on the battlefield or at the conference table were myths woven together to form a foundation, and as thus, were entered into the collective memory of a nation. In fact, this common myth has frequently enabled nations to draw cultural boundaries between themselves and their neighbours and thus achieve national cohesion.

In the case of the ‘belated nation’ Austria (Plessner 1982), the foundation myth and the post-war myth are highly congruent. The narrated struggle against foreign powers is predicated on the representation of National Socialism as an alien regime imposed from above: the myth of Austria’s being Hitler’s first victim. Whilst the year 1955 and with it the foundation myths associated with the State Treaty and Austria’s neutrality are crucial for the country’s identity, the year 1945 is hardly present in the collective memory. Hence Dvořák (2006: 262) refers to a country “that would prefer to have come into existence in 1955.” It is only since then that the nation has experienced itself as precisely that, as an imagined community that suffered under the occupying forces (who were certainly not perceived as liberators everywhere) and achieved freedom for Austria. In contrast to other European states, which celebrated the end of the Nazi regime and of World War II in 2005, and which put the holocaust, as a negative point of reference for European collective memory, at the centre of their commemoration, official Austria chose to
celebrate the anniversary of the State Treaty. In the nation’s collective memory the final moment of liberation was only reached in 1955. Once the occupation by the Allies was over, everyone could feel themselves free again, even the (former) national socialists (Liebhart 2006). The myth that Austrians were oppressed victims was used to bring about internal cohesion as well as to project a positive image to the world outside (Uhl 2004). During the EU accession debate the opponents of joining could exploit people’s fear of losing their autonomy, updating the post-war myths and exploiting them in the slogan No to Anschluß #2.

**Austria’s European mission**

To counteract the voices that warned of national disintegration in the event of EU accession and of an impending ‘no’ vote in the referendum, the pro-European campaigners opted for a dual solution by combining the old myths of liberation deriving from the idea of a special mission for Austria with the idea of European unification. The slogans ‘We are Europe’ (Wir sind Europa) and ‘Who, if not us?’ (Wer, wenn nicht wir?) were able to connect seamlessly with the Habsburg and Central European myth of a multi-cultural Austrian empire as a version of Europe, or even a vision of a better one. In the past these ideas had cropped up in Julius Raab’s government policy statement of 1956 in which he refers to Austria’s mission, and they re-surface in the EU Commission’s avis on Austria’s application for membership: ‘Moreover, the community will be enriched by the experiences of a country like Austria, whose geographical position, history, and traditional and more recent links and connections with other countries place it at the very heart of the making of the new Europe.’

Politics make use of the symbolic and emotional power of myths. In the process, the myth can take up European issues and thereby, to a certain degree, become open to interpretation, provided this serves the interests of national politics. Thus, in Austria in 2005, life was breathed into the foundation myth of the Second Republic once again, while at the same time the anniversary of ten years’ EU membership was also celebrated with a view to emphasising the unity of Europe, which had been an Austrian aim for so long, the so-called ‘Austrian mission.’ Myths of integration were brought up to date in order to defend the social and political status quo and also to justify current policies. This should be seen against the background of the governing coalition of the People’s Party and the Freedom Party at that time, and the sanctions that were enacted against Austria by the EU14 in protest against this (Schorkopf 2002). The staging of the past and the slanting of history, as for example, in the case of the ‘mobile balcony’ (the balcony on wheels) from which one could invoke the acoustic banner of the Second Republic, ‘Austria is free!’ (Österreich ist frei!), Leopold Figl, or the tales and anecdotes surrounding the negotiations leading to the State Treaty (‘Give us our freedom at last, give us the State Treaty!’ (Gebt uns endlich frei, gebt uns den Staatsvertrag!, Franz Jonas) together with various legends of hard-drinking politicians were meant to call to mind the common values shared by all Austrians, values that were surely echoed by the European community. What the propaganda claimed as Austro-European identity, however, was in fact only a prop for national(ist) sentiments.

The European component of Austrian identity is defined by various and mainly culturally connoted pasts, in particular, that of the Habsburg monarchy, which can be made use of in the political present. Current Austrian EU policies are often made attractive and legitimised in a narrative with strong links to the past. Alongside the view of Austria in Europe as a ‘nation with a long tradition of culture and a harmless, easy-going and peaceful population, fond of singing’ (Kulturation mit einem harmlos-gemütlichen, sangesfreudigen und friedfertigen Volk, Uhl 2004: 484), the country’s function as a bridge in and to Central Europe has been and still is the focus of self-representation. In the post-war period Ernst Marischka’s Sissi films served to put some distance between the country and its Nazi past and to create an independent Austrian, non-German identity. The cinematic mythologisation of the Habsburg monarchy, and with it the idea of Austria’s importance for Central Europe, found its way into the collective memory, also into the memory of those who had been born later — a postmemory (Hirsch 1997) of Austria’s European mission.
Gehler (2005: 321) reminds us that at the time of Austria’s accession to the EU, ‘It was hoped that it would provide a motivational push to set the necessary restructuring processes in motion. A sense of nostalgia, i.e. the old yearning and long-hidden or suppressed wish to once more be part of a large and powerful economic area (a kind of ersatz Habsburg Empire), played a certain role here.’

Since the Jubilee Year 2005, a period which also saw two rounds of EU enlargement, namely the accession of several of the former countries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 2004 and 2007, one can detect an enhanced sense of ‘mission’ in official speeches and in campaigns. In the discussions about setting up an Austrian House of History, Foreign Secretary Spindelegger (2008) said, ‘Our generation is so far removed from the early days of the Republic that one no longer needs to depict each historical event in minute detail. I am in favour of a relaxed way of looking at things. The role of Austria as a bridge-builder in Central Europe would be a topic that would also appeal to younger people.’

According to Schmale (1998) an integration myth and a political integration process tend to peak concurrently. So it is not at all surprising that in Austria, given the fact that rounds of EU enlargement and the implications from these (for example, the opening up of Austria’s job market to citizens of ‘new’ EU countries in May 2011) had to be politically legitimised, specific national myths are being activated. Spindelegger’s image of the bridge or the bridge-builder had already been called into action to handle the image crisis of the 1980s (Waldheim affair, arms sales abroad, wine scandal). On his pastoral visits Pope John Paul II also emphasised Austria’s function as a bridge in Europe. And the projected joint World Fair that was to be held in Budapest and Vienna in the mid-1990s was supposed to have ‘Bridges to the future’ (Brücken in die Zukunft) as its motto.

Since the most recent EU enlargement, the images of ‘heart of Europe’ and ‘bridge between West and East’ are more and more often grounded in the notion of a European mission for Austria and reference is made to the whole Habsburg mythology, especially in connection with the West Balkans. The myth of the Habsburgs, this ‘golden myth’ (Müller-Funk 1996) tells of a supra-national realm as opposed to the nationalisms of the Germans, Hungarians, Italians or Czechs. It paints the Casa d’Austria as a multiethnic home for all His Majesty’s peoples. Today the small, left-over Republic continues to live out this myth as it claims to promote the multi- and supra-national EU empire against nationalist impulses of the (future) member states. More specifically, Austria seeks to build a bridge to lead the dark, barbarous Balkans — the Barbalkans — into the light of Europe.

Here the Austrian story of the good Habsburg Empire as role model for the EU converges with a similar tale current in the West Balkan states. Many people have positive memories of (former) Yugoslavia, especially because of the multinational character of this ‘Yugoslav empire.’ (Baskar 2004) Moreover, as far back as 1941 Taylor described Josip Tito as the last Habsburg in the context of a period of stability for the multiethnic West Balkans, Yugoslavia being a new version of the ‘Austrian idea.’ (for further information, see Kuljić 2007) Such attributions encourage and promote Austria’s sense of mission not least because, according to Kuljić (2010), in the post-Yugoslav states that came into being after the civil wars of the 1990s, a civil war of memories is currently raging. In the West Balkans it is Austrian policy to remind states of their common history, and Austro-nostalgia is exploited to further economic interests.

Feichtinger (2003) draws our attention to the quasi-colonial power relations which held sway under the Habsburg Monarchy. The homogenisation strategy employed then shows interesting parallels to the Europeanisation of the West Balkans at the present moment in time. Europeanisation always entails standardisation; the pressure to assimilate that was felt by His Majesty’s peoples in those days is similar to the pressure for reform exerted on candidates for accession nowadays and manifests itself in both cases in the unequal distribution and exercise of power — who should these countries turn to for guidance if not Vienna, if not Brussels? The ongoing intensification of integration within the EU is reminiscent of the standardisation measures passed as a reaction to the pluralistic nature of the Habsburg Monarchy. Then, as now, a movement towards standardisation gave rise to a heightened aware-
ness of difference such as can be discerned in national(ist) reactions to Europeanisation today. So it should not come as a surprise to historians that EU identity politics uses the motto *Unity in Diversity*, which echoes the Habsburg *Einheit in der Vielfalt*, of course (Karoshi 2003). In the 19th century there was a plan to write a history of the Austrian supranational state and its people in order to foster a common sense of Austrian patriotism in the Monarchy’s citizens, thus binding them together. Recently the EU Parliament has resolved to implement a similar plan, with the same intention, to open a House of European History in Brussels in 2014.

**Conclusion**

In the light of the EU’s failed politics of identity, characterised by a culturalistic concept of Europe which closely followed the ‘paradigms of unity’ (Schmale 2008), it seems justified to doubt whether an appeal to the heart, soul and history of Europe will persuade the 500 million or so European citizens to adopt a transnational identity and come together in a close community. What is more, it is worth asking why the EU, which after all professes to transcend nationalism, should now be attempting to construct an identity using elements that are associated with the nation state. Another justified question would be whether a policy of recalling the culture of former empires such the Habsburg Monarchy or former Yugoslavia and their supranational identities can lead to the desired outcome.

For the European Union is a postnational(istic) community that cannot be preceded and legitimised by any form of cultural identity; it is rather the case that democratic participation in common institutions must bring forth a European demos and thus a European political identity (Ehs, Valchars 2009).

European-ness only becomes apparent in action, in participation in the common political system — making use of more (also direct) democratic elements — not in a pre-political state of being. Consequently European identity is not a pre-condition, it is not a basis for legitimising the EU, built on myths and nostalgia, but it is its democratic product. A European identity cannot be constructed out of tales and anecdotes and then endure for ever more. It can only arise and be re-negotiated in ever new acts of democratic law-giving and in public debate. The EU already shows the existence of a legal demos by passing laws and directives which have the same power throughout the union. Making this a political demos, an EU people by virtue of their participation, would be a new and perhaps a more promising approach to supranational politics. The objective would be a functional European identity, one defined by action not by mere existence, one that would get by without any appeals to integration myths or nostalgia.

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EU accession, mass media discourses:

The paper outlines the reciprocal perceptions between the Western Balkans and EU countries and EU identity, mass media discourses

Keywords: EU enlargement, Western Balkans, reciprocal perceptions, EU identity, mass media discourses

EU accession to the European Union (EU), also known as EU enlargement, refers to the process by which new member states, known as candidate countries, are admitted to the EU. The EU is a political and economic union of 27 member states located primarily in Europe. The primary purpose of EU enlargement is to expand the EU’s territory, influence, and economic power. Since its inception in 1957, the EU has grown from six member states to 27, making it one of the largest international organizations in the world.

There are several stages in the process of EU enlargement. First, a country expresses interest in joining the EU. Then, the EU Commission assesses the candidate country’s economic, political, and judicial capacity to meet EU standards. If the country is deemed suitable, it enters a formal accession process, which can take several years. After the accession negotiations are completed, the country becomes an official member of the EU.

EU accession has significant implications for both candidate countries and EU members. For candidate countries, accession brings access to the single European market, which offers vast opportunities for trade and investment. For EU members, accession can bring economic benefits and increased geopolitical influence. However, EU accession can also bring challenges, such as integration of new member states into the EU’s political and economic systems.

Mass media discourses play a crucial role in EU accession debates. Media coverage of EU accession can shape public opinion and influence political decisions. The reciprocal perceptions between EU countries and candidate countries can be shaped by media narratives, which can either foster positive perceptions or create negative stereotypes.

In conclusion, EU accession is a complex process that involves political, economic, and social changes for both candidate countries and EU members. Media discourses can significantly influence the perceptions of EU accession, shaping public opinion and shaping the outcomes of the accession process.
EU accession, crimes and sports: the thematic frame of reciprocal perceptions between Western Balkan countries and EU

Keywords: EU enlargement, Western Balkans, reciprocal perceptions, EU identity, mass media discourses

The paper outlines the reciprocal perceptions between the Western Balkan countries and the EU against the background of a future EU accession of the region. Based on the rationale that mass media is a crucial platform through which reciprocal perceptions are identified and reciprocal images are formed. A comparative newspaper analysis in 2009 focused on the reciprocal news coverage in two EU countries (Austria and Slovenia) and two Western Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia), which also identified the geographical and thematic frame of the reciprocal news coverage of both sides. The paper reveals that the attention paid towards the EU region in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia is significantly higher than that paid towards the Western Balkan region in the EU countries. It also illustrates that EU-related topics are not the only thematic frame shaping the news coverage on both sides when the respective, ‘Other,’ is taken into account.

The enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007, when a total of ten countries entered the EU, as well as the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, or most recently the global economic crisis and its impacts on the European economy have all contributed to increasing skepticism and fatigue among EU member states (EU-MS) concerning a further EU enlargement. The official accession negotiation process with Western Balkan countries (WBC) that is currently under way, presents an unpredictable factor relating to whether or not, and when, those countries will actually become EU members.

Recent public opinion surveys support these observations. While the populations in many EU-MS express a significant degree of skepticism regarding the future Croatian EU membership, or even more so, that of Bosnia, Herzegovina (BiH), or Kosovo, the populations in those countries express both a strong willingness to join the EU, combined with high expectations regarding this membership. At the same time, they express increasing skepticism about whether or not they are appreciated and welcomed as new members by the population of EU-MS. For further information, see Standard Eurobarometer 74 survey (2010), Gallup Balkan Monitor survey (2010).

The current state of research still lacks profound comparative analysis of the WBC and current EU-MS in regard to attitudes concerning EU membership, or the reciprocal perceptions between the two sides. Population surveys alone do not fully answer this question, because a lot of aspects remain ambiguous. They do not provide further information on the images and perceptions of EU and the Western Balkan (WB)
region that people may have in mind, when, for instance, they are asked about their support for a future EU enlargement. Thus, the potential conflict of differing expectations and skepticism that may result from the positions stated in those surveys can only be described and interpreted on a very abstract level, and the attitudes towards the EU cannot be traced to underlying political, economic, cultural or social principles and practices.

This paper presents the first results of a conjoint comparative media study\(^7\) which is a first step in shedding light on this research gap. For an initial summary of the current relations and perceptions between the EU and the WBC, our study asked the following question:

*What are the reciprocal frames of perceptions currently communicated between the EU and the WBC, and what facets of the reciprocal Other are focused on in that context?*

**Theoretical assumptions**

We consider this a crucial question, because future EU enlargements to the WB region not only mean (re-)defining actual EU borders, but it also triggers negotiations and (re-)defining of EU collective identity concepts. Arguing with basic assumptions of Social Identity Theory and Social Categorization Theory, the concept of the EU as a collective entity thereby inevitably contains an in-group/out-group element, and relies on (real or constructed) boundaries between those who belong to the in-group and a conceptual out-group against which an individual’s own concept of belonging can be demarcated. For further information, see Mummendey, Simon (1997), Abrams, Hogg (2004), Abrams et al. (1990), Turner (1985), Turner et al. (1987), Castano (2004), and Castano et al. (2002).

This definition of belonging is stimulated by the basic human need for a social identity and orientation within a social environment. Social categorization helps to provide a system of orientation for self-reference, to define one’s own place within the European context and in relation to other European countries. For further information, see Risse (2010) and Wöhlert (2008). The WBC continue to form a structural out-group to the EU, forming the Other against which the EU demarcates itself. Therefore, this in-group/out-group dualism (EU vs. WBC) and both sides’ definition of the EU as a collective entity form crucial parameters for the current perceptions and relations between the EU and the WBC. Among the EU-MS, the perception of the WBC may be shaped by criteria according to which those member states define the EU as an entity, and whether they support or oppose a further EU enlargement. Among the WBC, the perception of the EU may not only differ but may also reveal different levels of identification with this collective entity that oscillates between the ambition to become a part of this in-group (EU), and the rejection of this membership.

Therefore, using this design for a comparative analysis of reciprocal perceptions between in-group (EU-MS) and out-group (WBC) can provide new insights not only on how the EU is currently perceived (a) from the outside, i.e. when those who are not part of the EU, but strive for a membership, look at the EU, but also (b) from within, i.e. when the EU member states observe and define a potential out-group and thus define the boundaries of their own EU collectivity. A comparison of these two perspectives may track possible gaps that become apparent from those reciprocal perceptions and the EU concepts communicated in those contexts and that might become a barrier for the WBC in the accession steps lying ahead.

In that context, mass media presents an essential communication arena for the construction of collectivity concepts. For further information, see Eilders, Lichtenstein (2010), Gerhards, Neidhardt (1991/1993),

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\(^7\) The media study was carried out by the Commission for Comparative Media and Communication Studies at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna/Austria, in cooperation with the Mediacentar Sarajevo/BiH, the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory at the University of Belgrade/Serbia, and the Faculty of Humanities Koper at the University of Primorska in Koper/Slovenia. Additional contributions to the comparative media analysis came from Sandra Basic Hrvatin/University of Primorska and Gordana Djerić/University of Belgrade.
Gerhards (2004). Due to the widespread visibility and connectivity of mass media, discourses are predisposed for the evolving and expansion of societal descriptions on unity, especially because social identification and collectivity negotiation is not merely the calling forth of stored attributes of Self and Other, but rather a dynamic process in which collective identities are continually being reconsidered, renegotiated, and recomposed relative to other groups. For further information, see Rivenburgh (1997), Melischek, Seethaler (2008), Pfetsch (2008), Weller (2000).

Furthermore, we regard transnational collectivities like the EU as 'imagined communities,' as social constructions. They do not preexist outside communication, but are created precisely when people speak to one another, be it in interpersonal settings or through mass media. For further information, see Anderson (2005). Arguing with the agenda setting approach, mass media thereby sets the agenda for certain topics that are transferred as relevant to the public with regard to the focus on the WBC in EU-MS and vice versa, and that form the knowledge base for the social construction of community. For further information, see McCombs, Shaw (1972), McCombs (2004).

Project design

A cross-national comparative analysis of print media news coverage has provided further insights into the reciprocal views, topics, norms and values consulted as a source of information when attitudes and opinions towards the EU or the WBC future membership are queried. Focusing on the year 2009, we compared two EU-MS (Austria, Slovenia) and two WBC (BiH, Serbia). For each country, the data sample consisted of three daily newspapers: For Austria, the two quality dailies, Die Presse and Der Standard, as well as the tabloid newspaper Kronen Zeitung were analyzed. The Slovenian sample included the quality newspapers, Delo and Dnevnik as well as the tabloid newspaper, Dobro Jutro. For Serbia the quality newspapers, Danas and Politika, as well as the tabloid, Kurir, were analyzed. For BiH, due to the ethno-political divisions in the country that also affect the circulation range and relevance of newspapers in different regions, we chose Dnevni Avaz for the newspaper read by the Bosniak population, Nezavisne novine, which is read by the Serbian population, and, Dnevni list, which is read by the Croat population.

In a quantitative content analysis, and using the same analytical categories (codebook), we identified the geographical as well as the thematic spectrum of the reciprocal news coverage when (a) in Austrian and Slovenian newspapers focused on the WBC (i.e., when articles referred to Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, or Serbia, or to the transnational geopolitical categories ‘South Eastern Europe [SEE],’ ‘Western Balkans’ or ‘Former Yugoslavia’) and, vice versa, when (b) in Bosnian and Serbian newspapers focused on the EU region (i.e., when articles referred to EU-MS, and/or the EU as a geopolitical entity, and/or EU institutions). The whole newspaper edition was included, to also identify the scope of societal levels in which EU or WBC are perceived.

### Reciprocal perceptions between EU and Western Balkans

#### Level of attention paid towards each other

Starting with the overall level of attention paid to the EU region in the WBC, and vice versa the level of attention paid towards the WBC in the two EU-MS, we identified significant quantitative differences (see figure 1).
In the Bosnian and Serbian newspapers, the focus on the EU region was significantly higher than the reciprocal focus on the WBC in Austria and Slovenia. We found the highest level of attention towards the respective Other in the Serbian newspapers, while Austrian newspapers revealed the lowest level of attention paid towards the WB region. This indicates that the focus on the EU region was a significant frame of reference for both WBC in the daily news coverage; a relevance that was not attributed to the WB region in the regular reporting of newspapers in Austria and Slovenia.

**The geographical spectrum of the news coverage**

In Austria and Slovenia, the focus on the WBC was predominantly shaped by references made towards individual countries: In Austria, references towards individual WBC were found in 91.2% of all identified articles with a focus on the WBC, compared to 86.4% in Slovenia.

In both countries, most references were made towards Croatia and Serbia (see figure 2). One difference between both countries was a significantly higher level of attention paid towards Kosovo and Macedonia in the Austrian newspapers, while both EU-MS had a similar focus on BiH. Montenegro and especially Albania were only marginally referred to in both countries’ news coverage on the WB region.

In contrast to that, only 44.0% of the Bosnian articles and 58.2% of the Serbian articles where referring to the level of national entities when focusing on the EU region. In the Bosnian context, countries most often referred to were UK, Germany, Sweden, or Slovenia, while Serbian newspapers most frequently related to France, Germany, UK, or Italy (see figure 3).

One overall feature we noted is that all analyzed countries most frequently included references to their own country when the reciprocal Other was observed, meaning articles also had a national focus. Serbia
stands out especially with self-references in almost every article of the sample (86.6%), while national self-references were found in 54.9% of the Austrian and 34.0% of the Slovenian newspaper articles on the WB region. An exception here was BiH, where the reference towards the EU (70.4%) exceeded their own national self-references (50.3%).

Compared to the level of nation entities, fewer references were made in Austrian and Slovenian newspapers with regard to transnational entities when the WB region was taken into view (see figure 4). The label most frequently applied in Austrian newspapers was ‘South Eastern Europe/the Balkans,’ while only Slovenian articles to a significant extent, also applied the label ‘Western Balkans’ to refer to the region. A third category used was ‘Former Yugoslavia.’

Compared to that, in BiH and Serbia the reference to a transnational level was identified much more frequently when the EU region was taken into view. In Serbia, the label most frequently applied here was ‘Europe,’ a collective reference significantly less used in the Bosnian newspapers. Instead, in BiH more than every second article of the sample referred to the collective entity ‘European Union/EU,’ while only one third of the Serbian articles did so.

**The thematic spectrum of the news coverage**

In the context of this geographical spectrum of reciprocal perception, a variety of topics were taken into view in the analyzed newspapers of each country. Many articles, especially in the Serbian and Bosnian sample, included references to more than one thematic area, and especially in the Bosnian and the Serbian sample, articles not only discussed one but a variety of topics in combination. In all four country samples, the thematic area of Politics was most frequently focused on (see figure 5).

**Figure 4:** Frequency of references made to transnational entities

**Figure 5:** Thematic references (3 most frequent thematic areas)
Schengen visa regulations for the WB region. With regard to the former, most attention was paid to Croatia’s state of negotiation, whereas with the latter, particularly BiH and Serbia were taken into view.

Other frequent topics were the bi-national border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, the Serbia-Kosovo relations and in particular, the KFOR-Mission of the NATO\textsuperscript{9} and the EULEX-Mission\textsuperscript{10} to Kosovo. On a national level, Austrian articles focused on the nation-building process in Kosovo, the political structure and conflicts between the structural entities in BiH, or the resignation of the Croatian Prime Minister Sanader in July 2009, and the political causes and impacts of this internal governmental change.

A second thematic area frequently referred to in Austrian newspapers was Crimes and Catastrophes. Here, the news coverage was mainly shaped by articles reporting on criminal immigrants from the WB region in the national context of Austria. Here, the WB side was identified by references to the respective criminal actor’s nationality/country of origin (predominantly of Serbian origin).

A third relevant thematic area was the dimension of Economy. Identified topics here focus mainly on Croatia (e.g., Croatian economic legislation reform, the Croatian credit system, or real estate market), but also on the economic situation in BiH, economic relations among SEE countries, or on the situation of the region as a whole in different economic branches. Some articles had a national focus on Austria, centering on news about Austrian companies (e.g., REIWAG, Hypobank AG). Those national-based topics were put in relation to Austrian foreign trade relations with specific SEE countries or the region as a whole. The central focus here formed the news coverage of Austrian-Croatian economic relations, but we also found articles referring to relations between Austria and Serbia, or the SEE region as a whole (e.g., expansion of the above-mentioned companies to Serbia and Croatia).

In the Slovenian newspapers, Political news was dominated by a focus on the bi-national relations between Slovenia and Croatia, and in particular, the Slovenian-Croatian border dispute (e.g., during the time of our analysis, an arbitration agreement on the border dispute was reached between the two countries). This dispute is mainly a bi-national issue, however it was also partially connected to the EU level, and here mainly with regard to the political impacts it has on Croatia’s accession negotiations with the EU, of which Slovenia is already a member. Other than that, minor topics including the visa regime liberalizations for the WB region, or the internal EU positions on EU enlargement in general. We also identified articles that dealt with international relations between the WBC (e.g., Serbia and Kosovo), NATO, and the KFOR-Mission, or Croatian internal politics (e.g. war crime prosecution, resignation of Prime Minister Sanader).

As in the Austrian sample, a second thematic area frequently focused on was Crimes and Catastrophes. However, other than in Austrian newspapers, articles did not focus on crimes in Slovenia, but mainly referred to events and criminal actors in Serbia, Kosovo, Croatia, or BiH. Perceiving Slovenia as a central corridor for drug trafficking to the EU, one central focus was put on organized crime. In this context, the news coverage also outlined connections from the criminal groups to the political systems of the mentioned countries, indicating that those criminal structures in the WB region are not sufficiently combated by the governments of the region.

A third thematic area frequently taken into view was Arts and Culture. Here, articles reported on movies or music from the region, events in the region (Croatia in particular), or artists and guest concerts from the WBC in Slovenia. This level of perception indicated a high level of interconnectedness especially between Slovenia and the other countries of the former Yugoslavia, with many cultural projects still being produced in a conjoint process of Slovenian and WBC artists and cultural markets, or with artists well-known beyond their own countries of origin in the WB region.

In the Bosnian newspapers, the central thematic area of Politics was dominated by EU-related topics, the most central ones being the
Reciprocal perceptions between Western Balkan countries and EU

procedural and formal issues of the EU accession process and the visa liberalization for BiH and the WB region. However, in the context of those topics, the newspaper coverage rarely went beyond the frame of deterministic projections of the EU enlargement and visa liberalization processes in BiH. Questions of the actual implications of the EU accession for BiH citizens and state, involving pro or/and contra arguments, were rarely discussed.

References to EU politics were often related to internal political topics in BiH, primarily regarding constitutional changes and the negotiations of the political parties concerning those changes. Other topics within that context were, for instance, internal disputes between entities and between political parties, issues of harmonization of customs tariffs, or state incentives for domestic food production. Additionally, some articles referred to the role of EU actors in BiH and topics concerning the transformation of the OHR\(^{11}\) to EUSR\(^{12}\), the implementation of EU laws in BiH, or the conduct of individual EU-MS or their ambassadors in BiH.

In some articles, the relations between BiH and the USA were taken into view, as well as the involvement of the USA in negotiations for constitutional changes. This level of international relations was often discussed alongside the Bosnian relations with the EU, since both EU and international actors such as the USA or NATO mainly act side by side in its negotiation role with regard to nation building process in the country. Other topics were specific bi-national relations between BiH and individual EU-MS (e.g. Italy, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovenia, or Sweden), as well as the bi-national dispute between Slovenia and Croatia.

Besides this rather dominant focus on Bosnian political interrelations, the national politics of Croatia (especially the resignation of Prime Minister Sanader) and the Croatian-Slovenian border dispute were taken into view, and were discussed with regard to the connections and impact of those topics on the Croatian EU accession process. Furthermore, the Serbian EU accession as well as the internal political progress of the country was reported.

A second thematic area in which the EU region was frequently taken into view was Sports. Here, articles reported on a variety of events, either on a European-wide level or in different EU-MS (e.g. European Championships, UEFA\(^{13}\) Champions League, German football league, Danish handball league). In some of these contexts, performances of Bosnian representations and clubs were referred to, such as friendly games between Bosnian and German football teams, or the ranking of BiH representation in FIFA\(^{14}\) qualifications, etc.

As in Austria and Slovenia, a third thematic area in which the EU region was taken into view was the area of Economy. Topics related to that context were for instance the international financial crisis and its impact on different countries in Europe, as well as on MMF\(^{15}\) and EBRD\(^{16}\) credits and bank loans. Other thematic references were made to international trade and labor markets, or the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Besides that, Bosnian newspapers focused on problems of the Bosnian economy such as the shortage of national buffer stocks, economic deficit, a lack of incentives for national food producers, foreign trade de-balances, or the decrease of custom revenues and the need for harmonization of import customs tariffs.

Last but not least, in the Serbian newspapers, Political News was dominated by an outward perspective. The international involvements with and relations towards Kosovo, and especially the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, formed a central focus in the Serbian news coverage. In this context, the EU side came into view, but an even bigger focus was on USA politics. In other articles, Serbia’s relations with the UN (with regard to UNMIK\(^{17}\)), or the negotiations for a future

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\(^{11}\) Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina
\(^{12}\) European Union Special Representative

\(^{13}\) Union of European Football Associations
\(^{14}\) International Federation of Association Football
\(^{15}\) Money Market Fund
\(^{16}\) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
\(^{17}\) United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
Serbian membership in NATO were taken into view. Articles with EU references also reported on Serbian internal political debates, on the overall political system, internal political disputes between parties or ethnic entities, or the new statute of the Vojvodina province that was approved by the Serbian Parliament in November 2009.

With regard to EU-related politics, topics such as the Schengen visa liberalization for Serbia and the WB region, or the Serbian EU accession process, and especially the Serbian formal application for an EU membership candidature were covered. In that context, the newspapers reported on reciprocal visits of Serbian and vice versa, of EU officials, as well as on the results of those talks between the two sides. We also found frequent references to Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY trials in The Hague, which is seen as a crucial pre-condition for a future EU membership of the country. Minor topics reported were the elections of the president of the European Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, two positions that are also relevant for Serbia’s EU accession efforts.

As in the Bosnian sample, Sports formed the second most frequently referred to thematic area in the Serbian sample in which the EU region was reported on. Articles mainly reported on Serbian teams competing in the European football league UEFA, the European basketball league, the national basketball team’s involvement in the European championship, or the Serbian national volleyball team’s participation in the European championship.

Following Sports, Economy forms a third thematic focus when the EU region was taken into view. One main topic here was the international economic crisis and its impacts on Serbian and other European countries’ economies. In that context, financial institutions like EBRD, IMF or World Bank and their financial aid and investment in Serbia were reported on. Other topics included Serbian foreign trade relations with European countries or companies (e.g., the Italian car producer Fiat), the Serbian export economy, or foreign tourism in Serbia. Domestic economy issues varied from privatization problems to state investments and the fight against the economic crisis. As in the Austrian sample, the economic topics discussed were mainly directly related to the Serbian economy.

**Implications for EU-Western Balkan relations**

A comparison of the outlined geopolitical references shows that the Austrian and Slovenian focus on the WBC was shaped by the observation of individual countries rather than the region as a collective entity. Both EU-MS have a rather selective perspective, focusing on specific countries such as Croatia and Serbia in particular, while others such as Albania or Montenegro are rarely taken into view. The concept of an overall Western Balkan Other (integrated by recognizable common self-determination policies or common political agenda that would be equivalent to the EU) could not be identified for the analyzed sample, since most articles mainly focused on individual WBC at a time. In Serbia and BiH, the news coverage on the EU region significantly applied references to a transnational level, perceiving the region rather as a geopolitical entity than as individual countries.

A comparison of the thematic spectrum of the news coverage on the respective EU or WB Other in the four countries showed that the political dimension formed the central societal level on which both sides observe each other.

The EU-related political level was particularly relevant in the Bosnian and in the Austrian news coverage, while in both the Slovenian and the Serbian news, slightly more attention was paid to the level of other bi-national and international politics. This may be explained by the fact that both countries’ foreign political relations are currently shaped by an ongoing bi-national political conflict, in Serbia with regard to the independence status of Kosovo, and in Slovenia referring to the bi-national dispute with Croatia. Both are key topics of negotiation in the two countries’ EU accession process.

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18 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
19 International Monetary Fund
In all four countries, one central aspect of the reciprocal perception on the political dimension was the boundaries between the EU and the WBC. All four countries frequently addressed this, mainly with topics relating to the EU accession process of the region. In Bosnia and Serbia, their individual accession was most prominently discussed, while in Austria and even more so, in Slovenia, the Croatian status was focused on. In addition to that, Austrian newspapers revealed a significant focus on internal political matters of the different WBC.

Besides the EU boundaries, in Bosnia and Serbia a second emphasis was identified concerning the relations between the EU side and the WB side. The topics discussed indicated a strong orientation towards the EU. The findings suggested that the EU forms an important reference point when internal politics of the respective WB country were discussed, without necessarily also discussing in more detail EU-related issues. Here, we noticed that the Bosnian perspective on the EU was less critical than the Serbian one, but on both sides few substantial informative debates and questioning of EU politics and EU accession were found. Other than in the Serbian sample, when referring to the EU we also noticed a focus on the underperformance of Bosnian national political actors on political disputes, and on the need for political improvements against the background of a future EU accession, which indicated a pattern of negative Bosnian self-presentation.

In the Serbian sample, the political topics discussed not only indicated a strong orientation towards the EU, but also to other international actors such as the UN or the USA. A closer look at the topics presented, indicated that the perspectives on the EU and the interrelations between EU and Serbia was perceived slightly more critically, especially with regard to the outlined EU accession criteria that are expected from the country (e.g., cooperation with the ICTY, Kosovo status).

A second dimension that articles with reciprocal references touched on in three of the four analyzed countries was economy. However, as our analysis showed, this dimension was less relevant compared to the political perception, and rarely touched EU-related economic topics. Thus, while the political perceptions were strongly embedded in the overall framework of the EU, this was much less the case when the economic dimension was touched on in the reciprocal news coverage of EU-MS and WBC.

In the Austrian sample, the thematic analysis showed that this focus mainly referred to Austria’s economic involvement and interests in the region. Being a geographic neighbor of the WB region, the same could have been expected for Slovenia. However, compared to Austria, the economic perception of the WBC in Slovenia was only of minor relevance. This indicates, that the Slovenian perspective on the WB side was to a large extent dominated and thus shaped by the political level and here in particular by the issues that accompany the bi-national relations with their direct neighbor Croatia.

Other than in the political dimension, the aspect of EU boundaries was not focused on in the economic dimension. In BiH and Serbia, the discussed topics mainly touched on the interrelations between the EU-MS and the WBC or focused on domestic economic topics in the two countries. Again, in many instances the EU served as a reference point when economic evaluations of their own countries or the WB region were made, or, when articles focused on the financial benefits the WB region can expect or already have received from the EU within the course of the economic rapprochement process of the region towards the EU. Here, the already mentioned pattern of negative self-presentation in the political dimension, as it was outlined for BiH, was also employed when the national economy was discussed.

The most interesting result of our analysis was that beyond Politics and Economy, other societal dimensions shaped the thematic frame of reciprocal perceptions. It is with those thematic areas that we traced two major differences between the reciprocal perspectives of both the WB side and the EU side: While the two EU-MS focused on the dimension of crime/delinquency when the WB Other was taken into view, the two WBC frequently observe the EU region in the dimension of sport.

Especially in the Austrian newspaper sample, crime news formed a significant level on which WBC or actors from the region were observed. Geographically, those articles predominantly looked towards the in-
Reciprocal perceptions between Western Balkan countries and EU group (Austria), with the out-group (WBC) side stepping into view as criminal immigrants (of mainly Serbian origin), who have crossed the geographical, but also normative boundaries of the in-group. Those implications were mainly implicit, i.e. by pointing out the criminal activity and the impact of those crimes, but they were also made explicit, i.e. by referring to the “wave of criminals sweeping over Austria” or “crossing the Schengen borders” from SEE. In the Slovenian context this level of perception was shaped by an outward perspective, not covering crime news and events within their own national boundaries but in the WB region, Croatia and in Serbia in particular, which results in not only a negative, but also a distancing perception of the depicted WBC and not just of individual actors.

Compared to that, in the two WBC the news perspective on the EU region was significantly shaped by sports-related news, in particular by the news coverage of European sports events and the involvement of WBC in the same. The topics suggested that the discussion of Sports in both countries did not communicate boundaries between the in-group EU and the WB region. Bosnian and Serbian sports teams were portrayed alongside other European teams (e.g., in international competitions), and no structural or geographical distinctions were communicated in those contexts.

The two differing thematic foci indicate two opposite perceptions: Metaphorically speaking, the level of sport unites people, by bringing them together in a positive competitive activity that takes place on a mutual level. Compared to that, crime and violence rather divides people, by bringing them together in a negative competitive activity, with damages for one side. The negative connotation of crime and violence, per se, creates a negative setting for the perception of the WB Other, and this may implicitly challenge the region’s degree of belonging to the EU in the context of the respective news coverage, while the setting of sports does not challenge the belonging.

In the beginning of this paper we argued that shedding more light on the currently perceived relations between the EU and the WBC is an important task in view of the future EU accession of the region. By identifying the thematic spectrum for the agenda that newspapers set in the selected EU-MS and the WBC, we provided a first step in mapping the societal dimensions which the reciprocal perceptions between the EU-MS and the WBC communicate, based on attitudes towards each other that can be identified.

However, it is not only the frequency of the consulted thematic areas and dimensions of reciprocal perceptions in the analyzed newspapers that make those areas and dimension more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences. Particular interpretations and positions presented in the news reports on the portrayed topics can have an influence on the weight and relevance that readers give to certain issues, as well as on the images they connect with them. As McCombs (2004) has put it, attention and comprehension are closely connected. For further information, see Kiousis (2005), Soroka (2003), Entman (2004), Bruter (2005), Pfetsch, Adam (2008), Page et al. (1987).

Therefore, the next step of our conjoint cross-national analysis will be a more detailed qualitative analysis of the arguments and positions that are given with regard to the portrayed topics. This analysis can provide further insights on the perceived similarities, differences, gaps, potential conflict lines that are portrayed in the context of those topics. It allows deriving more detailed conceptualizations of the EU as a collective entity as they may become apparent in that context, and to further corroborate and specify the assumptions on the reciprocal perceptions of belonging and differences between the EU and the WBC we have introduced briefly in this paper.

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Changing identities: Croatian youth at the threshold of the EU

Keywords: Croatia, youth, attitudes, values, lifestyles, Europeanisation

The contribution discusses the profile of Croatian youth who are at the threshold of the country’s full European Union membership. Youth attitudes, values and lifestyles are not only viewed as an anticipation of future trends, but also as indicative of the current situation in a wider society. The results of the surveys carried out by the authors in 2009 and 2011 are compared to the results of several surveys that have been performed since the second half of the 1980s. These results suggest that, following a re-radicalisation of youth in the first half of the 1990s and contradictory value orientations in the ensuing period, in most recent years one can note a certain ‘Europeanisation’ of Croatian youth. This can be concluded on the basis of youth lifestyle types corresponding more closely to those found elsewhere in Europe. However, preliminary research results indicate that correspondence is found primarily with those lifestyles that can be classified as ‘conventional.’ Likewise, there is a worrying increase of intolerance among the secondary school students, in spite of generally heightened educational levels of young adults.

Introduction

A referendum on the European Union accession of the Republic of Croatia, held on January 22, 2012, resulted in 66.27% ‘yes’ vote. This was consistent with the results of the opinion pools which have been regularly carried out since May 2011, by three different agencies reporting that the percentages of those supporting EU membership in Croatia ranged between 55% and 63%. However, there was a significant exception to the general trend: young voters. As the media reported in the days preceding the referendum, young voters were largely not only sceptical, but straightforwardly against the EU accession of the country. According to media reports, in some locally administered polls, as much as 62% of young voters voted ‘no’ against the referendum, while only slightly above one third were opting for the ‘yes’ vote.

Previously, a report using data from a reliable national survey, commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in November 2010, concluded that young people aged between 15 and 24 were the only age group in the overall Croatian society in which those ‘against’ the EU accession of Croatia outnumbered those who were in favour of the accession (38% ‘against,’ 34% ‘for’) (Pavić 2010). At the same time, the largest support base for EU accession was found in the age group 45–54 (56% ‘for’), i.e., among those voters who were young adults in the late socialist period. Even pensioners were found to be less anti-EU-oriented than young voters (36% ‘against,’ 49% ‘for’).

In the run-up to the referendum, the quoted figures fluctuated, but the anti-EU sentiment of Croatian youth remained constant. The question is: how can such a sentiment — widespread in a population usually turned to the future and open to new experiences — be explained? Prior to the referendum, some media explanations emphasised the fact that young people rely excessively on information published on the Internet and social media, which are frequently one-sided and biased. Others have connected the ‘Euro-scepticism’ of youth with their above average susceptibility to nationalist and extreme left-wing anti-EU propaganda alike. However, a sociological analysis should go beyond such ad hoc
In the text that follows, the authors first outline the social and historical context of youth identity changes in Croatia in the period extending from the late 1980s to the present day. Following these introductory remarks, there follows a report on the preliminary results of a nationally representative survey of values connected with tolerance, generalised trust, mobility and creativity. In this report, the values of youth are placed into a wider context of Croatian society at the moment of so-called ‘ripe transition,’ i.e., the situation in which — measured by a bureaucratic yardstick — a country has fulfilled all the formal requirements for EU accession. Finally, the youth lifestyle types diagnosed in a recent survey of University of Zadar students are compared with those diagnosed in a comparable late 1990s survey in Croatia and with European youth lifestyle types on the basis of which a hypothetical model for comparison had been constructed. In the concluding remarks, the findings of these comparisons are placed more explicitly into the theoretical context which also served as a foundation for the initial discussions of youth identities in the late 1980s. At the centre of these explanations, is Inglehart’s polarisation between materialist and post-materialist values, as well as, his initial scarcity and socialisation hypotheses (Inglehart 1977) attempting to account for the variance found in this regard across different nations and cultures.

Youth identity changes: from late socialism to the present day

In the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the authorities in the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia paid special attention to youth, seen as an important social group because of its potentially disruptive effect on the governing socialist order. Unlike other socialist countries, Yugoslavia had been open to Western cultural influences since the 1950s and to limited market economy influences since the mid-1960s. Youth was perceived by the authorities as most susceptible to Western influence, not only in terms of its ever-increasing consumer orientation but also because of its openness to Western values and ideals implicit in the products of Western popular culture. The second reason why the authorities felt that youth needed to be ‘guided’ (i.e. supervised and controlled) was because they also proved susceptible to various political platforms essentially opposed to the regime. These platforms ranged from the student demands for a more egalitarian communist society (the generation of 1968) to the nationalist agenda of a so-called Croatian Spring in 1971. Whether they were perceived by the authorities as close to liberalism or nationalism these platforms were seen as a threat to the existing order and as such needed to be contained.

Seemingly paradoxically, the attempts of the socialist authorities to ‘keep an eye’ on youth materialised largely in massive investment into youth culture and free time activities. This resulted in the emergence of a well-subsidised ‘alternative’ youth culture, ranging from youth clubs and newspapers to theatre and literature. Although comparatively close to Western models concerning its pop and rock music scene, the Yugoslav youth culture of the time, on the whole, lacked political content bringing into question the established political order. Parts of this culture could certainly have been perceived as critical of the existing ‘socialist reality,’ but did not fundamentally challenge its premises. From the viewpoint of the authorities, in the context of a crisis-ridden multinational federation, the most important trait of this culture was that it was non-nationalist in character.

A special interest of the authorities for youth in the last decade of the socialist order is evidenced by a large scale empirical survey on the subject, carried out in all the parts of the former Yugoslavia and interpreted in different ways in different parts of the country. The most divergent interpretation of the preliminary research results (Vrcan et al. 1986) came from the Slovenian social psychologist Mirjana Ule (1988, 1989), who recognised the emergence of a ‘new type’ of youth in the north-western Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia. In contrast with ‘classical,’ ‘traditional’ or ‘generational’ youth, the values of this new type of youth in Slovenia corresponded to those of the ‘postmodern’ or
‘culturally modernised’ youth (Ule 1989, 2002). Apart from individualism, which is a hallmark of what Beck (1986) referred to as ‘second modernity,’ and values termed by Inglehart (1977) as ‘postmaterialist’ (1977), youth in Slovenia also demonstrated an openness to political pluralism and entrepreneurship. In contrast with ‘postmaterialist’ values, which can indeed be seen as related to the country’s “approaching the Scandinavian level of ensuring social prosperity” (Ule, Kuhar 2008), the openness to political pluralism and demands for rule of law were also the consequences of the local equivalent of the ‘new social movements’ and a long theoretical discussion on the topic of civil society, delegitimizing the intentions and form of the governing socialist order (Tomić-Koludrović 1996).

In retrospect, the results of the survey and Ule’s interpretation of them can be interpreted as breaking the monolith, collectivistic and ideological conception of ‘youth’ in socialist Yugoslavia. It came to light that youth in different parts of the Yugoslav federation was not a homogeneous entity. Values similar to those in ‘the developed republics’ (Slovenia and Croatia) were also found in ‘urban centres’ elsewhere in Yugoslavia, but it turned out that in the less developed republics potential for authoritarianism and lack of openness to political pluralism among youth was significantly higher.

In the period following the breakup of Yugoslavia, not only the values, but also the whole social context of youth in the formerly ‘developed republics’ of the socialist Yugoslavia parted ways in a rather radical manner. While Slovenia, following a brief ‘Ten-Day War,’ continued to develop into one of the most successful post-socialist (‘transition’) countries, Croatia was caught in the quagmire of wars of Yugoslav succession for a full five years. In this period, the social context was strongly marked by political authoritarianism. The war situation also brought about impoverishment, and partial isolation of the country, at least in intellectual terms. During these years, an overall homogenisation and retraditionalisation of Croatian society occurred. Among young people, previously pronounced ‘post-materialist’ values, emphasising autonomy and self-expression, were replaced by ‘materialist’ values centred on economic and physical security in a ‘survival’ context (Tomić-Koludrović, Leburić 2001). From pre-war individualism implicit in Ule’s interpretation of “the new type” of “culturally modernised” youth in the ‘developed republics’ of the socialist Yugoslavia (Ule 1989), young people in Croatia moved back to a more traditional, ‘generational’ definition of youth as a social group (Tomić-Koludrović, Leburić 2001).

In the post-war period in the second half of the 1990s, also marked by political authoritarism, a differentiation of youth emerged in relation to the status of their parents as ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ in the process of post-socialist transition. The overwhelming majority fit into the picture of a ‘passive generation’ that feels safe only within the spheres of privacy and parental family, avoiding any sort of public activity (Tomić-Koludrović, Leburić 2001). One should emphasise that this kind of dependence on the parents’ resources is not comparable with refusing to accept the responsibilities of adult life (the so-called Peter Pan syndrome) nor to the behaviour of those young men in Italy living in their parents’ home even after graduation and employment (so-called ‘mammoni’). Namely, the representatives of these two categories are motivated primarily by economic constraints and have managed to secure a space of their own autonomy in the home. In contrast with that, the situation of the Croatian youth during that period was marked by an extreme dependence in most spheres of social life and by an openly paternalistic relationship of the parents in relation to their ‘children.’ On top of that, in the public discourse of the time, young people were portrayed as a source of social problems, and related to issues concerning drug addiction, unemployment, juvenile delinquency, social indifference, escapism and violence.

Surprisingly to some, young people were very active in the first parliamentary election following president Tudjman’s death in December of 1999, campaigning not only for the coalition standing up against the legacy of the Tudjman era, but also, for wider changes in the political life of the country. After a period of political apathy resulting in abstention from voting, in the 2000 elections, the turnout of young people at the polling stations was significant. The results of a survey carried
out within a student population during that period suggest that young people were behaving on this occasion, as goal-oriented ‘rational actors.’ (Tomić-Koludrović 2002) Young people saw the 2000 elections as a realistic possibility for not only political, but also wider social change, which would in the end improve their overall position within society and increase their life chances.

A relatively brief period (2000–2003) of the coalition government rule following the ten-year Tudjman era was important in that it made certain cultural patterns more acceptable reminiscent of the pre-war era of the flourishing youth culture. Although the overall visibility of young people in society was heightened, their life chances did not significantly improve (Ilišin 2006). The period of a left centred coalition was followed by a long political dominance of the right centred Croatian Democratic Union, extending from 2003 to 2011. In this period, the former Tudjman party gradually changed its rhetoric to a mixture of the national and ‘neo-liberal’ discourse and set a European Union membership as its primary goal. Although the economic situation of the country was on the whole, improved in comparison with the 1990s, this period, in effect, exacerbated the division between the transition ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ the buoyant capital city, and the neglected provinces. It also brought with itself new, more sophisticated and more globally integrated forms of corruption and clientelism.

In December 2011, following what has been described by the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as “a long and difficult journey for Croatia,” the country signed the accession treaty with the European Union, which is currently being ratified by the member states. This process is expected to be concluded by the end of June 2013, and Croatia is set to become the 28th member state of the EU on July 1, 2013. Judged by the yardstick of EU accession criteria for post-socialist countries, the country has obviously met the requirements defined as necessary for those expected to shoulder the responsibilities of membership. But the issue of a possible ‘culture lag’ in a wider society, implicit in the process where countries are expected to meet formal criteria defined primarily in political and economic terms, is rarely addressed. What kind of value orientations and everyday practices can one find in Croatian society? What can be expected of its encounter with the realities of membership in the European Union?

To answer these questions, let us take a look at the selected results of a recent nationally represented survey enabling an insight into attitudes and values related to tolerance, generalised trust, mobility and creativity. The data suggests that young adults — in spite of the hardship and continued paternalism they experienced during the first decade of the 21st century — are today the most tolerant segment of the Croatian population in terms of openness to diversity, mobility and new work practices. But there are also signs of different trends, which need to be contextualised and discussed.

Croatian society and youth at the threshold of the EU

During the post-socialist transition, which has included a five-year war, Croatian society has undergone significant changes. Not only have there been radical changes in the political and economic system during this period, but also in the makeup of the population and value orientations. Population changes were caused by war-induced migrations from and to judiciary structures to fit the EU norms was added at the European Council meeting in Madrid in 1995. The progress of the post-socialist countries in ‘transition’ has been judged on the basis of these criteria.

The criteria for accession of the former socialist countries to the EU were already laid down in 1993. This was done by means of the so-called Copenhagen criteria, relating to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, existence of the functioning market economy, and ability of the candidate country to shoulder the responsibilities of membership. The fourth criterion, requiring adjusting of the administrative and

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other parts of the former Yugoslavia, as well as by economic migrations, including an allegedly large brain-drain of young university graduates. Changes in value orientations include the already mentioned notable retraditionalisation in the 1990s, but also changes characteristic for the process of individualisation, which can be taken as a sign of a presence of certain second modernity trends.

The conflicting impulses simultaneously at work in Croatian society frequently result in contradictory configurations of value orientations: for example, studies of women (Tomić-Koludrović, Kunac 2007; Tomić-Koludrović, Lončarić 2007) find traditional values in religious and family life, modern value orientations in relation to work practices, and post-modern values in free time activities. In this case, traditional values can be said to have been reinforced by the retraditionalising pressures of the 1990s, some of which are continuing to the present day. Modern value orientation’s in the perception of work have proved to be the result of the experience of emancipation in this sphere during the socialist period, while free time activities are related to media saturation typical of the present-day, globalised context.

A similar contradictory configuration can be found within the youth population. For example, a comparison of survey results indicates that between 1986 and 1999, the religious affiliation of youth in Croatia increased by 26 %, their participation in religious practices by 25 %, and religious self-identification by 40 % (Marinović-Jerolimov 2002). Furthermore, traditional forms of religiosity are dominant among the youth just as they are among adults. However, according to the quoted author, young people in Croatia do not find it contradictory to consider themselves religious and at the same time have attitudes opposed to the official position of the Church in the areas of sexuality and marriage (Marinović-Jerolimov 2002). Just as in the case of the decision to participate in the 2000 parliamentary elections, these kind of contradictory attitudes could be interpreted as ‘rational actor’ type of behaviour of young people.

Obviously, the contradictory values and attitudes of women and youth in the two examples summarised in the preceding paragraphs relate to the social context in which similar processes are at work. The question is how different populations within that context cope with these processes and what kind of potential they have for further modernisation of society that an EU accession inevitably brings with itself.

While in her 1989 book, Youth — for the modernisation of Slovenian society, Mirjana Ule could state that young people represented an important development potential in the westernmost republic of the former Yugoslavia, more than two decades later it is by no means easy to repeat such a statement in the Croatian context without reservation. To begin with, the overall political and economic framework has changed, not only in the former socialist countries but globally. Secondly, in spite of the retraditionalising pressures bringing back ‘generational’ identifications of youth in the 1990s, the trend of individualisation brought about by the global context has also been at work. It has resulted in an increased concentration on the private sphere. However, in the Croatian context this also means accepting the widespread conformism of the adults, which is not conducive either to social or to economic development.

As has already been mentioned, the results of a nationally representative survey from 2009 indicate that young adults (aged 19–30) are consistently more tolerant, gender equitable, and open to difference and mobility than the rest of the Croatian population, with significant exceptions of generalised trust and acceptance of migrant workers. However, this is valid only for that segment of the age group whose members are currently students (45.5 %) or post-secondary education graduates (33.2 %). In other words, these are young adults who have been in a position to enjoy ‘extended youth,’ who are better qualified, and who consequently stand somewhat better chances on the job market.

This segment of young adults is more tolerant of the company of persons of different nationality or to different sexual orientation than other age groups in the survey (31–45, 45–65, 66 and over). It is also more gender equitable, accepts euthanasia and its members practice cohabitation more than those of the other age groups. Likewise, students and post-secondary education graduates in Croatia are more open
to job-seeking and job-retention mobility. They also value more highly the possibility of advancement and flexible working hours, even more so than good salary and job security. Finally, they are significantly more open to seeking a job in the private sector, especially when compared with the immediately preceding age group (31–45).

However, as has already been mentioned, the values and attitudes of 21.3% of the members within the age group 19–30, who are not currently studying or do not possess a post-secondary degree are much less open and tolerant. They are closest in the general outlook to the age group 31–45, which — apart from the age group of 66 and over — turns out to be the most intolerant and least mobile age group in the overall Croatian society.  

Furthermore, young adults (aged 19–30) are on the whole, the age group whose members least “agree” or “completely agree,” of all the age groups in Croatian society, with the statement that “most people can be trusted” (only 20.9%, while a further 39.3% “neither agree nor disagree”). Of those meagre 20.9% who do show generalised trust 43.2% are students and 40.9% hold a post-secondary degree. However, out of the 39.8% in this age group of those who “do not agree” or “completely do not agree,” 45.2% are also students.

In social capital research, such a low level of generalised trust as shown by the members of the age group 19–30, is not associated with development potential. The reasons for this low trust would be worthwhile of a more precise analysis, which could be performed after a more detailed empirical survey of its determinants and implications. For the time being, speaking of possible socio-cultural reasons for it, it should be mentioned in passing that a relatively low level of generalised trust is found in countries with as diverse recent histories as Austria, Spain, and Hungary (Wallace, Pichler 2006: 86). Also, it can be hypothesised that such low generalised trust within the age group of young adults could be connected with their precarious life chances and first-hand exposure to the shifty nature of capitalist practices associated with risk society.

When it comes to another survey response in which young adults show a lack of tolerance, the reasons for rejecting “the government allowing the import of a foreign work force” are much easier to grasp. They are obviously connected with pragmatic reasons, i.e. with a fear of loss of employment opportunities. Such an explanation seems logical because the members of this age group show tolerance in all the other survey variables relevant to this issue, in which they do not feel personally threatened. It is also consistent with the conclusion based on empirical surveys carried out in the late socialist and different post-socialist periods (Radin 1988, 2002, 2007; Sverko 1999), suggesting that young people ever-increasingly privilege individual and utilitarian goals over those that require wider political or social engagement.

5 In the quoted text, Wallace and Pichler (2006: 86) analyse the Eurobarometer data from a targeted representative sample survey of 27 European countries carried out in 2004, according to which generalised trust in Austria stood at 33%, in Hungary at 25%, and in Spain at 36%. This is compared with the 65% recorded in the same survey for Sweden. In the quoted 2009 representative sample survey of the Croatian population, generalised trust stood at 30.2%.

6 Only 16.3% of the surveyed young adults “agree” with the idea that the government should allow the import of a foreign work force, making this age group the second one least agreeing with this proposal (the age group least agreeing with this idea is the 31–45 one, with only 14.4% agreeing). In the 19–30 age group, the outright rejection of the mentioned proposal (“do not agree”) also stands at the high 54.1% (in the least tolerant age group on this issue, the one aged 31–45, the percentage in this category stands at 60.2%).

7 The age group whose members are 66 and over are who are opposed to “the government allowing the import of foreign work force” are obviously motivated in their rejection by ideological reasons, as foreign workers do not represent a threat to them on the job market. The fact that the group aged 46–65 is most receptive to this proposal can perhaps be related to both their socialisation in the socialist period and the achieved professional status they are currently enjoying, which includes a perceived job security.

4 The lack of tolerance in this age group can be explained by its members’ socialisation in war circumstances in the 1990s, as well as by war-induced emigration (brain drain of the highly educated population) and mainly lower-qualified immigration to the country (primarily from the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina). The members of this age group perceive state employment as the ideal kind of employment. They are over represented as police and army employees, low skilled workers, and home makers, and under represented as administrative officials with post-secondary education. They also tend to live in smaller towns, are less entrepreneurial and consider high salary as the primary motivation for job change.

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The preliminary analysis of survey results of a representative sample of secondary school students in Croatia (Čačić-Kumpes, Gregurović, Kumpes 2010) suggests that this trend, as well as a trend of increasing intolerance, is even more pronounced with young people aged 15–18. The question is to which degree such values, which can perhaps be interpreted as a consequence of susceptibility to paternal values at this age, can be changed in the post-secondary education process. But it is beyond doubt that every effort should be made to do so, as further social development and relatively smooth integration into an economically advanced context is otherwise not likely to happen. 8

Youth lifestyles: ‘Europeanisation’ equals conventionalisation?

The notions of social and cultural development imply a frame of reference wider than that termed ‘EU-isation’ by Radaelli (2003: 27) or ‘EU-Europäisierung’ by Kohler-Koch (2000: 12). In this wider sense, Europeanisation is not viewed as — primarily political — ‘harmonisation’ with the institutional framework of the EU, but as a process in which there happens a transnational diffusion and coming together of previously more divergent social and cultural patterns. Within a broad definition of such ‘cultural’ or ‘informal Europeanisation’ (Mair 2004), a certain standardisation of cultural practices is obviously under way (Featherstone 2003; Harmsen, Wilson 2000). It can be seen as connected to wider globalisation trends (Sittermann 2004), but, also carries within itself specific patterns of increasing ‘cross-cultural convergence’ (Mair 2004) within Europe.

The sociological research of lifestyle, which enables an in-depth analysis of social and cultural differentiation, can serve as a basis for a comparison of similarities and differences found in the identities, habits and resources (both economic and cultural) of those living in countries that have been within the institutional framework of the EU for a longer period of time, and those countries that are more recent members or, are only awaiting EU accession.

In the case of Croatia, there exists a body of data on youth lifestyles that can serve as a basis for comparison in this respect. While the results of a survey carried out in 1999 (Tomić-Koludrović, Leburić 2001) suggested similarities of Croatian and various European youth lifestyles in free time activities and aspects of everyday culture (such as musical taste or style of clothing), but differences in value orientations and identities, a more recent survey (Tomić-Koludrović, Zdravković, Skočić 2011) suggests that youth lifestyles in the sample correspond more closely to those found elsewhere in Europe. However, preliminary results indicate that correspondence is found primarily with those lifestyles that can be classified as ‘conventional.’

This, as well as any other comparison of this nature, should of course be taken with a grain of salt. Namely, both surveys were carried out at the University of Zadar, but in the meantime the makeup of the student population has changed, both in terms of the wider scope of different profiles of study programmes offered at the university, and the geographical background of the incoming students. For example, while at the time of the 1999 survey there were no students at Zadar studying technical (nautical) sciences, now such students make a noticeable part of the student population. Likewise, while in 1999 most of the students came from the urban areas of the southern Croatian Adriatic region, a sizeable student population now comes to study at Zadar from smaller towns in northern, continental Croatia. In spite of that, the results of the two surveys can still be seen as justifiably comparable in a longitudinal dimension. Likewise, good grounds for comparison with youth lifestyles in the EU exist in that the hypothetical model for both surveys was derived from the pertinent models of European youth lifestyle studies.

The results of the 1999 survey revealed that lifestyle types clustered on the basis of identity orientations, free time activities and ac-

8 A recent article discussing ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ in terms of transnational activities and networks views “geography, the level of modernisation, and the degree of societal internationalism as major factors determining the opportunity structure” in this regard (Mau, Mewes 2012: 13). The same could also be said about the possibilities for other forms of integration at different levels.
cess to resources, and did not correspond to either the types of the constructed hypothetical model, or individual types found in the preceding European studies on the subject. Types of youth lifestyles identified on the basis of the survey result were described as: ‘hedonist-intellectual,’ ‘dominant-fashionable,’ ‘superficially sociable,’ ‘traditional family-oriented,’ ‘socially committed’ and ‘leisure-fashionable.’ (Tomić-Koludrović, Leburić 2001) These types contained individual characteristics of lifestyles found in European surveys, but mixed them in a different way, resulting in hybrid types, deviating in certain respects from the ‘clear’ European ones.

As has already been mentioned, the similarities with European types were found in free time activities, musical taste and style of clothing, while differences in value orientations and identities suggested a less individualised, ‘generational’ type of youth, with more traditional values. In many ways, this generation of Croatian youth resembled that of the first German post-war period, described by Schelsky (1957) as a ‘sceptical generation.’ Apart from sharing the experience of war in recent past, the members of this generation of Croatian youth shared with their German 1950s counterparts a widespread disillusionment with the world of politics and also had limited access to resources for self-advancement. In the Croatian case, this resulted in a traditional family reliance by youth, mixed in some of the mentioned types with a strong hedonist orientation, resembling the elements of such orientation also found in European postindustrially modernised societies.

In contrast with these hybrid lifestyles, youth lifestyles identified on the basis of preliminary results of the 2011 survey suggest much less individualist pluralism and a move toward a smaller number of clearer ‘types,’ some of which fit in fully with those from the 1999 hypothetical model constructed on the basis of results of previous European lifestyle surveys. The identified types could be described as ‘conventional male,’ ‘conventional female,’ ‘rational-sceptic’ and ‘hanging out.’

Out of these, the ‘rational-sceptic’ type, which in the European context represented individual responses to difficult and uncertain circumstances (Gaiser 1994), seems to be closest to the characteristics of part of the respondents to the 2011 Zadar student survey. The members of this type follow their own needs and preferences, with some degree of fear that they have not chosen the right thing. The general orientation is towards the present, but because of the lack of self-confidence, they try to keep available options open as long as possible. Education is important to them. The ‘rational sceptics’ among the respondents in the recent Zadar survey were also less self-confident than the participants in other clusters. They were less sociable, lower on leadership, and less led by appearance. Their orientation is more towards free time activities in the home, which includes reading books much above the average.

What was classified in the European context as the ‘conventional’ type youth lifestyle (Gaiser 1994, SINUS 1983) also matches quite closely with the current situation of a part of the 2011 Zadar survey respondents. This type is characterised by expecting life to follow a standardised (conventional) path. The main goal is a secure job with steady income, and the period of youth is perceived as preparation for adult life. Risks and experiments are avoided: everything should happen ‘at a right time’ and ‘in the right context.’ All these characteristics, as well as a general preoccupation with ‘getting ahead in life,’ are present in the Zadar survey. A major difference in relation to the European precedent is, however, a strong gender distinction found in the free time activities of the respondents, as well as in identity characteristics connected with leadership.

Although the ‘conventional’ youth lifestyle was predominantly male in the European context, its basic characteristics were also shared by women clustered in this type. In the 2011 Zadar case, the gender differences in the mentioned two areas were so pronounced that ‘conventional’ young men and women could simply not be classified within the same type. We have therefore labelled the two differently clustered types sharing the basic conventional orientation as ‘conventional male’ and ‘conventional female’ types. Such a strong internalised gender distinc-

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9 It should be noted that 15% of those respondents clustered into the ‘female conventional’ type are male young adults, as well as that 23% of those clustered into the ‘male conventional’ type are female young adults. In other words, the basis for definition of these types were not the actual gender of the respondents but their behaviour.
tion and obvious conformity with traditional male and female patterns of behaviour could be interpreted as a consequence of retraditionalisation that both youth and the overall Croatian society have undergone in the period of post-socialist transition. In any case, post-materialist, reflexive, as well as, even entrepreneurial values of the 1980s youth have close to disappeared in the 2011 Zadar survey.

The members of the type clustered as the ‘hanging out’ type in the Zadar survey are seemingly close in some respects to what was once labelled as the ‘hedonistically-oriented’ youth in the European context (Lenz 1988) in that they enjoy intense contact with their peers and spend time with them in commercial establishments that enable socialising (predominantly coffee bars). They also perceive themselves as “active no matter what they do,” however, they show minimal aspiration to individuality. The latter makes them different not only from the ‘hedonist’ European youth mentioned above but also from the hedonist orientations diagnosed in different Croatian youth lifestyles at the end of the 1990s (Tomić-Koludrović, Leburić 2001). What is almost completely missing in the present case is not only the subject-identity orientation or intellectual aspiration, but also previously widespread pastimes such as “going to theatre,” “going to cinema,” “reading a book,” or even “going shopping.”

In relation to the results of the end of the 1990s survey, now, one also does not find any trace of ‘refusing’ identity orientations in any of the clustered lifestyle type. The overall picture, then, is of a ‘conventional,’ ‘passive’ and, again, ‘sceptical’ youth. It should be repeated that the results of the quoted survey are by no means generalisable, however they can be taken as indicative of a certain trend both in the youth population and in a wider present-day Croatian society.

Concluding remarks

Studies of youth are generally considered important in that the attitudes, values and behaviour of young people can be viewed as an anticipation of future trends. However, they are also indicative of the current situation in a wider society. Namely, young people are either susceptible to, or reject paternal values, and can be considered as the segment of the population that is the most vulnerable and at the same time, subject to above-average scrutiny or protection. The implications of such a position are revealing, especially during periods of crises. In the case of Croatian or Slovenian transition, the studies of youth are especially telling, as, at the end of the socialist period young people in these now independent countries represented a segment of the population with a significant modernisation potential. This means that further developments in this regard can be followed more easily than in the case of those population segments which were less modernised or did not show susceptibility to modernisation.

Bearing this in mind, one can conclude that not only integration opportunities and expected benefits of EU membership, but also the general level of social development of the country, can be trustworthily estimated based on youth research. This is especially important in the context in which the overall progress of a country has been measured on the basis of meeting various formal and institutional criteria for more than two decades, i.e., throughout the entire period of post-socialist transition.

The results of the recent surveys of young adults that the authors have carried out suggest a trend in many ways opposite to that recorded in the late 1980s, i.e., in the late socialist period. While then one could note an increasing convergence of post-materialist values held by youth in Croatia with those held by their counterparts in the socially and economically developed European countries, what convergence can be found nowadays seems to be limited to that concerning the ‘conventional’ nature of certain youth lifestyle types. This is in sharp contrast with the dominant trend in e.g., “six Western European societies” (Ingle-
During the transition period in Croatia, there obviously occurred a radical socio-political change which resulted in a specific mixture of values defying clear classification into polarisations on the basis of which Inglehart and Baker (2000) analysed dimensions of global cultural variation. For example, the mentioned increase in religious self-identification of youth could be interpreted as a return to traditional values, but is immediately contradicted by widespread acceptance of secular-rational values in the areas of sexuality and marriage. Likewise, the fact that young adults (aged 19–30) are in many respects the most tolerant, and self-expression values-oriented age group in the quoted 2009 survey is contradicted by their intolerance towards the ‘import of foreign work force,’ obviously pragmatically motivated by scarcity fears. The same goes for the fact that the members of this age group show the lowest level of generalised trust in Croatian society.

An explanation for the diagnosed low levels of generalised trust of young adults and pronounced intolerance of the current secondary school youth in Croatia, can be found in Inglehart’s ‘socialisation hypothesis.’ (1977) If it is true that the circumstances of socialisation in one’s pre-adult years decisively influence values over the entire life course, it would be logical to connect the low self-expression values of the age group 30–45 with socialisation at the time of war. Likewise, the intolerance of present-day secondary school students could be connected with their growing up in the context of economic and political crisis, as well as with child-rearing practices of the members of age group 30–45.

Furthermore, as has also been argued by Inglehart (2008: 135), the basic value priorities of given birth cohorts are stable and those that he analysed remained “about as post-materialist at the end of the time series as … at the start.” In light of this, higher levels of generalised trust and tolerance for ‘import of foreign work force’ among the age group 46–65 seems a logical outcome of their socialisation in the late socialist period, when post-materialist values were widespread among youth. On the other hand, this would suggest that the present low levels of trust and tolerance among the members of younger age groups are bound to continue in the future. This cannot be considered a good sign for future social development and a smooth European integration of the country.

Another worrying sign is that youth lifestyles analysed on the basis of the 2011 survey quoted above show a high degree of conventionalism, which can among other things be seen as an indicator of susceptibility to authoritarianism. Coupled with mentioned low levels of trust and ‘selective intolerance’ of youth, this authoritarian potential suggests a trend that runs counter to the one in which youth was seen as a promise of modernisation potential.

Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that highly educated young adults (aged 19–30) are — as has been stated above — in many respects still the most tolerant and self-expression values-oriented age group in the quoted 2009 survey. This leads to the conclusion, that public policy emphasis on education, as well as symbolic actions and rewarding of behaviour consistent with the desired objectives, could have some beneficial effect and could again lead to youth identity changes in the direction of more modernisation potential.

10 The “six Western societies” Inglehart (2008) analysed, based on combined weighted sample of Eurobarometer surveys and World Values Survey, are West Germany, France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

11 According to Inglehart (2008: 135), major recessions and other sources of economic hardship push all cohorts down in response to current conditions, but since “positive and negative fluctuations tend to cancel each other out,” “the younger cohorts remain relatively post-materialist despite short-term fluctuations.” In short, in the period extending from 1970 to 2006, “most cohorts are slightly more post-materialist … than they were at the start.”
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Tanja Petrović 1

Serbia’s quest for the usable past: the legacy of the 19th century in the context of the EU accession

Keywords: Serbia, state symbols, EU accession, 19th century, reconciliation, revisionism

The main goal of the article is to discuss the ways in which 19th century identity symbols and practices were revitalized and incorporated into two sets of discourses and value systems, — one that insists upon tradition and contributes to the process of re-traditionalization, observable in all post-socialist societies in the Balkans, and the other that underlines modernization and the aspects of history that link these societies to ‘modern European traditions.’ The article focuses on the negotiations of the national identity in post-2000 Serbia and traces ways in which the 19th century legacy is used when negotiating ‘Europeanness’ within a society which is in process of accession to the EU.

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The efforts to establish a new image of Serbia after the dismissal of the Milošević regime in 2000 are essentially linked both to negotiating Serbian ‘Europeanness’ and to traditionalist, national values promoted since the 1980s. Symbolic practices through which the post 2000 Serbian national identity was negotiated and maintained have a reconciliatory character. As Stef Jansen (2010: 35) warns, “in the post-Yugoslav context, contrary to what one may intuitively expect, reconciliation has actually long been a major priority for nationalist elites. Their focus was squarely on intra-national level. Often aimed at dissolving oppositions between fellow-nationals associated with opposed ideologies in World War II, these efforts effectively amounted to programs of national homogenization that can be understood as attempts to erase antagonism by establishing discursive closure.”

In post 2000 Serbia, with a view to what happened during the 1990s, one may observe simultaneous efforts, on the one hand, to ‘reconcile’ Serbia with ‘Europe,’ and on the other to ‘reconcile’ different parts of Serbian political elites and population — the latter concerning the more recent history of the 20th century. In these processes, discourses formed in, and values promoted by the EU centered contemporary Europe, play a significant role. In fact, they are making possible the employment of very different, often opposing ideas about national identity within Serbia.

In search for new national symbols: Serbia after 2000

The dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, coincided with the end of socialism in Eastern Europe, and was followed in Serbia by more than a decade of Slobodan Milošević’s nationalistic politics. Combining extreme nationalism with socialist ideology and presenting its politics as simultaneously aiming to protect Serbian people and to save Yugoslavia, Milošević made it impossible after ‘democratic change’ in 2000 for the new political elite to use socialist symbols and keep continuity in the new Serbian identity politics. This may be one of the reasons why the

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socialist Yugoslav legacy in Serbia is strongly marginalized; its traces almost completely eradicated from public spaces, despite the fact that Serbia is considered (and self-perceived) as a successor of Yugoslavia in various political and social domains. The years after 2000 were characterized by intense efforts to establish new symbols, iconography and identity markers of the Serbian state. “A state without symbols is like a man without clothing. There is no country in the world which does not have its symbols. It is embarrassing for the Serbian people to celebrate two centuries of Serbian statehood (National Day of Serbia) with the anthem ‘Hey, Slavs,'” stated Radoš Ljušić in 2004 (http://arhiva.glasjavnosti.rs/arhiva/2004/02/02/srpski/DO04020102.shtml, February 2, 2004).

Hej Sloveni, as a national anthem, was considered inappropriate for at least three reasons. Or, to put it differently, it was inappropriate for everyone in Serbia for a different reason: it was a Yugoslav, and not specifically a Serbian anthem; it was closely related to the socialist period; and, it was the anthem used in Serbia during Milošević’s regime. Hence the anxiety, after 2000, to introduce a new set of national symbols that included a new anthem, national holidays, flag, and a coat of arms. The 19th century, the period of the Serbian struggle for independence from the Ottoman rule, in which the foundations of the ‘modern Serbian state’ were laid, provided plenty of material for new symbols of Serbian statehood. This period, often referred to as the ‘golden age of Serbian democracy’ (Stojanović 2009), became an important source for the national imagination of post-socialist and post-Milošević Serbia. This imagination, I argue, is exceedingly dependent, both on the negotiations of Europeanness and Europeanization/modernization inside Serbian society, and on the dominant EU discourses with which Serbia and other ‘Western Balkan’ countries approach the process of accession to the EU. These discourses are combined with, and often contested by, other constitutive discourses and clusters of values, — most importantly, the discourses concerning (Orthodox) tradition as a basis of Serbian identity. Authors of these discourses, in which tradition is highly valued, see socialism as a period when tradition was marginalized and prohibited in the public sphere, or at best, carefully shaped into a ‘new, modern’ way by communist elites (Hofman 2011a). European integration and ‘modernization’ of Serbia in this process are, on the other hand, also perceived as damaging to the (newly discovered) traditional essence of the Serbian identity.

Reasons for taking the 19th century legacy as the basis of a new, post 2000 Serbian national identity were explained by Radoš Ljušić, a member of the Committee for national holidays appointed by Serbian Government. He stresses both a wish of the Serbian political elite to be in accordance with European values (and to ‘reconcile’ with ‘Europe’), and a wish to avoid the 20th century symbolics. The latter is seen as a problematic and contested part of Serbian history and thus does not contribute to intra-national reconciliation:

“Our idea was not to take anything related to the Middle Ages, since no state in Europe took an event from the Middle Ages as its central commemorative day. Mainly it was events from the 19th century that were chosen. The 20th century events were also inappropriate, as they are too contemporary and thus acceptable for one part of population and not for the other. Therefore we excluded the Middle Ages and the 20th century and had to find something from the 19th century.” (Quoted after Kovač 2003)

Reconciliation with ‘Europe:’ giving up the Middle Ages

The lead idea of the Committee for national holidays, as Kovač (2003) stresses, was “to choose a national holiday that will be acceptable for the united Europe.” For the Republic of Serbia’s Statehood Day, February 15 was chosen and celebrated for the first time in 2002. This date is related to two 19th century historical events, — the day when the first Serbian uprising against the Ottomans began in Orašac (Serbia) in 1804, and the day when the first Serbian constitution was accepted in 1835 in the town of Kragujevac. The latter is widely perceived as a date that marks the beginning of a modern, European Serbian state. “The 1835 Constitution incorporated legislations of the most developed European states,
while some of its parts also refer to the Declaration of human and citizen rights, which is a legacy of the French bourgeois revolution,” wrote a journalist of the Politika daily in 2010. In public discourses in Serbia, this modernist and European character of 19th century Serbia is often related to the post 2000 Serbian state. “In this place [Orašac] the history of modern Serbian state began, since our ancestors, just like us, wanted the state to be founded on the human rights, equality and protection of private property,” Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić stated at the celebration of the Statehood Day in Orašac in 2002. In 2003, the Chair of the Serbian Parliament, Nataša Mićić, stressed that at the time the constitution was adopted 168 years ago, the then Serbian elite tried to include Serbia in the European developments. She added that one of the most important tasks of the current elite is to adopt a new constitution having the same importance as the one from 1835. Vojislav Koštunica, the then president of the federal state, said that “on this date almost two centuries ago, our ancestors started their path of liberation and Europeanness.” On the same occasion in 2008, Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković said: “Serbia today, as well as in 1804, when its modern statehood was built, has to choose the right pathway and face the dilemmas of the way of making its development faster and coming closer to the developed countries.”

The dominant narrative about modernization and the European character of Serbia is regarded more in accordance with ‘European values’ and is less problematic for an image with which Serbia wants to present itself to ‘Europe.’ Meeting European expectations in the domain of national and state symbols is openly presented by members of the Serbian elite who are involved in their creation in the same way politicians depict Serbia’s advancement ascending to the EU, largely characterized by conditionality (cf. Hammond 2006). According to Radoš Ljušić, “we were able to justify the choice of statehood day to Europe, since we did not chose a date that exclusively refers to national war history, but also to statehood and constitutional history.” (Quoted after Kovač 2003)

In addition to presenting to ‘Europe’ this preferable image of Serbia, practices and discourses related to the newly established Serbian Statehood Day, February 15, are also oriented towards the internal situation in Serbia. The way the Statehood Day is conceptualized also provides a possibility for reconciliation on the national level: first, it refers to two moments in Serbian history, — the beginning of the uprising against the Ottomans, and the adoption of the first Serbian constitution. Additionally, it coincides with the Orthodox holiday of Sretenje. And finally, from December 12, 2006, the Serbian Statehood Day merged with another important national holiday, — the Serbian Army Day, in order to remember the Serbian troops from the First Serbian uprising in 1804 which enabled the formation of the modern Serbian state and army in the 19th century. As stressed by Ana Hofman, “In this way, commemorating the National Day compiles three important events from the national past, proving the crucial role of the Constitution and the army in building the nation. Moreover, Sretenje, a religious holiday, celebrated on the same day, emphasizes a symbiotic relationship between religion and nation, perpetuating the historical link between identity and religious affiliation (Wanner 1996: 139). Therefore, the well-known state-nation-people triad was remodeled to one poising constitution-army-church as the main pillars of modern Serbian state.” (Hofman 2011)

Encompassment of these two 19th century events already represents an act of reconciliation of two opposing concepts of statehood and national identity in Serbia. The 1804 event is a symbol that represents the heroic nature of the Serbian people and their love for liberty and is part of broader discourses of resistance to the five century long “Ottoman/‘Turkish’ yoke.” The central figure of the symbolics related to the 1804 uprising is Karadorđe, the leader of the uprising and founder of Karadorđevići dynasty. The adoption of the constitution in 1835, on the other hand, symbolizes a citizen-oriented, modern and parliamentary organization of the Serbian state, with division of power and attention to human rights. The central figure in this set of discourses is Miloš Obrenović. As stressed by Dragana Antonijević (2003), Karadorđe and Miloš Obrenović serve as metaphors of two (opposed) types of political behavior, one is warrior, revolutionary and the other is statesman and diplomat.

The ambiguous character of the new Serbian Statehood Day and
the fact that it entails two opposed sets of political symbols and ideologemes, posed certain problems regarding the organization of the celebration in early 2000s. The first celebration in 2002, gave Radoš Ljušić an impression that “the government feared to commemorate the revolutionary aspect of the Statehood Day (referring to the 1804 uprising, TP) and only had a small celebration in Orašac, and then moved to Kragujevac (city where the 1835 Constitution was adopted) where the central celebration was held.” (Quoted after Kovač 2003)

In latter years, the coexistence of these two sets of narratives and value systems appeared to be less problematic: the warrior, liberatory/revolutionary aspect of the Serbian national identity was particularly reactualized since 2006, when the National Day was merged with the Serbian Army Day, and with the independence of Kosovo proclaimed in 2008. Despite insisting on a symbolic that is perceived as ‘inappropriate’ for ‘Europe,’ political discourses of that time are very often framed in relation to Europe and ‘Europeanness.’ The conflict with Kosovo was, just as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina several years earlier, set in the context of the ‘eternal conflict’ between Christianity and Islam (cf. Stojanović 2009). The 2008 celebration of the Statehood Day was held in Orašac, only two days before Kosovo independence was proclaimed. In his speech, Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica, drew a parallel between the Middle Age struggle against the ‘Turks’ in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the First Serbian Uprising in 1084 and the current situation. He also stressed that Serbia in Kosovo defends much more than its independence. Thus the recognizable patterns of antemurale Christianitatis discourse were employed that already played an important role in negotiating the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo during Milošević’s regime.²

² At his Gazimestan speech on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1989, the then president of Serbia Slobodan Milošević stressed that “Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself on the Kosovo Plain, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended European culture, religion, and European society in general.” The same metaphor was repeated several years later, in the 1990s, but then it referred to the contemporary situation in Europe and to a need to protect the continent from an ‘Islamic onslaught.’ Dragoš Kalajić, a Serbian journalist and painter stated that “The fact of Islamic onslaught on Western Europe by peaceful means, by means of mass immigrations, threatening to turn European nations into national minorities within their own states, only accentuates the importance of the Serbian struggle for the overall defense of Europe, European culture and civilization.” (Kalajić 1994, as cited in Bakić-Hayden 1995: 925)
Intra-national reconciliation: giving up socialist legacy

Another intra-national reconciliatory aspect observable in practices commemorating Statehood Day in Serbia after 2000, concerns the attitude towards the recent, socialist past of Serbian society.

In official discourses, creating a new foundation for the Serbian national identity by establishing a new set of symbols, rituals and practices is conducted in order to achieve national reconciliation. Socialist symbols and holidays are excluded from this identity because of their controversy and ideological weight. The law regulating national and other holidays in Serbia adopted on July 10, 2001, abolished the Statehood Day established by Slobodan Milošević, March 28, a day when Serbia “regained its integrity” by abolishing the autonomy of the provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The same regulation abolished the socialist Serbian National Day celebrated on July 7 (the day of uprising against the fascist occupation), with the comment that “in our history we have more significant days which are apart from that also less ideologically burdened.” (cf. Hofman 2011)

Exclusion of socialist and Yugoslav legacy as inappropriate and “not representative” for the modern Serbian national identity, opens the way for establishing a direct continuity between pre-WW2 monarchist Serbia and the post-2000 state. “After 50 years of non-freedom in 20th century, Serbia has returned to itself and to the world and is once more starting from the beginning,” emphasized Prince Alenksandar Karadorđević at the celebration of Statehood Day on February 15, 2002 (http://www.royalfamily.org/press/press-det/press-313_yu.htm).

Distancing from the Yugoslav and socialist past, and excluding the socialist legacy from narratives that maintain national identities is a common trait in post-socialist Europe. The violent breakdown of the Yugoslav federation made these processes even more intense in the former Yugoslav successor states. These processes are also closely related to historic revisionism and reinterpretations of events and roles in the Second World War since in the post-socialist societies events of the WW2 cannot be separated from succeeding decades of socialism.

Both the rejection of socialist legacy and the revisionist reinterpretations of WW2 history significantly contributed to the strengthening of nationalism in Eastern Europe. As shown by Dubravka Stojanović (2009), anti-communism and revisions of the past as tools for nationalism were employed in Serbia before the year 2000 as well as after it. It may even be argued that these processes accelerated after 2000. In the Serbian political discourses, Milošević’s regime is regarded as communist, and consequently ‘democratic changes’ in 2000 were negotiated as a victory of the ‘democratic opposition’ over communism, making this opposition a legitimate carrier of the national idea (ibid.). “This way,” Stojanović maintains, “political parties that formed new government in Serbia could present themselves as ‘real fighters for the national matter,’ which was a new ideological trap for people in Serbia. The new elite kept the people locked in the nationalist interpretation of the present, the past and the future.” (Ibid.)

Historical revisionism and the neglecting of the socialist past are essentially related to nationalist ideology and ‘intra-ethnic reconciliation’ in the former Yugoslav societies. It would be misleading, however, to entirely neglect their relationship to discourses and values emerging in a broader context, in the framework defined by the European Union.

In these broader discourses, socialism is regarded as essentially a non-European legacy that represents an obstacle for Eastern European societies to fully integrate in a ‘democratic Europe.’ The Socialist past of these societies is also a reason that ‘core Europe’ treats them paternalistically: the President of the European Parliament, speaking at the conference in Ljubljana on May 13, 2008, said that “[t]he current Slovenian Presidency of the EU is the best testament to the fundamental change that has taken place in this region over the past two decades. This is an extraordinary achievement, when you consider that less than 20 years ago Slovenia was part of communist Yugoslavia.”

The East Europeans themselves often treat socialism as something essentially non-European, that originated in Asia and was enforced upon them, threatening their otherwise profoundly European identity (as a result, accession to the EU is returning home). This kind of discourse
was already being used by opponents of the socialist regime after the WW2. For example, in emigrant newspapers of the Slovenes in Argentina: “We, who saw with our own eyes how Asiatic ‘freedom’ looks, could not believe that somewhere in the world there existed a country where a person could still live in peace. And so we came to Argentina, where freedom is so great that to us, accustomed to European circumstances, it seems too great. Argentina does not have concentration camps, or torture rooms that could be born only of Asiatic bestiality, or curfews, or the secret police that throw you out of your bed in the middle of the night never to come back, or paid spies who follow your every step and are willing to testify on order against you before ‘people’s court;’ there are no member cards of various colors here for those more and those less reliable, and even an opposition member can sit in a national office and vote against his employer.” (Svobodna Slovenija, January 15, 1948)

“These tens of thousands of fighters defending freedom and Christian civilization from the assault of Asiatic communist barbarism experienced their first disappointments during the first few days of their exile. Instead of the recognition of their persistent fight in the frontline against the greatest enemy of every freedom and human dignity, various accusations of ‘treason’ descended upon them from various sides.” (Svobodna Slovenija, May 5, 1949) “The Slovenian nation, which was more than any other European nation suffused with Western culture and civilization and Christian ideas, was along with its neighbors left in a cold-blooded manner to the exploitation of repulsive foreign Asiatic force to which every true Slovenian felt aversion.” (Svobona Slovenija, April 27, 1950) An example from post-socialist Romania, cited by the anthropologist Katherine Verdery, reveals how this kind of discourse functions in the context of accession to the EU. In 1991, at the founding rally of the Civic Alliance Party it was said that “Romania today has two possible directions before it: Bolshevist Asiatism or Western, European standards. Between these, [we] see only one choice: Europe, to which we already belong by all our traditions since 1848.” (Verdery 1996: 104)

Negative attitudes towards socialism shared by Serbian political elites and the EU, lead to a paradoxical situation in Serbia where rejection of the socialist legacy caused marginalization of anti-fascism as a value, despite the fact that anti-fascism is regarded as a foundation of a ‘common European identity.’ (cf. Ifversen, Kølvraa 2009) Serbia was the only European state without a delegation present at the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. At the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Victory Day in Moscow 2005, Serbia did not send a high-level delegation as all other states did (cf. Stojanović 2009).

Conclusion: In search for a usable past

With their strong emphasis on the beginnings of the Serbian nation state, the 19th century legacy and symbols are today regarded as an ‘appropriate’ and ‘unproblematic’ part of Serbian national imagery. The spectrum of events encompassed by the celebration of the Statehood Day in post 2000 Serbia and the wide range of discourses (including modernist discourses, traditionalist discourses emphasizing values of the Orthodox religion, narratives of warrior/libertarian identity of the Serbian nation, etc.) enabled uniting and reconciling very different approaches to the Serbian identity. Thus conceptualized, commemoration of the Serbian Statehood Day as a central national holiday should be seen as a quest for a usable past that will provide a basis for a much needed national unity, and also present Serbia as a part of democratic Europe.

Narratives of Serbia and its modernist impetus in the 19th century should also be interpreted as a manifestation of nostalgia for an idealized past, characterized by modernity and prosperity, in opposition to the present, which is lacking these characteristics. “We were the first to have a state, we were the first to have a constitution, we were the first to have democracy, and now we have to acquire again all these things… As a great writer would say, it seems that we lost the 20th century. In the 19th century we made these great achievements, but then we lagged behind,” said historian Predrag Marković, talking about Statehood Day at B92 television on February 15, 2010. These words exemplify a nostal-
gic discourse that may be summarized with the phrase, *When Serbia was Europe.* Such a discourse does not always refer to the 19th century: it may also refer to earlier or later periods — including the socialist — as a frame of reference. However, the 19th century legacy, with its close relation to the idea of a national state, in the case of Serbia, represents a past that bears a promise of a national consensus about shared fundamental values. To which extent that the past can really be useful for politics of the future in Serbia, given the fact that its usage facilitates the processes of historical revisionism, the rejection of 20th century legacies, and accelerates nationalism, is a question that largely exceeds the particular Serbian context and lies in the foundation of the contemporary European anxieties about identity, the past and the future.

For example, a blogger who uses the name Alexandar Lambros posted on the Serbian b92.net portal a blog, "When Serbia was Europe." It is a historiographic text about the flourishing of art in Byzantium and King Milutin’s Serbia in the 14th century. Serbia is depicted as a state that was an important part of broader cultural processes. The metaphor of Europe is historically ungrounded in this historiographic text: as Peter Burke emphasized, until the 15th century the name *Europe* had been used only sporadically; the word had no special weight and “for many people it had not meant a lot.” (Burke 1980: 23, quoted in Mastnak 1997) Despite its anachronism, the metaphor of Europe in this blog is motivated by the sharp contrast established between the present — when Serbia symbolically is not part of Europe — and medieval times — when it belonged to wider cultural networks and developments.

References


Introduction

“I have always had a problem with this differentiation between Slovki - ans and non-Slovenians. Non-Slovenians are not English or Hungarians; they are always ‘the ones from the South.’”
— Montenegrin representative

The territory on which the independent state of Slovenia was created in 1991 was never ethnically and culturally homogenous. The number of ethnic minorities, their extent and real economical and political power varied through different historical periods with respect to changes of state borders and the sovereignty over this area (Komac 2005). After Slovenia’s independence there are members of several non-Slovenian ethnic communities living within the boundaries of the state. These communities can roughly be divided into two groups:

- historical or territorial national minorities (or the autochthonous national communities as defined by the constitution) including the Italian, the Hungarian and the Roma community;
- the so called ‘new’ national communities, members of which belong to the nations and nationalities of the former common state of Yugoslavia. Most of them immigrated to Slovenia during the 1960s and the 1970s as economic migrants.

1 The Slovenian constitution does not specifically define the term ‘autochthonous;’ in the context of ethnic minorities the term is used when referring to an ethnic community, which has occupied a certain geographical area ‘from old.’ However, due to numerous difficulties and dubious explanations (the definition of ‘autochthonous,’ for instance, is largely arbitrary) the term is criticised by several authors. For further explanation see Klinar (1986), Kržišnik-Bukić (2003), Komac (2005). Due to its arbitrary and manipulative nature the term ‘autochthonous’ is no longer used in EU’s documents in regard to national and ethnic minorities. In this sense, Slovenia is a discernible exception.

2 When using the term ‘new’ national communities we are referring to the definition of Komac (2003, 2007), though it has to be noted that this terminology too is perhaps a relic of the past rather than an adequate expression of the present times. The members of nations and nationalities of the former Yugoslavia have lived in Slovenia for several generations, so the use of the term ‘new’ national communities is disputable. As noted by Medica (2004: 98): “the current terminology is diverse, inaccurate and often degrading in everyday life... and thus — by all means and among other things — rather
The assurance and protection of the rights of (national and ethnic) minorities in Slovenia can be categorised into three spheres:

1. the relatively integral legislative protection of historical or autochthonous minorities (Italian and Hungarian), including constitutional provisions and about 80 laws and regulations, concerning various aspects of everyday life of minorities. Special rights, are of dual nature, being collective and individual rights simultaneously. The recognition of the dual nature of minority rights and the implementation of the 'positive concept of protection of minorities' is defined in the article 64 of the constitution of the Republic of Slovenia which also establishes an obligation on the state to assure the realisation of these special rights, morally and materially.

2. article 65 of the constitution, which establishes that the special rights of the Roma community in Slovenia are regulated by a special law;

3. members of national communities from the former common state of Yugoslavia do not possess a collective social status in Slovenia. The Slovenian constitution does not include particular regulations regarding the protection of their (collective) rights and their minority communities. When preserving their national identity, the ‘new’ national communities are only supported by the articles 61 and 62 of the constitution determining the right to express their national appurtenance and the right to use their language and writing.

The differentiation between individuals or social groups is based on their position in the social structure which is set in accordance to the (rare) material goods or skills and knowledge they possess, and to the available opportunities of changing their social status. Usually, the determining factors influencing the status of a certain group within the social structure, are the values and the attitudes of the majority society towards this group, its socio-economic position (level of education, employment …) and access to cultural, social and political resources. Members of national or ethnic minorities are underprivileged in certain social spheres and achieve inferior status within the social structure and are therefore more socially vulnerable and more susceptible to social exclusion.

In everyday life, societal integration of immigrants largely depends on majority attitudes, namely, on ‘autochthonous’ population. Research (Kržišnik-Bukić 2003; Komac 2007; Zavratnik, Kralj 2008) reveals that the attitude of the majority population towards the immigration of foreigners into Slovenia is generally dismissive, particularly so in the case of immigrants from the other republics of the former Yugoslavia, who, in fact, represent the major proportion of the immigrant population in Slovenia. Researchers point out that in contemporary societies a qualitative shift in giving expression to prejudice can be noted. While people used to express their prejudice through direct contact with members of other (stigmatised) social groups, today, we observe society avoiding these groups (Ule 1999). The Slovenian public opinion survey, which from 1992 on also measures social distance, can be interpreted along these lines. Immigrants and foreign workers were listed under the question “Which of the following groups of people wouldn’t you want to have as your neighbours?” The proportion of answers marking immigrants or foreign workers as unwanted neighbours has fluctuated over the years; it was highest in the years immediately after independence, which coincides with the wars in the area of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, when a larger number of refugees moved to Slovenia. According to the most recent available data more than a quarter of total population, taking part in a survey, said they would not want to have immigrants for neighbours.

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4 The law regulating the rights of the Roma community was passed through the parliament as late as 2007 and only after a long-lasting and heated debate.
This paper discusses the situation of members of ‘new’ national communities in Slovenia, focusing particularly on their experience regarding discrimination in the spheres of everyday life. We are arguing that discrimination, encountered by members of the ‘new’ national communities in Slovenia is often rooted in the lack of systemic regulation of their status as a minority. To gain maximum insight into the type, the extent, the circumstances and the consequences of the social, civil and political discrimination based on national or ethnic appurtenance we have decided to perform semi-structured interviews with members of minority associations, who are more active in representing the interests of minority communities and appear in the media.

**Discrimination in everyday life**

When speaking about discrimination or unequal treatment towards members of national/ethnic communities in everyday life, our informants emphasised the distinction between the overt and covert discrimination. The discrimination they are facing within everyday life is often rooted deep within the institutional level.

“They say that there are two sorts of discrimination, hard and soft discrimination. Hard discrimination is present in legislation, in laws and other legal regulations, while soft discrimination is something we meet in everyday life. The literature says, and I would agree, that soft discrimination is more common than hard discrimination … which is, nevertheless, present as well. Hard discrimination is present in a sense that our national communities are not acknowledged as national minorities in the Slovenian constitution. This is the first level of discrimination we are facing. We are not present in the constitution, though, in a way, we should be, as we were among the constitutive nations of the former Yugoslavia and the present-day Slovenia. In the first place the absence from the constitution. Then this continues in legislation.”

— Serbian representative

Another problem that comes to the fore is using one’s mother tongue in public, which is often the reason, why members of ethnic/national communities are regarded with disapproval or subjected to outright rejection. This happens despite the fact that the article 61 of the constitution of the Republic of Slovenia states, that “Everyone has the right to freely express affiliation with his nation or national community, to foster and give expression to his culture and to use his language and script.”

“As there are remarks in the sense ‘How dare you [speak in your mother tongue; author’s note], this is Slovenia!’ Most of us use our mother tongue when we speak on the telephone. … But a certain discomfort is always present. If you speak in English, then everything is fine. This is the problem of small nations, which are very homogenous.”

— Bosnian representative

People we interviewed drew our attention to the subtle pressures exerted upon the members of national/ethnic communities because of the use of their mother tongue on their work post, which can lead to different forms of ‘self-censorship’.

“As far as public use of our mother tongue is concerned, of course, it can represent a problem. For instance, when I am at work and my phone rings and I know that a Serb is calling me, I will always carefully observe who is around to hear me speak. There is nothing spontaneous about answering the call. At one occasion it happened that I left the office and spoke on the phone in Serbian in the corridor, when a co-worker approached me and told me to be careful, when I speak, as someone could hear me.”

— Serbian representative

### Table 1: Ethnic distance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do not want immigrants as neighbours</th>
<th>SPO 92/1</th>
<th>SPO 93/1</th>
<th>SPO 94/1</th>
<th>SPO 95/1</th>
<th>SPO 98/1</th>
<th>SPO 99/1</th>
<th>SPO 00/1</th>
<th>SPO 01/1</th>
<th>SPO 02/2</th>
<th>SPO 05/3+4</th>
<th>SPO 08/1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in %</td>
<td>39,6</td>
<td>55,6</td>
<td>40,5</td>
<td>18,1</td>
<td>28,5</td>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>28,5</td>
<td>20,6</td>
<td>22,6</td>
<td>17,6</td>
<td>28,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Science Data Archives, http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/en/
“When we call someone on the telephone, the first thing we ask is ‘Možeš da pričaš?,’ ‘Can you speak?’ and this does not mean ‘Do you have time to talk?,’ but ‘Can you speak Serbian?’”
— Serbian representative

According to our informants, discrimination in everyday life varies amongst the different generations of ethnic/national communities, living in Slovenia. The first generation has faced specific problems, mainly because of their lack of proficiency with the Slovenian language. The next generation of young people, born and educated in Slovenia, usually do not have this problem, however, they are facing other difficulties. All the people we spoke to point out that the second and the third generation suffer stress caused by an identity crisis, which is best described with the question ‘Who am I?’.

“Then we have the second generation, which is hurt, which does not receive enough of our attention and is torn apart between different worlds, without the possibility of drawing knowledge and strength from the cultural identity of their ancestors. On the other hand they are stigmatised and cannot fit inside the wider younger generation. The young have to struggle to be accepted for who they are but without any scorn.”
— Serbian representative

“The younger generation is in some severe distress. They live in this conflict. Let us say that they speak Slovenian at home and then a question arises ‘Who am I?’ and it is easiest just to say ‘I guess I am Slovenian.’ On the other hand the environment does not perceive these kids as Slovenians, but rather as a sort of a foreign body in the national corpus. They will always remain immigrants. Sadly, it is the surname that defines the attitude of the environment towards an individual.”
— Serbian representative

To gain further insight into the blurred boundaries of ethnic identities we held a focus group with seven youngsters, whose parents migrated to Slovenia in search for work in the late 1970s and 1980s.

“I proudly declare myself Albanian! People tell me I was born and educated here in Slovenia, but no! No way, I am Albanian and proud to be one! I am living here, I know one additional culture, I speak one additional language, but I could never declare myself Slovenian. But I would never want to live in Kosovo, either. Recently, I was there for two weeks and I started to miss Slovenia, I started to miss my way of life. Maybe I am partly Slovenian, after all. I am Albanian but part of me is Slovenian, too. Maybe not just a small part. You see, only now that we are talking about this, I am starting to realise I am partly Slovenian, too.”
— Albanian youngster

“It’s difficult to decide… What does it mean to be Slovenian — culture, traditions, language, religion? I like Bosnian culture; it feels so close to me, we even have a prayer rug at home. I would say I am somewhere in between. I am not a real Slovenian, but I am not a real Bosniac, either. In a way, I am Slovenian, I have Slovenian citizenship, I like Slovenia… But to declare myself Slovenian, this is a tough one! You simply cannot — the culture is different.”
— Bosnian youngster

“Hmm, this is a difficult question. I would put it this way: ‘Macedonia is my mother, Slovenia is my step mother. Macedonia could not provide me for a living, Slovenia can. Otherwise, I feel as Macedonian, living in Slovenia. But I could never go back, living in Macedonia. Only for vacation, but living there, no, no way…”
— Macedonian youngster

The emotional distress of the second and the third generation, trying to be recognised as equal within mainstream society, is also apparent in the process of quiet assimilation or self-assimilation, which is well illustrated by the alteration of personal first names and/or surnames.

“In my experience, the alteration of surnames, I think, is rather...
common in the second or the third generation. Then this voluntary assimilation takes place, when a person wants to have an easier life and says to oneself: ‘Why did my parents give me this first name or this surname?’ And of course if there is an opportunity, these kids write ‘ć’ instead of ‘č’ and thereby participate in a sort of soft assimilation. The second and the third generation can have this aversion towards the members of the nations they originate from. … I think this is a consequence of this soft assimilation, of the desire to be closer to the majority population and then this represents a burden. A child with such a surname gets a feeling of inferiority, is labelled for life with this mark. In the first generation we are aware of this from the first moment — we know, where we came from, but the third generation… they are in a very difficult situation, it is hard for them to identify themselves as they have lived here since they were born. They could be Slovenian, but are not and so they ask themselves: ‘Why am I not Slovenian?’ This represents an enormous emotional pressure for young generations.”

— Serbian representative

“Sometimes I felt like… in the primary school, even though half of my schoolmates came from the other republics of Yugoslavia, I had a feeling that I am surrounded by Slovenians, that I am the only Bosnian child. I was ashamed; I didn’t want to tell my mother’s name, because it sounds so different. I had a feeling of inferiority.”

— Bosnian youngster

“This pressure is huge. The son of my friend is 25 and could not get a job anywhere. So he gave up his father’s surname and took the one from his mother. There are some examples... for instance, Rasim becomes Rastko.”

— Bosnian representative

“I know some people that changed their surnames in order to have better possibilities, to achieve more in society. Many people told me to at least change my surname, to change the ‘ć’ into ‘č’ but I don’t want to. I am who I am, I want to show other people that my surname is not important. I am not inferior because my surname ends with ‘ć.’”

— Croatian youngster

Whether or not there is an ethnic distancing by the majority nationality towards immigrant populations depends on the current social context and the political situation as well. Public opinion research polls observe a growth of intolerance towards immigrants during the time just before the attainment of independence of Slovenia and immediately after it. The results of the research project Perceptions of Slovenian Integration Policies from 2003 demonstrate that 70% of the participants in the survey answered that intolerance among people exists. 40% of participants in the survey thought that there is more intolerance present in society that there was before the declaration of independence, 30% thought that the level of intolerance has not changed, and 13% believed that there is less intolerance than there used to be. Serbs, Bosniacs and Muslims among the sample population, have mostly answered, that the level of intolerance has risen (Medvešek, M, in: Komac, M, [ed.], 2007: 199).

“Before Slovenia became independent the relationship towards the workers, let’s call them immigrants, was dismissive but still tolerant to a certain degree. However, when there was a conflict, the immigrants were always the ones to blame. Various penalties and pettifoggery were usually aimed at immigrants rather than domicile workers. This was a sort of reaction of the national corpus. During and after the declaration of independence of Slovenia this intolerance towards people intensified. Intolerance was partly a result of hate speech, used by the politicians, when referring to the nations of the former Yugoslavia, especially Serbs, and this had an effect on people. The differentiation of Serbs, Croats, and Macedonians was not insignificant. This lasted for five, six years and is now slowly calming down.”

— Macedonian representative

**Conclusion**

Members of national and ethnic minorities in Slovenia (whether recognised by the constitution or not) are facing various forms of discrimi-
natory treatment and social exclusion in everyday life, which could be considered as consequences of ethnic distance, ethnic rebound or ethnic intolerance. At the same time, we can predict that individual minority communities are affected in different areas and to a different extent and with different intensity. The absence of a legal status defining minority rights of unrecognised ethnic communities and the stereotypically negative attitude of a part of the majority population towards immigrants, particularly those from the former Yugoslav republics, are the main factors governing the position of ‘new’ national minorities in Slovenia. As noted by Medica (2004: 99), these communities “… without a determinate status and designated terminology remain invisible social groups.”

Discrimination based on ethnicity is not only an ethical or a moral problem of a certain society, but is also a latent scene of action for political conflicts. A striking example is the situation of the ‘erased’ inhabitants of Slovenia, citizens of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, who were erased from public registers of the population of Slovenia by means of a collective administrative step in 1992. Despite the ruling of the Constitutional Court that this action was not legal, their situation has hardly changed to this day and this issue is only reaching the response of the wider public as a collateral victim of winning political popularity during the election campaigns.

Prejudices and stereotypes which support the discriminative attitude towards the (‘new’) minority communities are more than merely oversimplified judgements arising from narrow-sightedness or limited knowledge. Prejudices and stereotypes include political analyses and represent political measures, ideological tales which are the crucial driving force of existing societies and economic relations. They can only exist if they include all crucial material carriers of ideologies like the family, school, media, and politics: they require discursive networks of signs, systems of symbols and manners of discourse and coding. Of course they also require the ‘living power’ of people, who identify themselves with both sides of the prejudices, to start up the material and symbolic machinery and to keep it in motion. Prejudices and stereotypes based on ethnic appurtenance are nothing but alibis for the displays of power, so they probably do not even deserve their old-world names any more. Ethnic discrimination — whether insulting remarks and attitudes or the perfidious violence of ignorance — which is based on the alibi of prejudices is therefore never ‘an event,’ but rather a process, nesting within the relations of power.

References


Segregated identities, multidimensional exclusion and mental health: the case of Roma

Keywords: Roma, segregation, exclusion, mental health, housing conditions

The paper presents a case of segregated identities of the Roma and the impact of multidimensional exclusion on their lives and mental health. It gives special attention to the living conditions of a group of Roma in Ljubljana, Slovenia, and explains how these are connected to the exclusion of the minority group and presents how these function in a circle of different exclusion moments. It draws from international literature as well as ethnographic research conducted in a Roma settlement, focusing particularly on Roma women. The paper shows the interconnectedness of a certain identity to social exclusion on a case of a minority group, present and discriminated throughout Europe.

Introduction: Ethnic groups and mental health

Identities which face social exclusion and discrimination, are usually minority identities. In a globalising world these do not become equal elements in a social-mix, but on the background of rising nationalisms become even more vulnerable. This vulnerability, fuelled by inequalities (economic, social, etc.) becomes a risk factor for individuals and groups. This paper will focus on the consequences of this vulnerability and mental health problems and how they are connected to migrant and minority identities.

International research (Fernando 2001; Trivedi 2002; Bhui 2002; Urek, Ramon 2008) shows that ethnicity and mental health have a close relationship because migrating, in of itself presents intense stress and has a major impact on individuals who migrate or have migrated. The mental health field is very complex and multidimensional: it not only involves medical and psychological debates, but it demands a wider context of understanding (taking into account circumstances such as religion, ethnic and gender dimensions). Suman Fernando (2001) states that the mental health of each individual should be observed in his or her cultural context (ibid.: 189). Also, anthropological studies have further demonstrated that how emotional distress is expressed and the way support is offered is culturally specific. The helping professions should therefore reject the universal concepts of sameness and the idea that cultures are not more or less developed, but simply different. When we are addressing crises we need to focus on a personal definition of a situation from the perspective of the one having the crisis (Fernando 1995, 2001; Ramon 1996; Zaviršek 2000).

In this paper, we will present the situation of Roma people in Slovenia, especially Roma women, in the context of one of the Roma settlements in Slovenia’s capital, Ljubljana. We draw on stories collected for

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2 In this paper, we understand the term ‘minority identity’ as a person’s categorisation by others (or self-affiliation) as a member of a group, which is a minority group (in this particular case an ethnic and cultural minority).
the purposes of a research project in 2008 (Hrženjak et al. 2008), which serve as our case studies. The findings cannot be generalised, as they are based on a small number of 10 interviews and a number of informal conversations, but they clearly show the issues connected to segregated minority identities, exclusion and mental health. Multidimensional exclusion, as it is experienced by the inhabitants of the settlement will be presented and also how deeply social exclusion and mental health problems are intertwined. The Roma, especially experience multiple deprivations (bad living conditions, unemployment, discrimination, etc.), which lead to social exclusion, resulting in a high-level of stress and other psychological problems.

The relation between ethnic groups and mental health problems is fuelled by the experiences of social inequality. Social inequality is a consequence of structural patterns, not individual choices, that call on society to provide for marginalised groups (Leskošek 2010). This begs social workers to engage in social action, challenging and eliminating structural inequalities. First studies on ethnicity and mental health (dating as far back as the 18th century, and more extensively in the 19th century) discuss such issues as how black people cannot become depressed, because their life-responsibilities are not as great as white people (Zaviršek 1994, Fernando 1995). The criterion for measuring the occurrence of depression was the frequency of visits to the psychiatrist, which lead to conclusion that people from ethnic minority groups have less mental health problems that those in the majority, because their life was not so stressful. Barnes and Bowl (2001) have shown that in the field of mental health it is exactly the ethnic groups that are the most vulnerable because of the experience of moving (leaving homes and states). Migration involves expectations to find a better life, but this is usually not the case; mostly, migrants face the pressure of assimilation which opens up identity cultural issues and dilemmas (should they give up their own cultural habits and act as expected, or should they maintain their own culture and risk exclusion, discrimination, and harassment). Moreover, coping strategies in the case of mental health problems vary among cultures. Studies from the UK and USA show that members of minority groups need more psychosocial help because harsh living conditions and low economic resources are risk factors generating crises and resulting in mental health problems. Unemployment, bad living conditions, and a low access to education influence one’s identity within underprivileged groups, which more often than other groups are admitted to psychiatric hospitals. Research in the field of mental health (Fernando 2001, Bhui 2002, Pritchard 2006) shows that the most frequent way of support in mental health that people from minority groups receive, is hospitalisation — involving high dosages of medicines.

Studies in ethnicity (Littlewood, Cross 1980; Mckenzie, Murray 1999) have identified that the Afro-Americans are more often admitted to closed wards and that their ethnicity affects psychiatric diagnoses, which submit them to being closely watched and heavily medicated. Studies also show that they receive psycho-therapeutic treatment more rarely than the majority group. Black people more often than white people are diagnosed with a mental health disorder. Suman Fernando (2001) has verified beyond doubt the existence of racist theories which demonstrate that the biased treatment of non-white people perceived them to have lower mental capabilities.

Ramon and Urek (2008) have shown, how one of the main factors for mental health problems, the so-called cycle-deprivation, passed from one generation to the next. Urh (2009), who has done research with Roma in Slovenia has shown transgenerational deprivation: Roma are one of those social groups, where more generations are experiencing various modes of deprivation in important areas (employment, living conditions, access to health services and education, social networks, leisure time, etc.).

Social exclusion always takes place in multiple areas, which means more risk for crises. The stories, shared with us in the Roma settlement prove that the people face numerous mental health crises and distress, connected to multidimensional exclusion. The compiled research provided a foundation which made it possible to identify the circle of exclusion that represents a threat for the emotional health of it’s inhabitants.
The case of a Roma settlement in Ljubljana, Slovenia: the situation

The Roma, whom we spoke to, live in a settlement of sheds which was primarily constructed (in the 1970s) as temporary housing facilities for construction workers. They were originally intended to be torn down at the end of the project, but during the war in the Balkans the sheds were used as a temporary housing solution for migrants from ex-Yugoslav countries. The bulk of the migrants, placed in this settlement have been Roma; the primary number of inhabitants in this small settlement has reached 500, including families and others who have joined them (many reside in the settlement illegally). For urbanism and other reasons this settlement has long been planned for clearing and rebuilding and re-development with occasional media reports speaking of the immediate relocation of its inhabitants.

Housing situation

Living conditions (housing situation) in the settlement are very poor: multi-generational families cohabit in very small spaces, some of the sheds don’t have private bathrooms and toilets, water and electricity is insufficient. Some sheds are not sufficiently protected from the rain, creating consistent problems of dampness and insufficient heating. The settlement has no proper road, and is separated from the rest of the environment with a barbed wire fence, etc. Such conditions have a direct impact on health and hygiene, and consequently also on the mental health and self-image of the inhabitants. They seem to be in the state of ‘temporality’ (cf. Zorn, Sobočan 2010): never knowing when they will have to leave their modest homes, which contributes to their insecurity and stress. Some of the inhabitants have tried to improve their living conditions by renovating, improving, amending their living spaces, therefore, the constant threat of moving and possibly a move that is enforced suddenly, even though it has long been expected, (but due to this also very distant and distanced), will also mean a destruction of the invested efforts to improve their lives.

Access to information

Another element in this aggravating situation is that the inhabitants are insufficiently informed, and constantly ask themselves and anyone coming to the settlement, what will happen to them and their ‘houses.’ Even if occasionally they get assurances from the municipality that they will be provided for, the insecurity about their situation is constant because they are not informed about how they will be provided for, what they can expect, what are their rights and possibilities. Many of the inhabitants have another issue to deal with: their legal status is not clear, as they are not citizens, but might only have a residency permit, a temporary residency permit or, are even without any status (‘paper-less’). Their situation is particularly unclear, as usually most of the rights are connected to their citizenship status. During our field visits, we have met two older women, who are illiterate, don’t have a family and don’t have any kind of legal status in Slovenia.

Economic status

Additionally, most of the inhabitants face a poor or disastrous economic status. At times some couldn’t even pay the very low electricity and water bills and were left without both for considerable periods of time. Some of them would turn to collecting, cleaning and selling metals and wonder if they will still be able to survive in this way after they are relocated to an unknown location. Some of them cannot afford to arrange their ‘papers,’ because they can’t afford the taxes. A bad economic situation also hinders any kind of integration, equal participation of their children in school, etc. which all additionally contributes to their segregation and marginalisation.

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3 Since the first draft of this paper (2010), some of those people had a legal right to reside in the settlement, are starting to be sporadically relocated to other housing facilities.
Living situation of Roma: segregation and marginalisation

The living/housing conditions are a key part of the quality of life and welfare of any population. The joint EU policies, primarily the strategy to fight poverty and social exclusion (Lisbon strategy) brings to the fore three issues: problematic neighbourhoods, insecure housing and homelessness, — and calls for dealing with these. Numerous declarations, documents and statements emphasise the importance of appropriate living conditions for every human being. These documents include for example The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 25), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 11), the UN document The right to adequate housing (stating freedoms and entitlements connected to that right), the Istanbul Declaration, the Agenda Habitat, the European Social Charter (article 31), European Convention on Human Rights, etc. In today’s European social politics, the question of housing is foremost a part of those debates which are concerned with the fight against exclusion and homelessness (Mandič 2006: 16). Historic marginalisation of the Roma population also influence the general opinion that the Roma are content with their living conditions, and that these conditions are adequate to their life-style (Delepine 2006), or that they don’t need better living conditions because they are used to and practically adapted to harsh conditions. In all European countries, the Roma, on average live in the worst living conditions (in cities, this would usually mean ghetto settlements; Kovacs [2004] describes this in detail for Budapest). Providing housing opportunities, as one of the basic human rights, has in Central and Eastern Europe worsened during and after transition times, when ‘funded housing’ became very scarce: this has created the ‘housing poor,’ people, who are not able to rent or buy in the real-estate market, or keep their own housing (Fearn 2004: 9).

Zaviršek writes that forced moving can cause irreparable psychological damage — this is a traumatic event which affects a person even before it actually happens, because it holds the person in uncertainty (Zaviršek 1999: 133). Arthurson (2004) has, in the case of Australia demonstrated that when settlements which are planned to be demolished are depicted in the media as dangerous, and their inhabitants as socially dysfunctional, this produced a pathological image of the settlement and its inhabitants and legitimised the eviction of the people from their homes, as well as adding to their trauma.

Numerous research have demonstrated that there is a close relation between the location of a settlement and access to services, employment possibilities, language integration and education, all which influence and then enforce the differences between the majority and socially vulnerable population (e.g. Sampson, Sharkey 2008, Cristaldi 2002), while the spatial segregation also creates social distance (Gijberts, Dagevos 2007). Segregation, mostly forced but often seemingly voluntary disables access to social contacts and services (e.g. Puckett 2005, Bouma-Doff 2007).

The effects of segregation in the case of the Roma population in (Eastern) Europe have been identified by many authors. Vassilev points to Bulgaria and shows that the state provisions concerning the Roma were usually intended to create new segregated settlements and schools, which caused even more of a divide between the Roma and the majority population (2004: 42). Rughinis (2006) presented research on the social construction of Roma identity in Romania and other Eastern European countries showed that living in a perceived Roma settlement usually lead to bad attitudes from public service employees, barriers when registering children into a preferred school, or when choosing a family doctor — all which are signs of discrimination formally unacceptable, but obviously very prevalent in the case of the Roma. Zoon wrote about the Czech government building settlements to separate the Roma from the rest of population, placing them into ‘holobyty’ — living arrangements for ‘socially un-adapted persons’ used for ethnic concentration and segregation (Zoon 2001). Gijberts and Dagevos have demonstrated that ethnic concentration has a negative impact on the minority group. Higher education levels, better positions in the labour market, etc., are connected with contacts made within the majority group as there is a “connection between a structural and social integration.” (2007: 816)

Both spatial segregation and limited access to contacts and servic-
The impact of social exclusion on mental health

Reasons and forms of exclusion

The stories we collected in the Roma settlement in Ljubljana can be demonstrated with a circle model of social exclusion, as shown on the diagram below (figure 1). The rectangles show the categories stemming from the interviews, and in the view of the interviewees, most connected to their crises and distress. All interviewees explicitly stated that what is the most problematic, is their insecure, unclear and bad housing situation. What they face is a key issue, which enforces their vulnerability and insecurity: when will we have to move and where to? For years, it has been planned to tear the settlement area down. Coming as ‘outsiders’ to the housing area, the inhabitants would frequently ask us if we came from the municipality, and if we knew when they will have to leave their homes. Such a situation has a devastating effect on a person’s mental health. Srna Mandič (1995) says that living (housing) conditions are a key part of the quality of life and welfare of the population.

The principal reason for the exclusion of the Roma is the exclusiveness of the majority society, exhibited in many ways. The social exclusion of the Roma is complex and multi-dimensional and it demonstrates itself in various levels of their lives, but most of all on the level of education, employment, access to social welfare services and active participation in social and political life. Dragoš and Leskošek (2003) say that people don’t start their lives in neutral and unstructured environments; they are born into social spaces which significantly determine conditions and opportunities for life (2003: 24).

One of the factors of exclusion is the illiteracy of Roma women which is accepted as a given fact. We met many middle-aged women

Figure 1: Vicious circle of exclusion of Roma women
during our research who were illiterate because they had never gone to school. The younger women we met (about 20 years younger) were more often literate. We found that many of the Roma women had gone to school only for the first few years: the youngest illiterate woman in the settlement, was 34 years old. We asked two of the illiterate women, why they think they were not able to go to school. One of them (34 years old), and who has lived in Ljubljana since her childhood, said that her parents had to work and she had to take care of her brothers and sisters, as well as the household. The second woman (43 years old), who had spent her childhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina, told us that in her culture it is very important for a girl to keep her innocence until she is married, so her parents kept her at home. Both cases demonstrate the connectedness with patriarchal ideologies (work inside the home — taking care of the family, and control over the body/sexuality).

Illiteracy is gender specific. A woman, let us call her Fidana, said: “I cannot write. You know, when we were living in Bosnia, it was like this: when there was time to go to school, the girls had to hide ourselves in the attic. My mother did not enrol me to school, and people from the school would come to look for the children. My mother hid us girls in the attic and covered us with blankets. We had to be quiet. And we were. This is why I never went to school and I have no knowledge. They covered us with blankets so that the teachers would not find us. Only men went to school. That is the reason, why they can all write. Women can’t write. They also cheat on us because of that. Some time ago, I had to take a taxi, and he took 10 euros from me for a very short ride. At the grocers I just give my wallet to the cashier, and she takes the money out.”

Illiteracy makes it impossible to participate in the job market or claim one’s rights (i.e., illiteracy or functional illiteracy are the reason for one’s inability to file social support claims, etc.), which only furthers economic exclusion. Katarina Meden, who was working with the children in the settlement for a long time, believes the main reason why children have to go to the special needs school (a school for children with intellectual impairment or learning problems) is that they don’t know the Slovene language and are therefore unable to communicate appropriately or express themselves, etc.) so they get classified as impaired. Also, many children don’t finish obligatory primary school education because of their poor understanding of the Slovene language, which in the past has been frequently used as a reason for placing Roma children in special schools (Zaviršek, Urr 2005). This is a clear case of exclusion and segregated education, based on racist implications — Roma children are seen as intellectually less capable than other children. Suman Fernando (2003) demonstrated such practices by showing how biased research has tried to prove that white people are intellectually superior to non-white people.

Exclusion is also visible in the field of employment. The ratio of employed/unemployed persons in the settlement was impossible to count. Nevertheless, during our fieldwork visits we noticed mostly women present in the settlement. They told us, that their husbands were working. According to their recounts, only two women from the settlement were employed (one of them cleans trains, we found no employment information for the second woman).

Our observations show that social exclusion is evident in all areas of the lives of the Roma people. It is a vicious circle with different circumstances and difficulties connected: poor housing and bad living conditions; denial to employment, education and services and unemployment, poverty and bad health. Bad living conditions and low income make people poorer and more vulnerable while at the same time racism
and other exclusionary practices experienced by the Roma create stress which has an impact on their health (Bhui 2001, Trivedi 2002, Fernando 2003). These worries generate anxiety (especially the fear of everyday survival) all of which are contributing risk factors for mental health problems.

**Special focus: Roma women and mental health problems**

Our perspective in this paper is influenced by the fact that in our field work we mainly spoke with women.

What we observed during our fieldwork visits are patriarchal family relations which contribute to the risk factors concerning the mental health of women. Women stay at home, are responsible for the household, do the shopping and have to manage the survival of the family. Our interviews have shown us, that the women perceive situations as stressful on many levels and practically everywhere. The risk factors for mental health include poor living conditions, limited connections to the outside world, overload of housekeeping work, disrespectful and degrading attitudes from men, the feeling of not being able to ever escape the situation in which they are. One of the women told us: “Being at home is not so easy. I do all this work, and nobody appreciates it. It makes me very sad very often.”

Taking care of the home practically from their childhood on, triggers distress: “You know, I am ill on my nerves. I take many medicines. I am going to see my psychiatrist today, to give me higher doses. I am very nervous.”

“I am ill on my nerves. The psychiatrist gave me two medicines. I have also been in the psychiatric hospital. I don’t know what to take. I don’t know how to read, you know. Somebody has to read it to me. But the medicine help me to be less nervous.”

“I have to go to the psychiatrist today. I am very ill on my nerves. I am nervous, I have worries. We have no money, we have no clothes. Everywhere I go, they give me bad looks. The last time I was at the Red Cross, they offered me very bad clothes. I cannot buy anything for my grandchildren, but I want to. And then I feel bad.”

As it is clear it the above three recounts, Roma women in this settlement express their daily suffering and troubles mostly with the expressions: “I am ill on my nerves. I am nervous.” They often try to look for help at the psychiatrist’s, who usually give them medicine, and they become frequent users of psychopharmaceuticals (mainly sedatives). Several women reported during same day that they had to see a psychiatrist. This evidently shows that visiting the psychiatrist is an important connection to the outside world. It seems to be an important event which they look forward to and perceive as essential, even if they just go to pick up their medical prescriptions. “He always gives me medicines, because I need them. I feel really bad, and my soul hurts.”

The women seem to believe that if they are able to feel calm, then all their difficulties and troubles will go away. The fact that Roma women are frequent patients at psychiatric hospitals was cited by Simona Neuvirt Bokan (1997), who explored the life of Roma in the east of Slovenia. Another risk factor concerning the mental health of Roma women is their weak social network, which usually consists of a few individuals, who are themselves in the same situation. The sum total of their social network consists of a few friends and family members usually only available to them via the phone. “I don’t have any friends here in the settlement. I do talk to the neighbours, but we are not close. I don’t tell them about my personal problems.”

“My friends are my family in Bosnia. When I have the money, I visit them. This is usually during the holiday (bajram).”

Besides housekeeping, another source of stress for Roma women is the fear of losing their children: “The social services suggested I should put my kid in an institutionalised care, so he will learn things and have a good life. But I won’t let them take him. None of them.”

Another Roma woman said that social services suggested she should let the father have the children. “My children are my biggest capital. Even thinking that they might go, makes me sad. I become depressed by the thought that the children would live with their father.” The ever present fear of losing her children by having them taken away from her also gives the impression that this woman was not able to fulfil
the only role given to her as a woman: taking care of the home and the children.

**Conclusion**

The mental health condition of the Roma population in Slovenia is difficult to follow, because separate statistics based on ethnicity do not exist and we cannot ascertain how many Roma have received treatment in Psychiatric hospitals. What can be determined is that the number of Roma, using mental health social services (this data is being collected by non-governmental organisations) is very low. Only one organisation (non-governmental organisation in the field of mental health) has reported two Roma women seeking help.

As found in Fernando (1995), in the study on mental health in a multi-ethnic society, certain ethnicities receive poorer psychiatric services. One of the outcomes of such poor treatment is less access to services such as psychotherapy and counselling (based on the prejudice that these patients are less capable to follow a counselling process): their symptoms are addressed only with medication. From a cultural point of view presented by Fernando (ibid.), in certain cultures this can have an opposite effect, it could undermine the value system of the user, by threatening his/her cultural healing strategies. For instance, it could be said that good mental health in the East involves balance and harmony with oneself, family, and community, while the West seems to prefer self-sufficiency, independence, capability and resistance (Fernando 1995: 17–18). Medicalisation can also mean a decontextualisation of an individual’s life situation.

The results from the collected data (including mental health) conclude that the Roma are one of the most vulnerable ethnic groups in Slovenia. Frequent use of psycho-pharmaceuticals cannot be connected to the stereotypical images of the Roma or any minority ethnic group which depicts them as having less feelings; that they have less worries and stress; or that they need less support — but actually speaks of the fact that their needs are not properly answered by the social and health services.

Isolation and ghettoisation is the reason for the Roma’s weak social network, add to that their low economic status, and their problems become even bigger and more hopeless. The Roma in Slovenia who migrate from other ex-Yugoslavian countries, face numerous stress situations: migration, in of itself, (economically and emotionally); learning a new language and culture; social isolation and lack of any contacts or network in the new country. The basics which should be provided for include, but are not limited to: accessibility to information, (that includes literacy training and support and free language learning opportunities); social inclusion (social-mix, addressing segregation); and finally, understanding ethnicities and identity differences by offering appropriate and contextualised complex support.

It is important to understand the connection between the reasons (bad living conditions) and the consequences (social exclusion, addiction to psycho-pharmaceuticals, mental health problems), and how these reasons and consequences have a circular nature which create a never ending cycle. Identifying the reasons is important in planning services that take into account the differences among ethnic groups and apply culturally different approaches. For quality services in the field of mental health we first have to be aware of the ‘ethnic realities’ (Urh 2009), which foremost means understanding and taking into account exclusion and racisms. In a globalising world, where (self-constructed and ascribed) identities are becoming demarcation points on which inequalities and exclusions can be pinned to, it is of utmost importance that we strive to provide all social groups with an opportunity for equal participation in society which is not a private property, but something that we all share.
References


Resistance strategies against social power and consumer ideology: Slovenia resisting the Empire

Keywords: transart, contemporary art, socially engaged art, Slovenia, globalization, consumerism, tactical media, bricolage

If the term contemporary art signifies several practices that appear in contemporaneity yet only few significantly corresponds its features and structure as well. The author uses the term transart to distinguish the very contemporary approaches in art from the mainstream contemporary art, whereby transart holds a very important distinction — if contemporary art or global art rather follows the flow of globalization, transart on the contrary, being inspired by historical avant-gardes and the critical theory of society, encourages critical awareness. The author focuses on the period of the last twenty years (the fall of the Berlin Wall signifying an important demarcation between modernity and contemporaneity), especially, the last ten years, when artists have responded to the global swing of capitalism and Slovenia’s entering the Empire. In this regard the author particularly focuses on the tactical media that respond to global communication structures, the positions of power and control, and ‘bricolage’ used in art in order to resist the uniformism of the consumer culture and the ideology of consumerisms, which both meet in the growing ‘temples of consumptions.’

Transart vs. contemporary art

Global society is marked by certain features, such as establishing global premises, the consequences of recent capitalism as related to the free market, consolidation of significant information-communication systems (net structuring, digitalization and telecommunications), and the rise of specific sciences and technologies, etc. These features express contemporary global culture, as well as they structurally and functionally signify contemporary art understood in a Hegelian sense, i.e., as art reflecting and expressing the spirit of its age. From this point of view, one can hardly say that all the contemporaneity art truly expresses this age. Most art that appears today rather continues the traditions of modernism; this holds true even for art that is commonly understood as the contemporary art, — the argument being that contemporary art is not truly contemporary has been recently and notoriously acknowledged by Terry Smith. Worldwide, art that appears today, which has the same features, no matter where on earth it is produced, and which could be called global art, is the contemporary art that has been strongly criticized by Julian Stallabrass. He recognizes ‘heated’ talk about globalization has been ubiquitous in the art world and it has followed a wave of enthusiasm for globalization that has swept through the discourse of economics and politics, along with the humanities. In his view, the art world has taken up a politically liberal part of the rhetoric on globalization, recommending the benefits of cultural mixing, or hybridization, that results in the praised demolition of cultural barriers accompanying the supposed destruction of trade barriers. In such a sense, contemporary art is supporting the overall vision behind this rhetoric, which is the dream of the global capital. (Stallabrass 2006: 9–10) Stallabrass sees connections between the changes in art with changes within the art institution, more generally, i.e., the phenomena of establishing biennials and other art events founded across the world throughout the 1990s; with building new museums for contemporary art, or expanding the old ones; and last, but not least, in the adoption of corporate ideals and the establishment of the alliances with business, bringing their products...
closer to commercial culture and modeling themselves less on libraries than on shops and theme parks.

In this text, I am not interested in building up another critique of contemporary or global art or expanding the existing ones, but in arguing for a kind of contemporary art that holds very contemporary and global features, where it cannot be framed within the above mentioned theories of contemporary art. Such art, which within it’s structure, is more complexly accommodated to the new conditions and has rather exceeded the modern determinations of art as art, and it could be even claimed that it is not art in the ‘traditional,’ i.e., in a modern sense (at this point the reader shall be aware of the discourse on the end of art, most notably represented by the American philosopher Arthur C. Danto in the middle of the eighties, 2 in which the issue of art as art has been discussed as well, and in which Hans Belting has pointed out that the period of art has ended (Belting 1983, 1987). Such art is by no chance postmodernist art, as the art that comes post or after modernism and is for the most part only its radicalization (as this was ascertained by the theorists of postmodernist art [for example Hassan 1987]). It is not post-historical art (as called by Danto) that would appear after the end of history (this refers to the theories on the end of history again inspired in Hegel through Kojeve’s reading, or even more in Marx) (Fukuyama 1989) in which everything is possible and for which one cannot use any criteria since it does not have any orientation, and which does not bring anything that would have a historical importance, anything really new — thus it cannot be truly contemporary, since it only combines or recombines what has already been seen and done in the past, i.e., in history. However, this is not exactly true, — even postmodernist art already expresses the globalist tendencies and contemporary spirit,— this could be comprehended if one links it with contemporary culture, independently of whether one likes it or not. The profound connection between the two has been plausibly described by Fredric Jameson, who did not understand postmodernism only as (bad) art expressing global economy, but also, as the very cultural essence, the cultural dominant of late capitalism (Jameson 1991). I will use the term transart to denote the phenomenon of art that I would like to crystallize here. 3

2 The thesis on the end of art that has been first published by Danto in 1984 (in: Lang 1984) was actually developed from his previous philosophy of art which was built in the atmosphere of the much present analytical thought of the time (at the end of the 1950s) in the American context, marked with the Neowittgensteinian’s ascertainment that art could not be essentially defined on the basis of its perceptually experienced features. Danto’s philosophy of art as found in his The Transfiguration of the Commonplace is thus on the one hand a try to define art in its non-perceptual conditions in which now the historical and theoretical contextualizations are inscribed as well, and on the other hand this work rather announces the supposition of the end of art which has been more complexly discussed by the author in The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art where the reader can detect strong Hegelian influence related to Danto’s thesis of the end of art — not only in referring to Hegel where the thesis has been announced for the first time, but also in understanding art through its context, which also means not essentially but relationally. The institutional theory of art represented by George Dickie, which defines art as what the art institution or the world of art (here these are the artist, curators, critics, gallerists, collectors, etc.) recognizes as art, has been defended at the same time, and it actually followed Danto’s emphasis on the world of art (in his case meaning above all the theory and history of art) and contextual explanation of art.

3 The author has published a monograph on this issue (Tratnik 2010).
ernist conception of art as a high elitist cultural practice designed for only a few specialists, and of art as a pure autonomous discipline, clearly separated and cleansed from others in society. In order to comprehend transart it is necessary to understand that it is a cultural practice clearly reflecting contemporaneity. Thus, it has to be considered in regard to a society which has been transiting from modernity to post-modernity; put on the throne as the post-industrial; the consumer; the media; as the informational society; as the society of electronics; high technologies; as well as the reflexive society and the risk society. Furthermore, transart is not focused on the production of artifacts functioning as commodities and designed for contemplation in especially designed sacral places such as galleries and museums. However, it is devoted to research and often results in non-material, but rather processual, temporal outcomes. This specificity corresponds to the turn of economic relations between production and consumption. Especially interesting are the explicit tendencies of this art to exceed modern differentiation with new modes of connecting art to science and technology, as interdisciplinary and is encouraged in other social spheres as well. As modes of research, such art uses contemporary tools of expression, technologies, and specialized environments. Jurij Krpan, the artistic director of the Kapelica Gallery from Ljubljana, one of the leading supporters of such art world-wide, explains: “It is probably not difficult to understand that the use of contemporary tools and expression techniques is inextricably bound to the topic or subject of the thematization of the artwork itself. The complexity of the information technology can only be adequately thematized with complex tools, techniques and procedures that arise from it.” (Krpan 2009: 85) The artist is not defined by being trained as a painter or in any other artistic profession. The artist is a manager, a conceptualist, a communicator, a philosopher, a humanist, a social researcher and social servicer, or even a biotechnologist. Mostly, the projects are structurally, functionally and technologically demanding, take a lot of time, and need strong and complex production infrastructure. For special interests and objectives they include not only artists, but also various professionals from other social fields and disciplines (neuroscientists, cosmologists, biotechnologists, sociologists, etc.). In this manner, transart is entering various ‘nonartistic’ discourses questioning actual ethics, culture, anthropology and philosophy. It appears as a hybrid of art, humanities, social and natural sciences, technology, including social service, which is an important dimension of several projects presented here.

The avant-garde inspiration: retro-avant-garde, retroutopism

At the end of the 20th century the interest in the historical avant-garde has grown. In 1984 a political art collective, *Neue Slowenische Kunst*, was established and brought several groups together: *Laibach* (music; established in 1980), *Irwin* (visual art; established in 1983), *Theatre of the Sisters Scription Nacise* (in function until 1987; since the 1990s, its leader Dragan Živadinov has been running the *Noordung* project, a *Cosmokinetetic Theatre*), *New Collectivism* (design), and *Department of Pure and Applied Philosophy*. The retro-avant-garde hybrid collective emphasizes collective work and uses totalitarian rhetoric (especially the Laibach group) combining heterogeneous rhetoric, visual communication, and symbols that refer to the Slovenian political past and present (including the nationally important reference to the Alps and countryside sphere significantly present in the ‘Blut und Boden’ philosophy, as well as in social or even socialist realism in Slovenia, and in traditional cultural elements from hunting and industry, etc.); e.g., not only nazistic and communist symbols, but also pop and other symbols. In the 1980s (in

4 The myth of the gallery as the cleansed bright isolated space designed for proper quiet contemplation of art works as elitist or sacred objects which may not be touched, etc. has as well been destructed in the times of art testing its boundaries — the ideology of the gallery as the white cube has been revealed in the precise analysis conducted by Brian O’Doherty — his essays under the title “Inside the White Cube” have been first published in the Artforum magazine in 1976, and later in a monograph (O’Doherty 2000).

5 In 1987 the collective produced a big scandal which revealed the similarities be-
1983 by Laibach, *Monumental Retro-Avant-Garde*) and especially in the 1990s (Peter Weibel, Marina Gržinić and the group, Irwin), the term, *retro-avant-garde*, was invoked to denote a revision of art history which needed to be completed in order to shed light on the overlooked production of art from the East within the predominant historical and theoretical narrations written in the West. In this regard, the collective, Irwin, developed a concept of *Eastern modernism*. The project of bringing to light the Eastern European art production, which during the 20th century is strongly politically colored, has subsequently been complexly conducted by Zdenka Badovinac, the manager of the Museum of Modern Art, with the *Arteast Collection 2000 +*.

Another term invoking avant-garde movements in Eastern Europe has been coined by Inke Arns in 2006. With the term *retroutopism*, Arns, is however, not as interested in the project of rewriting history and revealing Western dominance in historical narrations, but rather in those contemporary interests for the historical avant-gardes, which bring up the media-technical conceptions from the beginning of the 20th century, at the time more or less understood as utopian: “This artistic engagement with historical avant-garde in a kind of retrospective, media-archaeological examination of avant-garde utopias, checks the media-technical possibilities, which are present in the avant-gardes, but were not yet realized. … In contrast to the other three directions (retro-avant-garde, postutopism, neoutopism) … here significant is a media-archeological interest in a renovated activation of media and technological utopias of historical (above all Eastern European) avant-gardes.” (Arns 2006: 265)

The key figure on this point identified by Arns, is the artist, Marko Peljhan, who was strongly interested in certain historical avant-garde figures and their technical experiments and conceptions. However, his activity has been re-oriented from a retroutopist approach to a tactical media approach, found increasingly present in his work after 2000. His work and also work by some other artists interested in the historical avant-gardes has become increasingly oriented to the present context.

**Global communication structures and tactical media**

Today, the global communication infrastructure is a combination of a democratic model of a network where theoretically each point of reception could, as well, be a potential point of broadcasting. Thus, every point in the network has an equal position in the communication system (using the internet as an example by eliminating the power positions and relations and controlling mechanisms, which of course, cannot and should not be eliminated, — not even theoretically), and an oligarchic broadcasting model with one way communication which is useful for totalitarian regimes and which was generally present in the 20th century public media systems (the models of the television, radio, etc.). The presence of the oligarchic communication systems teaches us that power can be attained, simply, by holding the broadcasting positions under its control. Thus, the radical activist plans which tend to warn about this fact as attempts are made to be in position in order to spread its alternative voices indicate the occupation of the broadcasting stations. *Infokalypse now!* by Sašo Sedlaček (2008) is an initiative for the establishment of an autonomous media zone at 700 MHz spectrum, “within which analogue television stations broadcast at present. With the introduction of the digital signal by 2012, the majority of the spectrum, just like the present-day analogue technology, will become a junkyard, which will be appropriated by the capital.” (http://www.sasosedlacek.com/anglesko/projects_infocalypse.htm) Sedlaček suggests building up a simple broadcasting system which could be used by anyone, especially cultural centers. There were several centers that followed the initiative and established autonomous media zones. Sedlaček collaborated with Sandra Bašić Hrvatin, the leading media theorist from Slovenia, and in 2007, a guerrilla studio began to operate at the Kapelica Gallery. During
the first broadcast by Ms Bašić Hrvatin herself, she talked about those aspects of the digitalization of television channels that national offices prefer not to talk about. The claim to free the spectrum for cultural broadcasting after the transition to digital signals, and last but least that it is a public property. All of which has been defended by Sedlaček and Bašić Hrvatin in the manifest presented to the members of the Slovenian parliament in January 2009 (http://www.vest.si/2009/01/26/infokalipsa-zdaj/).

A similar initiative has been conducted by Marko Peljhan in Insular Technologies. This is truly a democratic model, similar to the internet but an alternative, autonomous, and independent communication system with no power control, where each participant is not a passive receiver of the program broadcast by others, but can actively use the communication territory for connecting with other similarly isolated units. For Peljhan, an important referential figure in his projects from 1997 to 2001 (Situations in Wardenclyff, Solar, Signal-North!), is Nikola Tesla, the Serbian innovator from the beginning of the 20th century, who initiated some revolutionary concepts of the communication system that seemed utopian at the time but visionary from today's perspective. Tesla was the first who promoted the idea of a global wireless broadcasting/communication system; in 1900 (Wardenclyff, Long Island), he concentrated on the so-called ‘world system’ which includes a radio-energetic transmitter for the entire globe (Tesla actually started to build it). The ‘world system’ should enable quick and exact wireless transmission of any type of signal to whichever part of the world and use all the existing telegraphic and telephonic systems. Tesla actually considered establishing a network, in which each telephone subscriber could connect with any other telephone subscriber on earth. He believed: “[i]n the future the question of distance is irrelevant.” (O’Neill 1997: 260) It was 1904 when he wrote: “With a simple and cheap apparatus, which one can take with him in his pocket and could use anywhere on land or sea one could record world news and receive messages designed only for him. In such a manner the complete Earth is going to transform itself into enormous brains, of which each part would be able to respond.”

(Daniels 2002: 101) Peljhan is interested in the advanced innovations by Tesla, and in the bold thought of some other avant-garde figures such as Velimir Hlebnikov (Russian formalist) and Bertolt Brecht, speaking about communication systems and believing that mass media such as radio and television will have enormous significance for future cultures. Once the entire globe is covered by radio stations (Hlebnikov 1985: 272), Hlebnikov believed the radio of the future will not only transmit sonic information but also visual or even sensual stimuli for smell and taste (written in 1921, “Radio of the Future” [ibid.: 273]). Brecht defended a critical stand towards the radio medium since it serves the consolidation of the existing social order therefore: “From a device for distribution, radio needs to be transformed into a device for communication. Radio would be the most magnificent device for communication in public life as one could imagine … if it could also receive and not only broadcast, if the listeners would not only listen but also talk, if the radio would not only isolate them but establish relation between them.” (Brecht 1966: 140–141)

With globalization in the late phase of capitalism, digital media has strongly expanded and now there is a challenge to re-read the early discussions on tele-media from the beginning of the 20th century and find early activist initiatives, visionary conceptions and technological appeals. Since the 1990s, critical thought has been rising within an increasingly controlled society (and increasingly sophisticated control systems go hand-in-hand with technological development, along with the proliferation of communication technologies). In this sense, Peljhan’s work shifts from the retroutopistic approach, convincing described by Arns, towards the tactical media strategies which are rather oriented to very contemporary situations and social problems. “The term ‘tactical media’ arose in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall as a renaissance of media activism, blending old school political work and artists’ engagement with new technologies.” (Lovink 2009: 32) As explained by Geert Lovink and David Garcia in the manifest of tactical media: “Tactical Media are what happens when the cheap ‘do it yourself’ media, made possible by the revolution in consumer electronics and expanded forms
of distribution (from public access cable to the internet) are exploited by groups and individuals who feel aggrieved by or excluded from the wider culture. Tactical media do not just report events, as they are never impartial, they always participate and it is this that more than anything separates them from mainstream media. … Tactical media are media of crisis, criticism and opposition. This is both the source of their power.” (Garcia, Lovink, http://www.ljudmila.org/nettime/zkp4/74.htm)

A good example of media activism (also acknowledged by Lovink) is the extensive *Macrolab* (1997–) project by Peljhan. It has begun with an aim to establish an autonomous, self-sufficient system and research structures in isolation. It concentrates on telecommunications, climate changes and migration patterns. Peljhan believes in resistance, however, he speaks about strategies of minimal resistance to emphasize that resistance, although on a large scale, is only a small point of resistance in comparison to gigantic systems of economic, military and political power. (Peljhan 1999) Igor Zabel, the late Slovenian curator and art critic, believed Peljhan’s theatre of resistance has “three main aims, and all of them are connected to the idea of pointing to the (socially) invisible or overlooked. The first aim is to turn the attention of the audience to the particular structure of the contemporary world and the antagonistic social relations (the ‘global warfare’) determining this structure. The second aim is to make the audience aware of the possibilities offered by the very technologies used by the power elite as means of repression, neutralization, and control. … The third aim is to propose actual, developed models of strategic behavior and resistance.” (Zabel 2002: 93)

With his work, Marko Peljhan, systematically and complexly develops resistance strategies based on military strategies by inventing alternative autonomous systems in an age when power is being conducted through the global communication infrastructure. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt believe today’s form of sovereignty is one of an Empire: “The passage to Empire emerges from the twilight of modern sovereignty. In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is *decentered* and *deteritorializing* apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers.” (Negri, Hardt 2000: xii) As such, the resistance and activist strategies must take the situation into account. Peljhan’s interest in establishing autonomous zones and other interventions into beyond-national space as space, international waters and both earth poles, show the tendency to perform national or power evasion. The formation *NSK State in Time* is also resisting the government of the Empire with nomadism, ‘exodus’ or territorial evasion and hybridization of national subjects in a transnational form of a ‘state’ without a territory.

**Attacking the consumer ideology and culture**

Consumerism is one of the main features of contemporary culture. And for art, one of the important questions is how to develop a critique of consumer culture. The strongest theorists of consumer culture and contemporary art have searched but not found, art which takes and develops a critical stand towards consumer culture. Jameson understood postmodern art (more precisely: he analyzed Andy Warhol) as bad art since it is not as politically critical as it should be, especially according to the contemporary economic, political and cultural situations, but, instead only features capitalism: “Andy Warhol’s work, in fact, turns centrally around commodification, and the great billboard images of the Coca-Cola bottle or the Campbell’s soup can, which explicitly foreground the commodity fetishism of a transition to late capital, ought to be powerful and critical political statements. If they are not, then one would surely want to know why, and one would want to begin to wonder a little more seriously about the possibilities of political or critical art in the postmodern period of late capital.” (Jameson 1991: 9) Later, Stallabrass developed a similar argument for contemporary art: “contemporary art has moved into closer contact with selected elements of a mass culture that has become so pervasive that this turn is sometimes confused with a new engagement with the ‘real’ or ‘real life’. Art stars have long been celebrities, but now the art scene as a whole is treated
much like fashion or pop.” (Stallabrass 2006: 10) Even if Stallabrass’ arguments seem kindred to Jameson’s, they refer to recent situations and speak more widely about the art world, not just about singular works of art. Here I am arguing for art that not only specifically focuses about consumerism but is able to develop critical strategies.

Consumption has become a central activity of contemporary social life. In the market the contemporary consumer does not only look for new material products, but is also rather focused on the consumption of experiences and personal satisfaction. Zygmunt Bauman describes contemporary consumption as a dangerous combination of seduction and repression. Shopping malls or ‘temples of consumption’ are in tight relation to ideology. In the 1930s Walter Benjamin understood how powerful an ideological means film is, and wrote about the capitalist use of film in Western Europe (he did not experience the situation in the USA where film and other mass media were in an even stronger service of capitalism, as was precisely analyzed by his Frankfurt School colleagues, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer [Adorno, Horkheimer 1979]): “Under these circumstances, the film industry has an overriding interest in stimulating the involvement of the masses through illusionary displays and ambiguous speculations.” Today, it could also be similarly claimed for the temples of consumption: mobilization of the masses and an intellectual exodus is now being executed, mainly whelped by the speculations related to temples of consumption, and one could also number among them the cinematographic coliseums and enormous colorful relaxation environments, which try to take over the user’s imagination with their offerings. In such an environment, all the aspects of offer and thus, quality are first of all measured in superlatives.

In Slovenia and Other ex-socialist European countries the building of consumer centers accelerated after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the phenomenon of consumerism broadened within a decade. In 2003, the Laibach group, executed a happening, Einkauf (Eng. Shopping), in which the group walked the shopping malls with shopping trolleys dressed in their uniforms, in such a manner, that incited public shock. The happening showed that the totalitarian rhetoric the group used was able to poke society during the existence and destruction of the Eastern bloc, using painful similarities between the political totalitarian systems that still disturbed in a similar manner. This not only confirms the parallels between the consumer ideology and other totalitarian ideologies, but at the same time it reveals the obvious politics of the seemingly nonpolitical consumerism as the core of the late capitalist system. The invisible membrane of the Arcadian environment designed for enjoyment is instantly perforated. Therefore, on one hand the action shows that what should remain beyond exists as well, and on the other hand, it demonstrates that consumer culture is clearly politically structured in a totalitarian way, not bearing penetration of any other political-ideological winds.

According to Bauman, consumption is related to excessive individualization, moral indifference and the destruction of critical potential, which in previous historic eras has been assured by individuals with a feeling of moral responsibility, associated in the public sphere. Contemporary temples of consumption like shopping malls, destroy contemporary society and offer fake feelings of membership, which has nothing to do with feeling moral responsibility. A temple of consumption is a “self-enclosed ‘place without a place,’ unlike all the places occupied or traversed daily, it is also a purified space.” (Bauman 2000: 99) With the project, Beggar, Robot for Socially Deprived (2006), Sašo Sedlaček succeeded to strike the center of these problems. He noticed “that these spaces, which have taken over the role of city centers, are exclusionary. Despite the fact that they have displaced historical city centers, they have not completely taken over the function of an open public space available to all. You quickly notice that there are no homeless people and no beggars there; these people are becoming an ever increasing social problem, which was practically unknown here before 1990.” (Tratnik 2009: 18) The robot for socially deprived has been let for begging in the Ljubljana’s City Park and on the streets of Tokyo and Taipei. With Rent-a-Beggar (2007) Sedlaček has rented the beggar to Ljubljana’s homeless people for begging in the spaces of the BTC, where they are not allowed to enter and where they are also not allowed to sell their magazine, The
The sacredness of consumption spaces has already been violated with the parasitism performed by The Loop (2004). Using the medium ‘bricolage,’ a pavilion was made using materials from printed advertisements, cards, plastic bags, also including amateur radio components and “other packages, which could be found in each and every Slovenian home” and was displayed as a ‘parasite’ within the BTC shopping city beside a gigantic advertising billboard with the message: “BTC: This is my city.” It was possible to experience the object live, as if living while hearkening to the ‘noise of the city,’ i.e., telephone conversations, mostly by the police, taxi drivers, rescuers and radio-amateurs. The connotation of the shopping city as my city, my home is here perverted. The inscription now referred to two homes — the other, significantly smaller was held in regards to the ‘temple of consumption’ as unclean, but once inside it, seeming rather intimate and cozy. What type of consumption public space is it, that offers itself as home? According to Bauman, authentic public spaces are decaying, and being replaced by empty places or ‘non-places’ (such as airports, hotels, highways, public transports, etc.) (Bauman 2000: 102), which are robbed of any symbolic, identical and historical meanings — these are places related to public infrastructures and services for the collective consumption that maintain and support a system of flexible circulation of capital and reproduction of the existing social relations.

Additionally, Bauman ascertains that flexibility made possible by contemporary transport and communication systems and means, enable the capital and the new global elite to constantly move after profit, not caring for the values of traditional communities. Distance and space are looking after their importance because of the contemporary technologies enabling all-presence. Accessibility of any place on earth destroys local specifics of places and favors homogenization of culture.

With the project, Urban — Automat for a Dry Ware (2007), Sedlaček developed a modernized version of the Slovenian peddler, Urban from Ribnica (a small town in central Slovenia, known for it's homemade dry wares), by originally re-actualizing a specific local product. The automat, which offers authentic homemade dry ware for the price of 1 euro/piece, performs a principle of a ‘standardization of the local.’ The project responds to the phenomena of standardization, commercialization and industrialization of local ‘hand craft products.’ In the consumer culture genuine local products are vanishing, as well as ‘bricolage’ or ‘do it yourself’ techniques. However, recently, handmade products have began to gain a surplus value in the high-standardized European countries. ‘Bricolage’ has become appreciated for enabling resistance to the swallowing consumer society, not only in the sense of evasion, but also because of accessibility and recycling principles: it supports the smart use of used or cheap elements for new, pragmatically useful life conveniences. ‘Bricolage’ is also an important feature of the resisting art as one of the forms of transart since it resists cultural uniformism. As defined by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, there is a big difference between the thought of an engineer and the ‘bricolage’ practice: “The ‘bricoleur’ is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand,’ that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The set of the ‘bricoleurs’ means cannot therefore be defined in terms of projects (which would assume, like in the case of the engineer, there were, at least in theory, as many sets of tools and materials or ‘sets of instruments,’ as there are different kinds of projects). It is to be defined only by its potential use or, putting this another way and in the language of the ‘bricoleur’ himself, because the elements are collected or retained on the principle that ‘they may always come in handy.’” (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 17–18)
Conclusion

An important function art can assume today is to launch possibilities for social improvements. If the Dadaists and Benjamin appreciated scandal or public shock, this was because it was a tool to display the rejection of the bourgeois norms and values through indignation of a public logged with bourgeois ideology. Socially engaged art today is also modeling where it is able to mobilize the masses.” (Benjamin 2008: 40)

By more or less using non-artistic places which are already problem-locations, it can directly communicate with those to whom the issues could show modes of resistance against cultural homogenization and uniformism. It is art that can search and offer alternative uses of media. By more or less using non-artistic places which are already problem-locations, it can directly communicate with those to whom the issues should be addressed, i.e., social subjects, as they have been subjected to the dominant ideologies; they have entered power relations and games they play unwillingly thereby supporting all together. With the aim to stimulate critical awareness and rising social (and environmental) responsibility, such transart attempts are furthering the critical theory program of society, however, using methods with which broader audiences can more easily be reached. And this thought, holding a strong belief in the power of art in contemporaneity, brings us back to Benjamin ascertaining “art will tackle the most difficult and most important tasks wherever it is able to mobilize the masses.” (Benjamin 2008: 40)

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References
One music, multiple realities:

from local to global

Keywords: identity construction, popular culture, music, local

This paper deals with Istrian pop and rock music and how it used to reflect an entire range of local to global identities of its audience during the mid-1990s. Employing old, partly forgotten local dialects in its lyrics, combined with contemporary musical styles, this music became a means of conveying strong political messages, as well as a means of finding a place for oneself within a wide realm of constructed identities.

Vienna, AT

This is a revised version of the chapter "Globalization, Popular Culture and Music" (Kalapoš, J., 2002, Popularna kultura, regija in identiteta, Zagreb 2002).
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When looking at the thematic, methodological and concrete temporal teeter between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, during the age in which there are perhaps hundreds of definitions of culture being actively used, and after decades of collecting them in student textbooks and experts’ reference books, it is almost impossible to define the notion of popular culture, and it is especially hard to say what it does refer to. The use of the term, popular culture, has implied the existence of an apparent hierarchical difference between the so-called high and so-called low culture, the difference that also contained the class differences of the consumers of those two mutually opposed forms of culture³: “by postulating a correspondence between high culture and upper classes, and popular culture and lower classes, the class criteria also imply a relationship of superiority—inferiority, and minority—majority between the two cultures. … This distinction has in time undergone such a change as to produce a radical shift in the meaning of the notion of popular culture.” (Barbu 1976: 55) According to Peter Burke, “the traditional historian’s objection (is) that it is possible to write the history of popular culture because the documents are lacking or untrustworthy. We have to study the oral through the written and the illiterate through the learned. … The idea of an unchanging popular culture is a myth, a myth created by the educated townsman who sees the peasants as a part of nature rather than as part of culture, as animals rather than men.” (Burke 1976: 76, 81)

Since the introduction of the civil society, the processes of democratization and modernization have played a substantial role in numerous aspects of life, including culture. The forms of culture that had until recently been considered as elite and categorized as high culture have now become accessible to members of all of the social strata. It was ac-

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1 Vienna, AT

2 This is a revised version of the chapter “Globalization, Popular Culture and Music” (Globalizacija, popularna kultura i glazba), published in my book “Rock po istrijanski: o popularnoj kulturi, regiji i identitetu,” Zagreb 2002 (= Region, Ethnizität und Musik: Identitätskonstruktion in Istrien, Saarbrücken 2009).

3 It should be noted that, besides the notions of high or elite on the one hand and low or popular on the other, also recognizes the notion of ‘people’s culture’ (Ger. Volkskultur), which differs from the popular culture by the criterion of authorship. Namely, although the name of popular culture itself, derived from the Latin popularus (literally translated as people, folk) points to the popular character of its (musical, visual and other) contents, they usually do have named authors. However, the authors of the works of so-called people’s culture, are most usually anonymous (see Hausinger 1984, Rihtman-Auguštin 1991).
cessibility that up until now has been a major criterion of differentiation between the two cultures and nowadays we can see it rapidly vanishing; New York, Parisian, London, Viennese or Venice museums and galleries host exhibitions that daily are visited by thousands of visitors, (see Schiffler 1999), which pose new questions; Is the high culture of the past becoming the popular culture of today? Have the works of artists such as Van Gogh or Cézanne become a part of contemporary popular culture?

This evolution of accessibility imposed the task of generating a new set of criteria to define popular culture upon the researchers. Visual arts have become accessible through exhibitions, monographs and reproductions; classical music records and compact discs are sold by the millions of copies, as well as books, which are also publicly available through libraries at a nominal price, or even free of charge. Along with all of this, we have the media, especially electronic (radio, television and the internet), which enabled the transfer of information from one part of the world to another at lightning speed. Another factor is the establishment of two new audience groups, the professional group, (art, music, film, or literary) critics, and niche groups, a precisely defined targeted audience.

Furthermore, different cultural products have switched positions between high and low culture during the last couple of centuries, some of them several times. This mobility of cultural products, along with the stylistic changes of popular culture, make popular culture a dynamic, changeable category. “Popular culture can apparently be transformed into ‘high’ art by a simple critical act of appropriation. Indeed so insecure are these categories that the popular culture of one generation can become the high culture of the next and vice-versa — a fact that applies not only to individual artists but to genres (theatre, novel, film), sub-genres (farce, SF, detective fiction) and styles (romanticism, realism).” (Biggsy 1976: 17)

Before defining the boundaries of popular culture it should therefore be kept in mind that its definition is broader than ever; “Popular culture studies ... have embraced a very wide definition of culture, have resisted any particular set of theories and methodologies, and, above all, have sought to expand or perhaps more accurately, to abandon the notion of a cultural canon altogether. No form or level of cultural activity or text is automatically excluded from its purview.” (Cawelti 1996: 5) Although, as we can see, high and low, elite and popular cultures have with time overlapped, and sometimes even merged together, their distinction is still present in everyday speech and sometimes even in academic jargon.

Although present among members of all of the social strata, popular culture is above all a product authored by an individual or a group of people. The industry of popular culture or, as it is usually — quite inaccurately — called, entertainment industry, has developed into a complex mechanism with too much at stake for any of its stages, i.e. production, presentation, marketing, advertising and sales, to be taken anything but seriously. The influence of popular culture, especially of popular music and its power to mobilize masses, has turned it into a significant authority; “Producers (of meanings) encode their preferred meanings in cultural forms such as music, landscape, art or literature. The resulting text, — linguistic or visual, — is then read by an audience, in a manner sometimes concordant, at others discordant, with the encoded meanings. These meanings are then incorporated into lived cultures and social relations; feedback loops may then provide material for the production of new texts or lead to the modification of existing ones. Within this context, popular music as a cultural form can be examined in terms of the meanings encoded and decoded by different producers and audiences. Specifically, producers of music operate within the context of certain political, social and economic conditions, and with particular intentions. ... Music as a form of popular culture is constituted through individual and collective actions.” (Chye, King 1996: 215, 228) Authors of music (composers and writers of lyrics), as well as others who contribute to the production of music, are mostly aware of the influence their work can have. “The so-called ‘elite’ or ‘minority’ culture may have some influence according to the degree it is brought to the people and made applicable to their everyday lives. But the popular culture is already with the people, a part of their everyday lives, speaking their language.
It is therefore irresistibly influential.” (Browne 1984: 1) It is exactly this influence that makes popular culture a product aimed at carefully selected audiences — consumers — and its influence and power have been one of the primary topics of research during the last decades.

Even though forms or products of popular culture have been aimed at members of all age groups, popular music, being one of its most prominent forms, is primarily created for a younger audience; it has been considered as one of the main mechanisms of group and generational identification for decades (see Brake 1990 and his description of how music, together with football and clothes, is the main occupation and primary element of identification of the youth in Great Britain). This unquestionable attraction of music lies partly in the fact that popular and rock music is, in its roots, an urban phenomenon that brings “a dash of a big city” to smaller communities: “rock has been and is a new quality in content and form, in the messages and in its multimedial representations as authentic expression of collective experience under conditions of urban life.” (Mayer 1984: 151) Another point that makes music so attractive is certainly its globality, which enables listeners to develop a feeling of belonging to the ‘global village,’ as well as being up-to-date with global events.

There is a common belief that we live in a globalized world with a global culture. However, many of the discussions of popular music within the context of global culture emphasize that “contrary to common opinion, popular music is not universal, not only because there is no universal music, but because of the type of impact it has on the society as a whole. It may be global, its products may be sold in millions of copies of LPs, CDs and cassettes, it may be transmitted worldwide, broadcast by satellite and local radio and TV networks, but still, none of the pop hits is accepted or even known to every person in the ‘global village.’” (Muršič 1996: 59–60) In other words, although the process of globalization has been going on for some time now, there is no global culture as its result. The notion of global culture is most usually applied to certain cultural elements belonging to developed post industrial Western European and North American (with partial exception of Australia, New Zealand and some parts of Asia) countries and cultures. Parallel to the contemporary discussions of the term globalization, there are millions of people who do not have access to water, food and basic education, let alone technology needed to get the ‘global’ information and who cannot be introduced to the contents of the so-called global culture, be it rock music, McDonald’s restaurants, Coca-Cola, the Internet or popular soap operas. Therefore, the use of the term ‘global culture’ as self-evident can only be considered to be a contemporary form of ethnocentrism and should be re-thought very carefully.

What is in everyday speech considered to be ‘global culture’ is actually a set of elements that constantly change, are created, cease to exist, are replaced by others and possibly regain their original significance. Global culture should, therefore, be defined (1) either as a process whose dynamic of change is constant (2) or as a set of active and mobile elements. “A theory of culture, in this case global culture, is not ‘about’ culture/global culture, but about the concepts that culture generates, concepts that are themselves related in more or less complex ways to other concepts associated with other practices, and so on.” (Surin 1997: 202) Therefore, it would be more accurate to say that what is usually perceived as ‘global culture’ is actually the globalization of local — selecting certain elements of local cultures and mobilizing different (most often media and economic) mechanisms to adapt those elements to the ‘global taste’ and present them to the ‘global audience.’ In other words, it means that some features of local elements, which are considered to be less likely accepted throughout the world, are being subtracted and others, that are considered to be easily marketed, advertised and sold, are being added. One of the fine examples of this process is food; Japanese, Mexican, Italian or Chinese, it is served almost everywhere in the world; however, the original taste and ingredients are seldom preserved.

The humanistic disciplines — and especially ethnology and cultural anthropology — have recently developed research into reversing the process of adaptation of the so-called global culture (or, to be more accurate, of the elements that are considered to constitute global culture at any given moment) to the particular local circumstances, naming the
process as *glocalization* (see Maase 1998) or, as I would call it, *the localization of the global*. Glocalization is created through desire to select a cultural (or any other) element defining certain group or spatial identity that is considered to be distinctive of this identity and combine it with elements that are considered to be global. The process of glocalization, combining both local and global elements of identification, is thus used as means of overcoming fear of losing one’s local identity by the presence of ‘global culture’ and at the same time of overcoming fear of being culturally isolated by the ‘global culture.’ In other words, members of local societies are presented with an opportunity to participate (or have an illusion of participating) in processes of globalization, while at the same time enjoying well-known and familiar elements of local culture that offer them a possibility of re-defining their existing identity.

The best example of the process of glocalization within a wider scope of popular culture is popular and rock music performed in local (non-English) languages. Popular and rock culture denote music as a ‘global’ phenomenon used for identification of a large portion of young audience on the one hand and on the other, the usage of the national language offers both the understanding of the lyrics on a more basic and approachable level of identification. Of course, the process of identification goes further and deeper than the national and can be carried out at regional and local levels. In these cases, the standard variant of a national language is replaced by a dialect, but other ingredients of the formula remain the same: a cultural element considered to be local or authentic (for example, dialect) plus one of the elements that is considered to be global (for example, popular and rock music).

Musicians who use standard forms of their non-English languages for their music may not be as aware of the language as the media of communication as the ones who intentionally use their dialects. Throughout Europe, as well as in Croatia, dialects are used as one of the basic markers of regional identity, present merely in local media, at local cultural events and often seen as the expression of the authentic and the traditional, whatever that may mean in a particular context. It is thus interesting to take a look at the situation in Croatia during the 1990s.

Even though there has existed a vibrant dialectal music scene for decades, this easy listening music was primarily oriented towards the adult audience. One of the first newspaper’s report on the dialectal music created for the young audience was published in October 1994 in Zagreb daily ‘Vjesnik.’ (Knezović et al. 1994) The authors describe the way dialectal pop and rock music has spread all over the country, gaining instant and vast popularity, naming some of the proponents: Battifaca from Lovran, Gustafi from Vodnjan, ViM Forte from Rijeka, Alen Vitasović from Orbanići, Drelétron from Krapina, Zadruga from Zabok, Vještice from Zagreb, Gego Bend from Hvar, Šajeta & Capra d’oro from Opatija and finally Kuzma & Šaka Zulu from Split. However, what they failed to mention is that there was rock and even alternative dialectal music in the 1980s as well (among others, Franci Blašković from Pula or Azra from Zagreb).

Many of these musicians have vanished from the music scene before gaining national stardom; however, musicians from Istria, especially the threesome Gustafi, Alen Vitasović and Šajeta, have managed to obtain national popularity under the common name ‘ča-val’ (‘ča-wave,’ ‘ča’ being the distinctive pronoun of the Chakavian dialect), regardless of their stylistic differences. ‘Ča-val’ was actually the name of the top-chart of the Chakavian (Istrian and Kvarner) music on a radio station from Rijeka, which quickly became common for denoting the dialectal music originating from this area. It soon made Istria (and Kvarner, which was not as strongly visible) the only Croatian region with dialectal pop and rock music perceived as a style, and at a time perhaps even as a movement, recognizable and well-known in the whole country.

Since popular culture is created by an individual within a group of authors, it is important to look into the motivation (besides turning profit or gaining popularity) for the use of local dialects of those involved in ‘ča-val.’ The next part of the paper will therefore examine the statements given by those musicians in the Croatian press. This medium has been chosen for two reasons: first, it is itself a part of popular culture and it is interesting to observe the way in which one of its elements (verbal, printed) describes and defines another (musical, oral);
second, interviews are the basic way for musicians to communicate with their audience, of explaining their work and their attitudes, of explaining possible ambiguities and, last but not least, to develop their public image, which is essential in selling their product: music. Furthermore, newspaper articles have been considered an important source of information for ethnologists and cultural anthropologists due to their proven influence on the public (see Martischwig 1988: 27).

Besides Franci Blašković, who, together with his band ‘Gori uši Winnetou,’ became a cult figure of the Istrian scene back in the 1980s and who is always mentioned by all of the ‘ča-val’ representatives as the key figure of the movement and their musical role model 4, a group called ‘Gustaph y njegovi dobri duhovi,’ later renamed simply into ‘Gustafi’ achieved its local fame at the same time. Among the three most popular ‘ča-val’ performers, this group was the first to achieve popularity within the Istria region. The door to the rest of the country opened only after Alen Vitasović reached a surprising and almost instant stardom within the whole of Croatia. Not only was he successful at all of the festivals at which he performed in 1994, he also often publicly explained his reasons for using local dialect in his songs: “They ask me why I don’t sing in standard Croatian language. Why not, it will perhaps happen one day, but for the time being, it is the dialect that enables me to feel my songs. … I sing in Chakavian, Istrian, and what more can you do for your region as a musician? Do you understand?” 5 (Brnabić 1994); “I am bored with questions about singing in Istrian dialect. It is my mother tongue, I speak it as long as I can remember and it is the best for expressing myself. Of course, I can also speak the standard language…” (Matković 1994); “I think that, with time, language will cease to be important and dialects won’t be an obstacle for success. It is all about quality.” (Balen 1994); “Recently, in Pula, I have spent an entire evening with Dreletronic. He spoke Kaikavian and I spoke Chakavian and we understood each other splendidly. A singer promotes his region, why not?” (Cigoj 1995); “In my songs, I sing in the same language that I speak at home. Sometimes people ask whether I can speak the standard language. Well, of course I do, I have learned it at school. I am Croatian, I have to be able to speak our standard language.” (Jurić 1995) These are merely some of his numerous press-statements that show that for him, the role of the local dialect is primarily emotional; he sings in a language he grew up with, a language that enables him to express himself in a best possible way and a language that helps him promote his local community and his region. However, he never failed to mention that the use of the old fashioned, archaic and even peasant dialect did not affect the quality of music: “My goal is to make good music, my sincere music, American rhythm and blues, only with lyrics in Chakavian.” (Marijačić 1994)

Besides Vitasović’s emotional reasons, the usage of dialect in music also has historical and political connotations for the group Šajeta from Opatija. The band leader, Dražen Turina, who founded the group Yars at the beginning of the 1990s and thus became the founder of dialectal punk, later went on to found the group ‘Šajeta & Capra d’oro’ (Lightning and Golden Goat) or subsequently renamed into ‘Šajeta,’ the actual nickname of its founder. For Turina, “Chakavian is indeed a beautiful language. It is a bit archaic, and therefore more difficult to write in. … We are proud of singing in this language, although we are using it not because we thought it would become hit and make us money, but because of joy of singing in a language that brought our grandparents into trouble during the fascist period;” (Morić 1996) “Ča-val’ is important, Chakavian dialect is in and the kids today who listen to our music are happy to speak in this dialect, that used to be considered a language of peasants.” (Latinović 1997) We can see that Turina does not only speak about the emotional aspects of the dialect, but also observes its political dimensions; dialectal music and its popularity is seen as some kind of historical retaliation for the period when the former Italian government had sanctioned the usage of Slavonic (Croatian and Slovenian) languages in Istria and Kvarner. By taking the Chakavian dialect seriously and even translating a popular song from the standard Croatian

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4 Franci Blažević has, in one of his rare interviews, not only denounced his role as the founder of ‘ča-val’ but harshly criticised the commercialization of besida, the local dialect, by the music of ‘ča-val.’ (see Lucić 1996)

5 Articles published in Croatian have been translated into English by the author.
One music, multiple realities: from local to global

Kalapoš

into Istrian dialect ("Sve još miriše na nju" by Parni valjak into "Na nju još se diši"), Turina proves in practice the opinion of linguistic discipline that each dialect is a linguistic system in itself and can thus be considered a language, while the notion of dialect is a part of sociolinguistics and can be merely used to denote the position and mutual relations between the standard and the local languages: "A lexem can be held for dialectal only when observed in relation with the standard language. ... The linguistic status of a dialect is the same as the status of a language." (Damjanović 1980: 24) It is also important to mention that Turina, as well as Vitasović, combines the local identificational element with the 'global' contemporary musical standards.

This all shows that the musicians ascribe several levels of meanings to the use of dialect, from emotional (i.e. being honest with the audience, expressing oneself, speaking everyday language) to the desire of promoting one's region throughout the country and historical and political aspects (the use of the language that was prohibited only several decades ago and whose speakers have been pursued). The numerous connotations that have been added to the language make it more than merely a means of communication: "Dialect is not only the language of the people from the street, but also a historically defined language ('before') of people which is closely connected with the space and territory ('everyone') ... it itself transmits messages." (Köstlin 1990: 162–163) Dialect is perceived as a characteristic of the region par excellence and, thus, is given numerous identifying connotations. On the other hand of the equation, there is popular and rock music synchronized with the latest global trends and tuned to the young audience, for whom the consumption of cultural elements is one of the main avenues of identity formation. According to a British study, the consumption of music takes high second place (see Miles, Cliff, Burr 1998).

'Ča-val' can be studied within the Croatian context, but also in the context of the international world music and the revival of ethno trends. For example, the EU countries attempt to replace the loss of political importance of the national states by employing their cultural elements (see Delanty 1997). On the other hand, transitional countries are stuck somewhere in-between; they are adjusting a large portion of their public institutions to the EU standards, while at the same time they fear losing their authenticity and sense of identity. Employing cultural elements such as local dialects enables them to construct and re-construct their identity in a new context, not obstructing the political processes of international (European) integration.

At first, it may seem that 'global' and popular cultures, due to their general characteristics and the illusion of creating a unique world culture, do not belong within anthropological research and is (wrongly) accused of being responsible for the disappearance of the local and national cultural features. However, it is exactly the regional and local differences in adaptation of what is perceived to be global that can be used to detect the differences between local communities and their list of cultural priorities. It is applied not only to popular music, but to any other 'global' phenomenon. For example, even the seemingly uniform menus of multinational fast food corporations have large international differences. Discussing European ethnology, the Swedish ethnologist Orvar Löfgren has written that the discipline’s “competence should be furthered in studies of the ways in which the local, the national and the global interact, constitute each other, blend, mix or are kept apart.” (Löfgren 1996: 167) It should also be kept in mind that the processes of glocalization can be used to research into numerous other aspects of culture, for example, the construction of local, regional and national levels of identity. Popular culture is in no way an unimportant research topic. It reflects many of the processes studied by ethnologists, who usually concentrate on different aspects of culture, considering popular culture to be too banal: "As ethnologists we should devote more attention to ‘the nationalization of trivialities’... the ways in which national differences become embedded in the material realities of everyday life, and not only found in the rhetoric of flag-waving and national rituals.” (Löfgren 1996: 164)

Music offers numerous possibilities of social and political action, regardless whether it's authors are aware of it or not, whether they
wrote their music for political purposes, or it was politically instrumented without their consent or even knowledge. Especially in a region of such turbulent political history and multiethnic and multicultural composition such as Istria, the combination of music and dialect should be viewed in a broader social, historical and political context (see Starec 1999). The power of popular culture is vast and with the rise of electronic media, it is getting stronger by the day; it aestheticizes, forms, and politicizes everyday life and has a manifold influence on the ongoing process of (re-)definition of all levels of identity.

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The exotic, hybrid and progressive Balkan dance—the construction of shared meanings and concepts of identity within the Balkan music scene of Vienna

Keywords: Balkan music, Balkan, world music, exoticism, multiculturalism, ethnic identity

In Vienna, over the last two decades, a remarkable musical scene inspired by the geographical region of the Balkans, has been established. ‘Balkan music,’ as it is defined in this study, is a sub-genre of ‘world music’ consisting of a hybrid mixture of traditional musical elements from the Balkans and modern ‘Western’ styles. The main focus of this article lies on what has been attributed to the ‘Balkans’ within the Viennese ‘Balkan music’ scene. Through the analysis of qualitative interviews with artists and field-experts of the Viennese scene, the stereotypes and images existing about the Balkans and its musical tradition are being examined. Furthermore, the prevalent discourses about ethnicity, hybridity and multiculturalism within ‘Balkan music’ and their implications for identity building processes are being discussed.

Introduction

‘Balkan Beat,’ ‘Gypsy Groove,’ ‘Polka Punk’—these are just a few examples of the variety of popular music styles which hold connotations of the geographical region of the Balkans and its ethnical heritage. Over the last ten to fifteen years, these styles have been celebrating an increasing popularity, especially among the younger generation of the Western world. Due to its geographical, historical and social entanglements with the Balkan region itself, the city of Vienna has been established as a centre for these musical genres, with a large variety of corresponding artists, locations, and festivals, such as the well-known ost klub and the Balkan Fever Festival.

This article summarises the findings of an empirical research project conducted from Spring 2010 and Fall 2011 in Vienna. At its core were qualitative interviews with musicians and event organisers and a close examination of the Viennese ‘Balkan music’ scene with a special regard to the prevalent discourses on ethnicity and identity.

The central findings are: First, the music seeks to promote ethnical ‘authenticity’ (however that is defined) and thereby portrays the exotic and emotional ‘Balkan spirit’ as the contrary to the less exciting mentality of ‘Western modernity.’ Second, the success of ‘Balkan music’ largely relies on the mix of ‘Western styles’ on the one hand and traditionally connoted musical elements from the Balkans on the other, creating a certain notion of hybridity. Therefore, ‘Balkan music’ can be seen as a subcategory of the musical genre of ‘world music.’ Third, the music functions as a platform for negotiating the meaning of multiculturalism and intercultural dialogue.

We start with a theoretical insight into the role which music plays constructing identity. The main part of the article illustrates our findings regarding the shared meanings and concepts of identity among musicians, which include ethnic authenticity, hybridity and multiculturalism. Finally, we critically reflect how these concepts are constructed.
What is Balkan music? Analysing the field

We are aware that the use of the term ‘Balkan music’ for a particular genre could lead to misunderstanding. When using this term, we do not talk about all musical styles influenced by the Balkan region. Instead, we refer to a certain mixture of Western popular music styles and musical traditions from the Balkan region, which is also often labelled as ‘Balkan Beat,’ ‘Gypsy Groove’ or ‘Balkan Boom.’ This scene shows a certain homogeneity as far as its musical style, the demographic, and the social composition of its participants are concerned. Still we decided to use the term ‘Balkan music,’ because it is the only term broad enough for all musicians of this scene to identify with.

How can we make sense of ‘Balkan music’ — not only as a musical style, but also as a social phenomenon? One approach is to see musical practices as a reflection of social structures, as Bourdieu’s concept of habitus or the subculture theory suggest (Bourdieu 1987, Frith 1996: 108). Hereby we observe that personal preferences in musical styles correlate with demographic and social structures: As far as ‘Balkan music’ is concerned, its specific mixture of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ styles mainly attracts members of the highly educated upper middle class of the Austrian majority population as its audience.

Since its institutionalisation in the 80s, ‘world music’ has become an important and popular musical genre classification in the global music market. We see ‘Balkan music’ as embedded in the broader genre of ‘world music’ for three reasons: First, ‘Balkan music’ has been established as a subcategory of ‘world music’ in the global music market, represented by artists such as Gogol Bordello, Shantel or Balkan Beat Box (to mention but a few of the most popular artists). Second, the ‘Balkan music’ scene in Vienna is closely connected to the ‘world music’ scene, one example being the regular participation of ‘Balkan’ musicians at the ‘Austrian World Music Awards.’ Third, and most importantly, ‘Balkan music’ operates within the same logic as ‘world music,’ the most obvious being the dichotomisation of the categories of ‘West’ and ‘Rest.’ (Frith 2007 [2]: 152)

Other musical practices in Vienna also refer to the geographical region of the Balkans, yet following a totally different logic, having a different target group and portraying distinct stylistic features: For example, Turbo-Folk, which is a type of modern, electronic folk music, is highly popular among working class migrants from former ex-Yugoslavia in Vienna. Other musical practices could be labelled ‘traditional folk music,’ ‘Yugo Rock’ and ‘Balkanakenrap,’ which is a hip hop style practiced by young members of the ex-Yugoslavian diaspora (Behr, Pichler 2011: 122). These scenes are embedded in different ethnic communities, class and age groups.

As Frith remarks, it is not sufficient to look at musical preferences as a cause of pre-existing social phenomena, be it class relations or ethnic belonging. Music would be reduced to a reactive process, neglecting its potential to actively interpret and influence social reality. Rather, “the question we should be asking is not what does popular music reveal about ‘the people,’ but how does it construct them.” (Frith 2007: 261)

We suggest seeing a musical practice as a dialectic process, located at the crossing point between individual agency and social structure. It is an articulation of social structures, while at the same time it influences them in a certain way. A certain style of music can be seen as a mode of creating a narrative of identity and belonging to a certain group, enabling people to create and define their place within society.

There are certain concepts of identity and meaning, which are constructed within what we call ‘Balkan music.’ As we shall see, they are clustered around the discourses of ethnic authenticity, hybridity and multiculturalism. However, they don’t exist isolated from society, but are embedded in broader social structures, relations of power, and discourses.

‘Music in their blood’—ethnic authenticity and localisation

The discourse of ethnic identity in the Viennese ‘Balkan music’ scene is embedded in the broader discourse of ‘Balkan’ itself. Since the emer-
gence of the term in the 19th century the meaning of the term ‘Balkan’ has been very controversial: It’s not possible to define the borders of the region — it is not entirely clear which countries are included by the geographical term, the definition depends on the theoretical approach at hand³. ‘Balkan’ is by no means an objective category, although it is used as a geographical term. Without doubt a large variety of cultural and historical arguments were brought up in this context, but were camouflaged by geographical ones. (Todorova 1999: 55) ‘Balkan’ is not only a geographical term, it includes various social, cultural and political connotations which are partly negative.

Analogies between the Balkan and the post-colonial discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’ can be identified: extra-European regions are only thought of as a difference to the ‘West.’ (Hall 1992: 278) Therefore the result is the creation of a stereotypical other, which is in turn useful for the construction of a ‘Western’ identity. Both, the ‘West’ and the ‘Balkan’ are imagined as homogeneous entities. However, the hegemonic context can’t be ignored: Both identities are constructed in difference to each other, but the ‘West’ has the power to determine the definitions and to make the people of the Balkans experience themselves as the ‘Others.’ (Coronil 2002: 184)

‘Balkan’ is an ambivalent term. Its connotation is positive as well as negative. Both attributes — ‘Balkan’ and ‘Western’ — are in this context opposed to each other, whereas ‘Balkan’ stands for nativeness and the ‘West’ for civilisation. ‘Nativeness’ can in turn be split in its positive half, meaning down-to-earth, exciting, and authentic, and its negative half: uncivilised and dirty. Hall refers to this process as ‘stereotypical dualism.’ (Hall 1997: 308)

Whether stereotypes are positively or negatively charged depends on the individual, who is judging, and their understanding of their own culture. Cultural prejudices regarding the ‘brutal’ and ‘chaotic’ Balkans evolve if a person thinks of the Western society as shelter of progressiveness. Simultaneously the idealisation of the Other — in our case the Balkans — which Hall (1992: 310) describes, can be seen as a reaction to the contempt of ‘Western’ culture, which is perceived as rigid and artificial. This is described by one of the interviewed event organisers as follows: “The Balkan functions as the antithesis to the Western harmlessness, it’s a little bit macho, a bit virile, somehow freaked out …” In both cases — the positive and the negative — the form of representation operates in the same discourse — the binary representation.

Ethnic identity—or some kind of trumpet madness?

We understand musical practices as dialectical processes which reflect and construct social reality. The attributions of meaning to ‘Balkan music’ are not just created by the musicians, — the recipients and the event organisers also contribute to this construction process.

In ‘world music,’ ethnicity is a label of authenticity. In this context authenticity means the use of musical traditions of foreign countries (from a Western viewpoint) and their specific instrumentation. ‘Serbian brass,’ ‘Roma fiddle,’ harmonium and saz are usually seen as typically ‘Balkan,’ as well as ¾ beat and the use of the quartetone special key signatures. The later also leads to the perception that the intonation is not clean, since ‘Balkan music’ should somehow sound ‘dirty’ and ‘natural,’ as one of the interviewed musicians puts it: “… it’s not that important, whether the instrument is ‘correctly’ tuned, or better said, differently tuned …, it’s just different than in a classical orchestra.”

‘Balkan music’ thus transports a specific connotation of ethnicity: The existence of a particular ‘Balkan’ mentality is suggested, which supposedly stands for a positive attitude towards life, cheerfulness, savagery and a slice of craziness. Especially musical styles which use Serbian brass and a catchy chorus are perceived as very moving and cheerful.
Entertaining is mostly seen as the musician’s task: “they are supposed to make everyone dance — from the 3-year-old to the 103-year-old ...” ‘Balkan music,’ as it is seen here, is party music (neither the bottle of Vodka nor the dance floor are ever very far away).

Far less room is given to other aspects of traditional Balkan music in the perception of Western recipients. An interviewed musician, whose music doesn’t fit in this image, describes her experience in the following way: “Some of them just want to hear Serbian brass and they say ‘that’s not ‘Balkan music,’ so let’s just go.’ I had people in the audience who left the concert, because that’s really not what I do.”

The attributions of meaning to ‘Balkan music’ constructed by the agents in the field are thus mainly positively poled. Associated to this observation is the fascination exerted by the ‘Other,’ the foreign and exotic on the Western audience. This exoticism can be seen as a general need of ‘otherness,’ a thought that is also reflected in interviews, as the musicians and organisers draw parallels to, e.g., the ‘Latino boom’ of the 1980s and 90s.

As stated before, ‘Balkan music’ appears as somehow authentic, whereas ethnicity plays an important role. Balkan musicians in general and Roma musicians in particular are perceived to have a natural approach to musical composition. This contradicts the actual origins of the musicians: Many of them are native in the Balkan region, but others come from, e.g., Germany or Austria. Balkan musicians are often perceived as emotional and naturally gifted in their musical practice, something which is inscribed in their personality in an essentialist way. As one of the interviewed musicians (with his hand on his heart) puts it: “Music is in their blood, it’s just somewhere inside of them.”

‘A spicy blend of Orient and Occident’ — hybridity

The hybrid plays a central role in what characterises ‘Balkan music.’ Hybridity should be seen rather as a discursive construction than an empirical fact. Music, as well as identity, is always already hybrid — musical styles, because they are neither static nor locally fixed, have always relied on interaction, borrowing from each other and influencing each other. So instead of seeing ‘Balkan music’ as a hybrid culture in its essence, it is important to consider which specific connotations and meanings are being created around the notion of hybridity. In ‘Balkan music,’ hybridity describes an ethnic mixture, more specifically, the mixture of the sounds of the ‘West’ and ‘Balkan.’ As one musician remarked, “it’s all about a healthy mixture of traditional and ‘new’ productions.” One might think that in underlining this aspect, the musical practice transcends categories of ethnicity and localisation, making them blur into one great cosmopolitan concept of identity. Still, when looking a little closer, it becomes obvious that the hybrid doesn’t replace the authentic — rather, both concepts rely on the same dichotomy of ‘East’ and ‘West,’ whereby the ‘East’ is equated with ‘tradition’ and the ‘West’ with ‘modernity.’ Hybridity operates within the concept of difference, for it’s only possible to mix something which is initially perceived as separated.

How does this notion of hybridity itself show in the case of ‘Balkan music?’ To start with, the hybrid becomes obvious in the style of music. Musicians draw their musical inspirations from a whole range of musical styles, like Electronic, Dub, Jazz, Hip Hop, Club Sound, Rock, Ska or Punk. While these styles are labelled ‘modern’ and ‘Western,’ the music from the Balkans is seen as ‘traditional’ and ‘pre-modern.’ Artists consequently talk about how they ‘modernise’ these ‘traditional sounds.’ One way of doing so is by creating club remixes by taking musical samples, e.g., from traditional Serbian brass bands, and adding club beats, electrical guitars, synthesizer sounds or rap vocals. Hybridisation of traditional sounds is also achieved by collaborations between ‘Western’ and ‘Balkan’ musicians or the multicultural composition of bands. While some musicians emphasise the importance of these collaborations as far as intercultural dialogue is concerned, the specific modernisation of ‘Balkan sounds’ can also be seen as an adaptation to the expectations of the Western audience. The mixture is intended to preserve the exotic character of ‘Balkan music,’ while at the same time making it sound more familiar to ‘Western’ musical patterns, e.g., by
adapting the rhythm to $\frac{3}{4}$ time, the most common time in pop music (whereas traditional 'Balkan music' usually encompasses different and more complex time systems).

The importance of hybridity also becomes apparent through the self-definition and stylistic self-location of the musicians, who aim to transcend all and every musical genre classification they can. The interviewed artists emphasised their dislike of labels like ‘world music’ and ‘Balkan music,’ because by being put into one single category they feel reduced in their freedom of musical expression. This leads to the creation of a whole range of stylistic self-definitions like e.g., ‘Balkan Beats,’ ‘Oriental Dub,’ ‘Urban Gypsy,’ ‘Balkan Dub’ or ‘Polka Punk.’ What we observe is that all these terms rely on the combination of ethnic and geographical categories (like ‘Balkan,’ ‘Oriental’ or ‘Gypsy’) on the one hand and musical expressions that symbolise modernisation and hybridity on the other (e.g., ‘urban,’ ‘beats,’ ‘grooves,’ ‘styles’). One artist describes the meaning of his stylistic self-definition as ‘Urban Gypsy:’ “‘Gypsy’ stands for the roots, … it is the traditional part. The ‘new,’ the ‘urban’ stands for the club sound, for that which moves me and which I find suitable as a means of communication.” We can thus see how the image of hybridity as the juxtaposition of traditional and modern, of ‘Western’ and ‘Balkan,’ is being constructed and sustained by the artists themselves.

Finally, hybridity is also a term that reflects the concepts of identity prevalent in the scene: Musicians are cosmopolitan, bands are often composed of members of different ethnic communities, and the audience celebrates the notion of hybridity and the transcendence of cultural and ethnic borders. The hybrid has become the ‘trademark’ for ‘Balkan music,’ it is used to promote bands and events by emphasising their ‘cosmopolitan’ openness in press releases and band descriptions. But what about the audience, which is largely composed of ‘indigenous’ Austrians with a special interest for other cultures? Their consumption of ‘Balkan music’ can be seen as the reflection of the post modern desire to blur borders and generate new, hybrid global concepts of identity. However, they certainly are aware that they themselves are neither ‘Balkan’ nor ‘cosmopolitan’ (nor do they aim to become it). In taking part in the musical interaction, they are able to adopt the ideas which are being symbolised by this musical practice, and integrate these ideas into their concepts of identity (see also Frith 2007: 123). The aesthetics of ‘Balkan music’ enables them to imagine how hybrid identity could be lived.

**Multiculturalism—is ‘Balkan music’ political?**

‘Balkan music’ is often referred to as a potential means of initiating intercultural dialogue promoting the ideas of multiculturalism, anti-racism and the empowerment of ethnic minority groups. Musicians often see themselves as ‘ambassadors’ of their cultures of origin, trying to raise awareness about cultural diversity. Sometimes, musical activity is closely connected to political activism for minority rights, as it is the case with some artists’ support of fund raising and charity events or political mobilisation campaigns. These activities have to be seen in the broader context of the migration/integration debate in Austria, when immigrants with a cultural background from the Balkan region, e.g., migrants, foreigners or ethnic minorities, often find themselves marginalised by politics, legal frameworks and public discourses (Reitsamer 2008: 80).

Many artists and event organisers regard their personal participation with ‘Balkan music’ as a progressive social force to fight existing forms of discrimination. The manager of Vienna’s most famous ‘Balkan’ club ost klub, states in an interview: “We are often praised by private and public institutions because we are an example for lived integration.” Even though the music itself doesn’t necessarily contain political messages, the fact that it evolved out of a marginalised community makes it political. It comes to symbolise the opposition and critique of everyday racist practices by the Austrian public and in politics.

This seems logical at first, and promoting diversity and multiculturalism looks like a good and noble idea. However, the danger lies in the implication that ‘ethnic’ music automatically means progressive-
ness. Ethnic categories are not being questioned by this process, they continue to exist, only with reversed signs: While ethnic minorities are perceived as negative, e.g., lazy, dirty or backwards by the dominant discourse, they now appear to be essentially positive, exciting and exotic. This not only reduces members of an ethnic group to a certain stereotype, it also creates an attitude of expectation towards them: They are expected to symbolise the essence of resistance, anti-Western-ness and exoticism, whether they like it or not. One interviewee satirically imitates this attitude of ‘Balkan music’ lovers towards ‘Balkan people:’ “Do act as a ‘Balkanian,’ if we don’t spit at you and discriminate you like the majority population. If we protect you and stroke you, then please go and play that tuba!”

Another difficulty arises when ‘Balkan music’ — and ‘world music’ in general — is being used by political agents to demonstrate openness and tolerance, for example, inviting musicians to play at political events or public campaigns. As Reitsamer remarks, “the promotion of ‘integration’ and ‘intercultural dialogue’ is accompanied the unwillingness to change anything about the legal and social exclusion of foreigners on the other.” (see Reitsamer 2008: 80) Slavko Ninić, lead singer of the ‘Wiener Tschuschenkapelle,’ states that he is well aware of the hypocrisy at play, but his band still uses the opportunity to present themselves at political events to show their own idea of what equality and intercultural dialogue could mean (see Ninić [Interview by Jürgen Sander]).

In our research we are not trying to find an answer to the question whether ‘Balkan music’ can be described as a critical and progressive counter-hegemonic force or as a type of perpetuation of existing stereotypes. Rather than judging what ‘Balkan music’ is, which would only create another stereotype, we want to focus on what ‘Balkan music’ wants to be: ‘Balkan music,’ in our opinion, aims to create narratives and imaginations of ‘anti-racism,’ ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘intercultural dialogues.’ By practicing ‘Balkan music,’ the musicians as well as the audience articulate their viewpoint of what ‘multicultural’ could mean, how intercultural dialogue could work and what they associate with anti-racism. Therefore, ‘Balkan music’ serves as a platform to create a socio-political multicultural utopia. However, celebrating multiculturalism doesn’t necessarily imply cross-cultural mixing, since many of the ex-Yugoslavian diaspora don’t frequent ‘world music’ events, and neither do Austrians frequent ‘Turbo-Folk’ discos.

**Conclusions**

We find that through the use of a certain style of music, narratives of belonging and identity are being created, giving meaning to the social reality. The agents of the Viennese ‘Balkan music’ scene construct their identity in the process of making, promoting and consuming music. As we have seen, this identity largely relies on the discoursive categories of ethnic authenticity, hybridity and multiculturalism.

We have shown how and why Western recipients identify with a style of music that has its origins in the mystical and exotic Balkan region. Some aspects seem to involve a certain kind of cultural imperialism, promoting stereotypes of Balkan people and their musical traditions. These stereotypes are mostly positively drawn, e.g., Balkan people being cheerful and down-to-earth, always eager to party. Yet, they operate within the same practice of ‘othering,’ reducing the Balkan to a semantic difference category of Western societies. They are the counterparts of the already existing negative Balkan stereotypes and appear to be the reflection of a certain longing for otherness and exoticism in Western societies.

However, this interpretation should not lead to a static image of a ‘one way’ construction of meaning. Rather we understand musical practices as dialectic negotiation processes. The musical practices and the identity concepts that they reflect are an expression of social structures which in turn have impact on them. Like identity construction in general, these processes are also composed of contradicting voices within the same discourse. Stereotypes regarding the musical expressions are often parodied by the artists themselves. They are aware of the process explained before and take an active role in the production.
of meaning. Furthermore, as Hall remarks, identity as well as meaning is always to be thought of as polisemic: There is not just one but many ways to decode them.

References


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